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Introduction 
On 1 July 1978, Northern Territorians celebrated the attain-
ment of responsible self-government. This represented the 
culmination of a long campaign waged by a succession of 
vocal Territorians who were concerned at the lack of a 
responsible political forum in the Territory. Throughout 
most of the twentieth century. Northern Territorians had 
complained about some form of political discrimination. 
When the Territory had been transferred from the ad-
ministration of South Australia to that of the Com-
monwealth on 1 January 1911, Territorians lost their 
representation in the South Australian parHament and also 
their voice in the national parUament. Thus, the campaign for 
federal representation and a measure of self-government 
brooked large in the history of the Northern Territory from 
1911 to June 1978. This same period also witnessed the 
parallel efforts of Aborigines and many concerned whites to 
eradicate the discrimination and prejudice which existed 
against Aborigines in the Territory. Indeed, a great deal hap-
pened during this period which had imphcations for 
Austrahans in general, not simply Territorians. All 
Australians were concerned with the bombing of Darwin in 
1942; all Australian's have an interest, in some manner, in 
uranium mining in the Territory. What follows is an account 
of the history of the Northern Territory from 1 January 1911 
to 1 July 1978, showing the manner in which features of the 
Territory's history related one to another, as well as to major 
features of Australian and world history. 
In many respects, the history of this period is similar to 
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that from 1863 to 1910, when the Territory was the respon-
sibility of the South Australian government. Like South 
Australia, the Commonwealth took on the responsibility of 
this vast territory, although it had only a fledgling 
bureaucracy unprepared for the challenge. In both instances, 
early ill-informed measures dogged successive administra-
tions. 
Like South Australia, the Commonwealth was determined 
first of all to ensure the economic prosperity of the region 
and its European inhabitants. However, for the most part, its 
initiatives failed as completely as those of the South 
Australians, and the Territory became a drain on the 
treasury, and was the bane of successive ministers and 
governments. 
The major theme running through this account is the cons-
tant gulf between "perception" and "reality". As in the nine-
teenth century, so in the twentieth, contemporaries continued 
to perceive the Northern Territory as "A Land Full of 
Possibilities" — of economic and social development. 
Policies and plans were devised in accordance with this 
perception, only to be stillborn because of the difficulties 
associated with actual geographic and social factors in the 
Territory. After World War II, continued developments in 
transport and communications technology helped to break 
down the isolation of inland communities, and the provision 
of services and amenities similar to those provided in the 
rnajor population centres made life in the inland more attrac-
tive. So too, international conventions, and an increasing 
awareness amongst Australians, engendered increased 
frustration and concern at the state of black/white relations 
in the Territory. However, governments had little control 
over these developments, nor had they been directly concern-
ed about such quality of life issues, because their political sur-
vival was determined by the number of quantifiable 
developments which were successful. Few ministers scored 
political points from the Northern Territory, despite the 
many attempts to do so. 
As in my history of the South Australian period, that 
which follows is concerned primarily with the record of 
government administration in the Territory. Foremost, it is 
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intended as an overview of an extended period, providing a 
framework to serve as a reference for other features of Ter-
ritory and Australian history. Indeed, many of these features 
warrant extended and detailed study: they are touched upon 
here in so far as they are associated with government policy, 
or because they are necessary to explain this. There is an in-
creasing body of work concerned with aspects of the Ter-
ritory's history; however, there remains a great deal to be 
written. Much of this lies outside the scope of this record, and 
much is dependent upon access to recent documents and the 
records of key witnesses which are not yet readily available. 
Many people have facilitated the research which was 
necessary for this history. In Darwin they include Mr Harry 
Giese and Mrs Helen Wilson of the History Unit of the Nor-
thern Territory Department of the Chief Minister, Dr Alan 
Powell of the Darwin Community College, Mr Ian 
Sutherland of the Commonwealth Archives, and the staff of 
the North Australia Research Unit. Professor Peter Lawrence 
of the Anthropology Department of the University of Sydney 
graciously provided access to the Elkin Papers at the Univer-
sity. Several others who had played active roles in the history 
which is here recorded, also granted me interviews, for which 
I am indebted: they include the Messrs J. Nelson and S. 
Calder in the Northern Territory, and F. Wise and F. Chaney 
in Western Australia. For the help afforded by these and any 
others inadvertently omitted, I am very grateful. I wish to 
acknowledge the National Library of Australia for permis-
sion granted to reproduce illustrative material in this book. 
I am most grateful to the Northern Territory government 
which provided the History Award which made the research 
and writing of this history possible, and to June Donovan 
who, once again, has undertaken the typing. 
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A New Beginning 
1911 
In accordance with the provisions of the Northern Territory 
Acceptance Act (1910), the Commonwealth government 
assumed control of the Northern Territory on 1 January 
1911, after it had been part of South Australia for forty-eight 
years. Unfortunately, for the apparently auspicious occasion, 
this was a Sunday. Thus, it was not until the following day 
that the transfer was duly celebrated with a brief ceremony 
outside the Government Residency at Palmerston. His 
Honour, Mr Justice Mitchell, the Government Resident, read 
the formal proclamation, after which Mrs Mitchell hoisted 
the Commonwealth flag beneath the Union Jack, "and its 
accomplishment was signaHsed by the Palmerston Orchestral 
Band, stationed at a corner of one of the Residency veran-
dahs, playing the National Anthem, all present joining, with 
bared heads, in singing the first verse".' Mr Justice Mitchell 
then delivered an appropriate address. 
To those present, to those who had lived in the Territory, 
and to others who were concerned with its development, the 
occasion once more stirred feelings of hope.^ Forty-eight 
years earlier, permanent European settlement had been made 
at Port Darwin. Settlement had extended into the hinterland, 
first with the discovery of gold, then more surely with the 
pastoral penetration from Queensland, and South Australia 
proper. Successive South Australian governments had pro-
moted and encouraged all manner of schemes to stimulate 
economic enterprise in the region^ — for example, the 
Overland Telegraph had been built soon after Palmerston 
had been estabhshed. Later, a railway was constructed south 
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from Palmerston to the goldfields - in the hope that it might 
become the northern-most Unk in a great transcontinental 
railway. However, all the South Australian efforts went for 
nought.'* For the last twenty years of South AustraUan 
administration, the Territory's embryonic economy was stag-
nant, though the public debt on the Territory constantly in-
creased - it stood at £3,931,085/17/0 on 31 Deceniber 
1910.5 The change in government promised a new beginning. 
The Fisher Labor government, which became the first of 
the Territory's federal "trustees", was eager to succeed with 
plans to develop the Territory and to make it a profitable 
field of investment. It was Fisher's single-mindedness that 
had paved the way for the transfer of the Territory after the 
prolonged, but indecisive, negotiations between the South 
Australian and federal governments, which had begun as 
early as 1901. None of the federal politicians had been oppos-
ed to the principle of the Commonwealth assuming control of 
the Territory,* but some from Queensland and New South 
Wales had been concerned about the South Australian insist-
ence on the condition that the north/south transcontinental 
railway be constructed solely within the Northern Territory 
and South Australia. These politicians had argued that the 
Territory's interests — and that of their own states — would 
be better served if the railway deviated to the east. However, 
once the issue had been settled, and the transfer effected, it 
was agreed by all the political parties that the development of 
the Territory should proceed as a national responsibility, and 
with a minimum of delay.^ At the time, too, the Australian 
economy was buoyant, and the Fisher Labor government was 
still infused with an ideaUsm and the conviction that "the 
Labour programme served humanity and the national interest 
alike".» In addition, the government believed that it had the 
support of influential groups outside parliament, the Ter-
ritory and South Australia, which would support any in-
itiatives designed to prosper the new Commonwealth 
dependency. In November 1901, a deputation from the 
Australian Natives Association waited upon the Minister 
responsible for the Territory to urge the government to "push 
on as far as possible with the proper development of the Nor-
thern Territory" for in this matter it "could not move too 
fast". 9 
Chinatown, Darwin, 1911. (NLA) 
The Commonwealth faced a daunting task. By 1911, there 
was little to show for the determined South Australian efforts 
to develop the Northern Territory. In 1907, the value of all 
buildings in the Territory, both public and private, was 
estimated to be only £44,870.'° The total non-Aboriginal 
population in the Territory at the time of the census in April 
1911 was 3,310,'' about half of whom lived in and about 
Darwin. Of those resident in Darwin, only 374 were Euro-
pean,'^ There were few other centres of significance in the 
Territory at the time. Pine Creek, which had long been the 
centre of the Territory's premier goldfield, and the southern 
terminus of the North Australian Railway, boasted a popula-
tion of only 284. The total European population of central 
Australia numbered 272, with only 138 being resident in the 
Alice Springs census region. For the rest, the European 
population was spread about the numerous pastoral stations 
and the far-flung mining fields at Arltunga, Tanami, and the 
district about Pine Creek. 
Despite efforts of governments to maintain Australia's 
White Australia Policy, Darwin remained a cosmopolitan 
town — perhaps the most racially-mixed town in Australia at 
the time. It remained so for the entire period during which the 
Commonwealth maintained close control over the Territory. 
4 At the Other End of Australia 
Table 1 Census Figures for Darwin within an 8-kilometre Radius, 3 April 1911 
Nationality Males Females Total 
European 
Japanese 
Filipinos 
Half-caste Filipinos 
Aborigines 
Half-caste Aborigines 
Chinese 
Half-caste Chinese 
Malays 
Javanese 
Siamese 
Cingalese 
South Sea Islanders 
Half-caste Samoan 
Eurasian 
Fijians 
Zanzibar Negroes 
224 
77 
52 
13 
145 
30 
364 
4 
21 
49 
4 
5 
5 
— 
1 
2 
2 
150 
4 
8 
8 
102 
28 
78 
— 
3 
— 
— 
— 
— 
1 
— 
— 
— 
374 
81 
60 
21 
247 
58 
442 
4 
24 
49 
4 
5 
5 
1 
1 
2 
2 
998 382 1,380 
Source: Al , 11/16191, AAC. 
One of the chief reasons why South Australians sought 
control of the Northern Territory in 1863 had been that they 
believed that plantation agriculture would thrive there. Thus, 
it was this industry which received probably the most active 
encouragement from successive governments — yet it was 
one which responded least to the many initiatives.'^ By 1911, 
the only agricultural successes had been recorded by Maurice 
and Nicholas Holtze at the Botanic Gardens, and several 
Chinese market gardeners about Palmerston and the 
goldfields. 
The pastoral industry which, in 1863, had been expected to 
be the other major Territory industry and the backbone of 
economic development in the interior, had at least survived; 
indeed, it led a modest recovery in Territory export earnings 
during the early twentieth century.''' Pastoralism had been 
established in central Australia after the mid seventies as an 
extension of the South Australian pastoral frontier: in the 
Top End it had been founded principally by Queenslanders. 
This industry had been characterized by some speculative 
booms, but little substantial development. Throughout the 
Territory, the development of the industry was hampered by 
the vagaries of the seasons, and during the nineties, by the 
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outbreak of disease known as Red water. At all times, it was 
handicapped by the lack of markets. For a time, from 1891 to 
1897, efforts were made to export live cattle through Port 
Darwin to markets in South East Asia. Later, after quaran-
tine restrictions were lifted in 1900, the turnoff was able to be 
over landed to the eastern states via Camooweal, to Western 
Australia via the Victoria River, or to South Australia via 
Charlotte Waters." By 1911, there was some cause for 
optimism, at least among Top End pastoraUsts. The modest 
pastoral recovery after 1900 had induced the British-based 
Bovril Australian Estates Ltd., to purchase the Victoria River 
Downs Station in 1909, together with Carlton Hill and Napier 
Stations in Western Australia. At the same time, the com-
pany had released plans for a meat-processing works at either 
Wyndham or Port Darwin.'* 
The mining industry, which had been characterized by a 
speculative gold boom in the eighteen seventies, and another 
in the last years of the nineteenth century, had been the Ter-
ritory's major export earner during the nineteenth century, 
but it was in a period of continued decline at the time of the 
transfer.'^ This was due directly to the steady fall in the 
number of Chinese miners on the fields after the passage of 
the Chinese Restriction Act of 1888, and was hastened by the 
speculative plunge in the years after 1896. 
The pearUng industry had been a steady export earner dur-
ing the latter decades of the South AustraUan period, 
although it received Uttle support from governments, prin-
cipally because it employed so few Europeans. In 1911, there 
were thirty-three boats and 146 men employed in the pearling 
and trepanging industries, but only five of these men were 
Europeans.'* 
One of the few capital works taken over by the Com-
monwealth in 1911 was the North Australian Railway. At the 
time of the transfer, the Commonwealth agreed to pay South 
AustraUa £3,144,869 to cover the expense of the jetty at Port 
Darwin and the North AustraUan Railway. This latter was a 
narrow-gauge railway running south from Palmerston to 
Pine Creek, 233 kilometres distant. It had been completed in 
1889 to serve the goldfields about Pine Creek, and, as many 
South AustraUans had hoped, to form the northern-most 
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part of a transcontinental railway." It had returned a slight 
operating profit in the years from 1890 to 1895, but at no 
time did it make sufficient profit to cover loan interest 
payments.20 It could not do otherwise, given the decline in 
gold mining, and the fact that it did not extend sufficiently 
far enough to the south to tap the pastoral region about the 
Katherine River. 
Although the enabling legislation was passed late in 1910 
after several years of negotiation, the actual transfer of the 
administration was achieved with a minimum of dislocation: 
though it might be said that there was little to be dislocated. 
On 1 January 1911, responsibility for the Northern Territory 
was assumed by E.L. Batchelor, the Minister of External 
Affairs in the Fisher government. This seemed appropriate, 
because he was already responsible for the Territory of 
Papua, and it was assumed that problems of administration 
would be similar. All Northern Territory records in Adelaide 
were removed to Melbourne, together with the few officers 
who were responsible for them, and others from the Lands 
Survey Department who wished to transfer to the Com-
monwealth. 2' They commenced duties under their new 
Minister on 9 January. F. Benda, who had been in charge of 
the Adelaide office, kept this open for two months for the 
finalization of any outstanding business before moving to 
Melbourne.22 Mr Justice MitcheU continued in his role as 
Government Resident, and other members of the Northern 
Territory administration continued in their respective posts, 
and were permitted to do so permanently if they so wished. 
Those who preferred to remain in the South Australian civil 
service were given until 30 June 1911 to apply for the 
necessary transfer." The Commonwealth's assumption of 
control of the North Australian Railway and the Port 
Augusta to Oodnadatta railway added a totally new area of 
responsibility to the Commonwealth civil service, which until 
this time had primarily been concerned with implementing 
matters of policy. The immediate solution, however, was 
simply to enter into an agreement with the South Australian 
government, whereby the state continued to operate the 
'nr^Zl - 7 ' """"'^i - '^^ ''^'^ b^^""g the cost of all 
ordinary maintenance and, in return, receiving the whole of 
the revenue derived from the railways." 
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Under the terms of the Northern Territory Acceptance Act 
(1910), all of the South Australian laws which applied in the 
Northern Territory before the transfer, were to remain in 
force afterwards. Indeed, for the most part, it was business as 
usual in the Territory, with few apparent changes from the 
earlier situation. In one important respect, however, there 
was a change — Northern Territorians were disenfranchised. 
Prior to 1911, Territorians were able to elect representatives 
to the South Australian House of Assembly, and they were 
able to cast votes for representatives in the state's upper 
house, and in the federal parliament. They lost any 
parUamentary voice in 1911 .^ ^ This was a matter of little con-
cern to members of the government,2* — and for most Ter-
ritorians. However, those, Uke the members of the North 
Australian League, who were concerned with the develop-
ment of the Territory, saw it as a matter for early reform, and 
Melbourne members of the League lobbied the federal 
minister accordingly.2^ Later, the Northern Territory Times 
criticized the government for its tardiness in providing for 
Territory representation in the federal parUament, pointing 
out that it had been a long-estabUshed principle of British 
justice that "taxation without representation is nothing more 
nor less than poUtical robbery".2* It is doubtful that this 
disenfranchisement meant much to the majority of Ter-
ritorians — many of whom were itinerants and aUens — but 
from time to time, it was to be seized upon by many of the 
local minorities, who had cause for grievance against the 
government, and sought something with which to criticize it. 
The campaign of Territorians for first, a voice in, then an in-
creased measure of self-government, is one of the major 
themes in the history of the Territory from 1911 to 1978. 
In much the same way that celebrations marking the transfer 
of the Territory were postponed for a day, so finalization of 
the new administration, which was to usher in the new era, 
was delayed for the Territory while the current situation was 
assessed. For those in the Territory, 1911 was a year much 
like those immediately before: as Baldwin Spencer remarked 
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in AprU 1912, "things have more or less drifted on in the same 
old groove for years".2' However, there was at least the ex-
pectation that grand things were happening, or were about to 
happen. Indeed, on many occasions in subsequent years, 
simUar strategies were to be used to give the impression of 
industry. On 3 March 1911, the name of the capital was 
changed from Palmerston to Darwin.^o Later, when Justice 
MitcheU was summoned to Melbourne early in the year for 
talks with the Minister, the position of Government Resident 
was abolished, and Mitchell was made Acting Administrator, 
until such time as an Administrator was appointed.^' Then, 
on 15 May, W.S. CampbeU arrived in Darwin, the first of 
several experts who were retained by the Commonwealth 
government to examine the Territory, its industries and its 
administration, and to report on means whereby these might 
be improved. This thorough-going review was to form the 
basis for the Commonwealth's policies for Territory develop-
ment. Campbell was formerly the Director of Agriculture in 
New South Wales. It was his task to "advise the Minister as to 
the sites suitable for experimental areas on which to test the 
agricultural possibilities of the Territory"," although it had 
been amply demonstrated during the South Australian period 
that agriculture, while being possible, was not an economic 
proposition. However, he entered upon his task with such 
"energy and resourcefulness" that MitcheU claimed that "He 
revived the flagging hopes of the half-dozen people who were 
engaged in agriculture."^^ On 16 June, Campbell was joined 
by other members of "the Scientific Party"^ "* Professor 
Baldwin Spencer, the Professor of Biology at the University 
of Melbourne and a noted anthropologist, whose brief was to 
study the Aborigines; Professor J. A. Gilruth, a veterinarian, 
and also from the University of Melbourne, who was to study 
aspects of the pastoral industry; Dr W.G. Woolnough, who 
was charged with yet another geological examination of the 
Top End; while Dr A. Breinl, the Director of the Australian 
Institute of Tropical Medicine, was to report upon the 
healthiness of the region for Europeans. Thus began a period 
of intensive study of the Top End. During the next five years, 
others followed "the Scientific Party", and numerous expert 
scientific reports were added to the store of knowledge about 
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the Territory.'^ However, it seems that most of these simply 
embodied observations of the Territory at that time, and took 
little cognizance of the many scientific reports written earUer, 
or the hard experience gained while the Northern Territory 
was part of South Australia. There is no denying the 
expressions of enthusiasm and earnestness of the federal 
government to encourage the economic development and 
settlement of the Territory, but this promoted an overcon-
fidence which disparaged the earUer efforts of South 
AustraUans in the Territory. Indeed, it seems that the Com-
monwealth authorities learnt nothing from the South 
AustraUan experience. Their insistence upon promoting close 
settlement in the Top End which was to be based upon an 
agricultural industry, was precisely the policy of the South 
Australian government forty-eight years previously. In 1863, 
however. South Australians believed that this might be 
achieved with the aid of cheap labour from South East Asia 
after the manner of other European colonies which were 
founded at the time: the Commonwealth's White Australia 
PoUcy precluded this form of labour as an aid to settlement in 
1911. By disregarding the South Australian experience in the 
Territory, the Commonwealth needlessly created problems 
for itself. 
The task assumed by South Australians in 1863, of ex-
ploiting the vast Northern Territory, had been a gigantic one 
— too great for a colony of limited resources — but the day-
to-day administration of the dependency had been further 
complicated by accidental factors such as the rapid turnover 
of ministers who were responsible for Territory affairs. 
During forty-eight years, thirty-four different men were res-
ponsible for the Territory — several of them on a number of 
separate occasions.^* The Commonwealth record in this 
matter was to differ little from that of South AustraUa: and 
once again, the pattern was set in 1911. E.L. Batchelor was 
the first Commonwealth Minister responsible for Territory 
affairs.^' He was a South Australian. He trained as a teacher, 
but later became an engineer in the South AustraUan 
railways: his rise through the ranks to the position of 
foreman mirrored his rise in the Labor movement. He might 
have been good for the Territory at this time. Before entering 
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the federal parUament in 1901, he had been a member of the 
South Australian parliament since 1893, and a Minister for 
Education and AgricuUure, and could be expected to be 
familiar with the Territory and its problems; he had visited 
the region, and had shown an interest in it during the many 
parliamentary debates concerning the transfer. However, he 
died unexpectedly in October 1911, after having been absent 
from Australia for several months attending the coronation 
of George V, and the subsequent Imperial Conference. 
Although Batchelor had been effectively in charge of the 
Northern Territory for only a few months, his death 
necessarily made for some "confusion and delay" in for-
mulating government poUcy for the Territory.^* Batchelor's 
portfoUo passed to Josiah Thomas, a New South Welshman, 
who had been a miner at Broken Hill before representing that 
area in the New South Wales Legislative Assembly in 1894. 
His early instruction to have MitcheU "make substantial 
reductions in railway rates to encourage agriculturists along 
the Une", met with general acclaim,^' and reinforced op-
timistic expectations for the future. However, though he was 
Minister for twenty months, untU 24 June 1913, he left little 
mark on the Territory. 
If the actual mechanics of the transfer caused little disloca-
tion in the administration, the later "confusion and delay" in 
implementing the government's poUcy certainly did so. An 
Administrator, J.A. Gilruth, was not appointed untU 25 
March 1912. In the meantime, Mr Justice MitcheU, who, as 
South Australian Government Resident had presided over a 
smaU, but sufficient public service in a region long reconciled 
with depression, was expected to oversee many new initiatives 
of the federal government, although he had not the fuU con-
fidence of the authorities in Melbourne.''" This was 
demonstrated in August 1911 when the Acting Minister at the 
time. Senator Findlay, publicly repudiated an undertaking 
given by Mitchell to assist prospectors in the Territory."' 
Spencer later commented that "the general feeling here is that 
he [Mitchell] met with very scant courtesy, and he felt very 
keenly that he had been much humiUated".''2 in September 
1911, critics of the government in Darwin, claimed "that 
matters were never quite so chaotic under the State as they are 
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at present".''^ Europeans were particularly dissatisfied at 
delays in "the lands business and lands office records","'' 
whUe the government's first concern was to strengthen the 
numbers of the northern administration. Given this criticism 
and subsequent history, it is interesting that the first appoint-
ments were made to a department which was concerned with 
Aboriginal affairs. Dr Herbert Basedow"^ was appointed 
Chief Protector of Aborigines and Chief Medical Officer 
early in April 1911. Basedow was well qualified for the posi-
tion. He was born in South Australia, and trained as a 
geologist at the University of Adelaide, In this capacity, he 
made several expeditions into remote areas, including the 
1903 South Australian Government North West Prospecting 
Expedition, He used the opportunity to study the Aborigines, 
and subsequently pubUshed his anthropological studies. In 
1907, he traveUed to Germany to study both medicine and 
anthropology. On his return to Adelaide in 1910, he was 
appointed Assistant Government Geologist and Government 
Medical Officer for the remote areas. To support Basedow in 
the Northern Territory, there were appointed two Medical 
Inspectors Drs Holmes and Burston, and two Travelling In-
spectors, J.T. Beckett and J.H. Kelly."* They, together with 
J.C. Lewis, newly-appointed Stock Inspector, and H.V. 
Francis, the Railway Superintendent, arrived in Darwin on 17 
July."'' Basedow was also appointed a member of the Admin-
istrator's six-member Council of Advice."* But late in 
August, amidst general surprise, he resigned his appoint-
ments,"' and on 30 August took ship for the south. Basedow 
claimed that the principal reason for his resignation lay in the 
fact that the authorities in Melbourne changed the conditions 
of his employment after he had arrived in Darwin, by taking 
away aU responsibility for the administration of his depart-
ment, thus rendering him Uttle more than a clerk.'" It was to 
be a feature of the Territory's history in general, not simply 
that of Aboriginal affairs, that admirable sentiments and 
policies endorsed by successive governments lost much in the 
translation to practice. 
In 1911, there was certainly "the need for improvement in 
native affairs".'' During the South AustraUan period, 
authorities were guided by the contemporary belief that the 
12 At the Other End of Australia 
Aborigines were doomed to extinction. Their concern was to 
ensure that this took place without undue embarrassment to 
themselves, or any check to the European pioneers of the new 
Territory." This philosophy was impUcit in the designation 
of the local official responsible for the government policy on 
this matter, as the Chief Protector of Aborigines. In fact, he 
did little protecting. His most conspicuous task was normally 
the organization of the government's annual display of 
largesse towards the members of the tribes about Darwin. 
Thus, on the appointed day in May 1911, about two hundred 
Aborigines queued in front of the verandah at the Residency 
to receive their blue blanket, stick of tobacco and flour, "To 
kindly Miss MitcheU was allotted the privilege of handing the 
blankets and coveted tobacco to the long Une of recipients, 
and her bright face showed that the duty was a congenial and 
pleasant one,"" The official poUcy of protection was only as 
effective as the government's authority. Generally, in the 
frontier regions, force, and inevitably the Europeans, prevail-
ed. This was the state of affairs and the poUcy, embodied in 
the South Australian Aborigines Act (1910), which the Com-
monwealth inherited. 
In the matter of Aboriginal protection, as with its other 
Northern Territory responsibilities, the government im-
mediately took steps to demonstrate its earnestness. Early in 
1911, Professor Baldwin Spencer was appointed one of "the 
Scientific Party" to study the Aborigines in the Territory. 
However, his was to be simply an anthropological study with 
no explicit policy impUcations; it was to be Basedow and his 
staff who were to be responsible for implementing the South 
Australian act. This of course was frustrated by Basedow's 
resignation in August 1911. Ultimately, J.T. Beckett was ap-
pointed Chief Inspector to take charge of any clerical work, 
with Spencer being appointed for twelve months to advise on 
any necessary reform in Aboriginal affairs, and to carry out 
any administrative work of the Chief Protectorate.'" Im-
plementation of any new policy guideUnes was delayed until 
the following year, pending Spencer's release from his duties 
at the university where he had returned after his expedition in 
Throughout the South AustraUan period, missionaries had 
A New Beginning: 1911 13 
had little success in the Territory, and little or no effect on 
government policy or the relationship between blacks and 
whites. The Lutheran Mission on the Finke River in central 
Australia had been founded in 1877, and had at least surviv-
ed. Several unsuccessful attempts had been made to estabUsh 
missions in the Top End. However, in 1908, the Anglican 
Church Missionary Society founded a mission on the Roper 
River, and in 1911, Father Gsell, of the Roman Catholic 
Society of the Sacred Heart, established a mission on 
Bathurst Island. At this time, missions were left very much on 
their own resources, except for a small government subsidy. 
It was only much later that the encouragement of missions 
such as these, became part of government Aboriginal poUcy. 
Early in 1911, Darwin was a quiet little country town. Like 
any town of comparable size, it had its cliques, cabals and 
social barriers. These were delineated a Uttle more sharply in 
Darwin than elsewhere, because of the relatively high propor-
tion of aUens and civil servants, and its status as a capital 
"city", as well as it being the only port for the Territory. 
Several years later however, Darwin gained Australian and 
overseas notoriety for being a town dominated by extreme 
left-wing labour unions and officials. The seeds of this addi-
tional divisive element were sown in 1911, and encouraged by 
the reformist Fisher Labor government. Prior to 1911, there 
had been only an embryonic labour organization in Darwin 
which was largely concerned with political rather than in-
dustrial goals.'' Yet, despite the lack of industrial organiza-
tion, European wharf labourers called a strike for better pay 
in January 1911: they were encouraged in this by the govern-
ment's concern to implement the White AustraUa PoUcy, with 
its declaration that only European labour would be used on 
the wharf in future." They won their case. In December, the 
men struck again, to protest the employment of Chinese by a 
Darwin shipping agent. Two days before Christmas, the men 
met to form themselves into a properly constituted union." 
No doubt they were also encouraged in this by the govern-
ment's poUcy of giving preference to unionists throughout the 
federal civil service.'* This organization of Darwin labour 
was to bedevil successive federal governments, and com-
plicate the administration of the Territory. 
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In 1911, when the federal government assumed responsibility 
for the Northern Territory, it was determined to succeed 
where successive South AustraUan governments had failed. 
But the first years of the Commonwealth control of the Ter-
ritory only resulted in renewed failure, and a profligate waste 
of money which further condemned the Territory as a field 
for capitalist enterprise. A large part of this was due to the 
government's blindness to the hard-earned experience gained 
during the South AustraUan years. Though South Australian 
efforts to found agricultural communities in the Top End had 
failed, the Commonwealth attempted to have this as the 
cornerstone of its Territory initiatives. 
The year 1911 did not prove to be the momentous year that 
many Northern Territory apologists had hoped for. The deci-
sion to promote close settlement and agriculture in the Top 
End was as inappropriate then as it had been forty-eight years 
earlier. The refusal to be guided by the South Australian 
experience meant that needless costly mistakes were made. 
The tardiness in appointing officials created confusion that 
needed time and tactful officials to dissipate. And the deci-
sion to give preference to unionists for civil service employ-
ment in such a closed community as Darwin, where the civil 
service was the dominant industry, laid the foundation for 
the development of a power ceU other than the administra-
tion. Thus, while the year 1911 opened with the federal 
government commanding wide support for its Northern Ter-
ritory initiatives, it closed with some of this goodwUl having 
been eroded, yet with nothing achieved, and very little even 
attempted. 
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TWO 
A False Start and Disillusion 
1912 to 1920 
In 1912, the federal government took up its Northern Ter-
ritory responsibilities in earnest. Senior appointments were 
made to upgrade the administration, land regulations were 
altered in an endeavour to promote pastoral and agricultural 
development, and experimental farms were established to 
show the way for agricultural enterprise. Subsequently, the 
government encouraged the erection of a meatworks at Dar-
win, and undertook the extension of the northern railway to 
the Katherine River, so that pastoralists there might have 
easier access to the new market. The government also en-
couraged groups of immigrants to the Territory, first to work 
on the railway, and afterwards hopefully, to settle there. 
Like the earlier South Australian initiatives, those of the 
federal government failed to stimulate the long-hoped-for 
development: once more, there was a vast gulf between 
expectations and hard achievements. Retrenchments and 
administrative economies were implemented even before the 
outbreak of World War I. The war rendered additional ad-
justment necessary. By 1920, the agricultural lands were prac-
tically deserted, the experimental farms had failed, the meat-
works had closed, and the administration was held in such 
abhorence by powerful elements in Darwin that the Ad-
ministrator was recaUed, and his immediate successor and 
other senior officials were expeUed. The Northern Territory 
once more sank into despondency. 
The latest federal initiatives failed for essentially the same 
reasons as did those of the South Australian government. The 
manner of development which was encouraged was inap-
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propriate because of the time, conditions with the Territory, 
and the Hmited technology which was then available. Much 
has been written about labour militancy during the period; 
little has yet been written on the effects of World War I on 
the Territory. These brook large in the history of the Ter-
ritory during the time, but they had no real bearing on the 
outcome of the government's developmental initiatives. In a 
similar manner, the upheavals of federal politics after Labor's 
return to power in 1914, contributed to the confusion, ill-
feeling, and tension which prevailed in Darwin till 1920, but 
was otherwise accidental to events there: it permitted and en-
couraged the development of disruptive influences in Darwin 
rather than caused them. 
"Even the keenest critics of our Labour Government have 
had to approve the first important appointments to the new 
territory staff."' So wrote the Australian correspondent to 
the Round Table in April 1912. In particular, he referred to 
the appointment of Dr J.A. Gilruth to the position of 
Administrator on 25 March 1912, and that of Professor W. 
Baldwin Spencer as Special Commissioner. Gilruth had been 
a distinguished veterinary surgeon in the New Zealand civil 
service from 1893 to 1908, and subsequently the Foundation 
Professor of Veterinary Science at the University of 
Melbourne. Both he and Spencer had been members of the 
scientific party of the previous year, and thus, each came to 
his task with at least a partial appreciation of the Territory 
and its problems. Other senior appointments made at this 
time included George Ryland, former Labor MLA from 
Queensland, as Director of Lands, Dr H.I. Jensen as Director 
of Mines, and W.H. Clarke as Director of Agriculture, and 
D. J.D. Bevan from South AustraUa as Judge of the Northern 
Territory Supreme Court. Together with the earlier appoint-
ments to the Aboriginal Department, that of J.C. Lewis as 
Chief Stock Inspector and H.V. Francis as Railway 
Superintendent, this represented a thorough reorganization 
of the Territory administration. 
Despite the false hopes and delusions of 1911, in 1912, the 
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administration set about its task amidst universal expressions 
of goodwill. Mr Justice Mitchell had longed for the position 
of Administrator in the new dispensation, and felt disap-
pointed at having been passed over, but "the last words of the 
little judge who was really much devoted to the Territory 
were an exhortation to those who went to see him off to do aU 
they could to assist G.[Uruth] in his work".^ All sections of 
Darwin society seem to have taken this advice to heart and 
turned out to welcome Gilruth to Darwin on 16 April 1912.^  
In the matter of Aboriginal affairs, the new administration 
was well into its stride. The appointment of Basedow early in 
1911, demonstrated that the Fisher government was concern-
ed about the welfare of Northern Territory Aborigines. This 
same concern led to the appointment of Baldwin Spencer as 
Special Commissioner immediately after Basedow's sudden 
resignation in August 1911. Spencer's main task was to for-
mulate an Aboriginal policy for the government. That which 
he devised was to be one of protection, "to encourage the 
native to lead his own life on reserves and to control his 
employment by the licensing of employers, the fixing of a 
minimum wage . . . and by embodying conditions of employ-
ment in a written agreement"." It remained the government's 
official poUcy until the mid twenties. However, as had been 
demonstrated earUer, the effectiveness of any policy was only 
as good as that of the administration, and during the first 
decades of the Commonwealth's control over the Territory, 
this effectiveness rarely extended beyond the limits of 
Darwin. 
Early in 1912, Spencer wrote to Atlee Hunt, the Secretary 
of the Department of External Affairs, complaining that "the 
conditions in Darwin and the mining townships can only be 
described as appalling. The lubras are traded — quite wilUng-
ly so far as they are concerned in most cases — amongst 
Malays and Chinese."^ Thus, Spencer's Aboriginal policy was 
determined by a sense of revulsion at the apparent promis-
cuity of Aboriginal women and the concomitant miscegena-
tion. To Spencer, this could only be checked by prohibition 
and strict controls of the Aborigines. He continued, "No at-
tempt until now has been made to check the evil and our only 
plan is to clear all aboriginals out of the Asiatic quarter." 
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Thus, Chinatown was declared a prohibited ar^ ^^  for 
Aborigines "the best move that we have made so far . This 
concern to segregate the Aborigines from Europeans and 
others, and to regulate their entry into Darwin also prompted 
the removal of the Aboriginal camp from Lameroo beach, 
and the building of an Aboriginal compound at Kahlin 
beach, with a curfew being imposed on the inmates.^ This 
met with the approval of the whites.* 
Spencer's own moral code also prompted his attitude to 
half-caste children. Contrary to what Cook has said,' Spencer 
was of the belief that these children should be removed from 
native camps, though he was not convinced that they should 
be brought up as whites. The only suggestion he could make 
was that they should be brought up on mission stations. He 
favoured the establishment of an institution for half-castes, 
but believed that "it would tend to indicate the recognition by 
the Government of mixed marriages and, more especially, of 
irregular intercourse between the white and black races, both 
of which must be discountenanced as much as possible".'" 
Little effort was made to implement any poUcy concerning 
half-caste chUdren. 
Spencer was also concerned to establish the principle that 
the Aborigines should be paid in money for any work that 
they should perform." Hitherto, "the pubUc . . . have been 
accustomed to employ natives without restraint. In most 
cases a stick of tobacco and the scraps of the table would be 
sufficient payment for a day's work, . . ,",'^ However, 
though the principle of paying Aborigines with money work-
ed well enough where government departments were concern-
ed, because of Gilruth's insistence that it should, other 
employers were slow to comply,'^ and the government could 
bring to bear little pressure on these recalcitrants. 
While Spencer's influence was limited within Darwin, it 
was almost non-existent in the country regions. It is true that 
a number of Aboriginal reserves were proclaimed early in 
1912,"' but this had little effect on European/Aboriginal 
relations, Spencer recognized that Aboriginal labour was 
basic to the survival of the pastoral industry, and that it made 
"all the difference at the present time between working the 
station at a profit or a loss",'' but, using arguments that were 
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to be repeated during the following fifty years, he opined that 
it was "not expedient" to enforce wage payments, "The en-
forcement of payment of money to aboriginals on pastoral 
areas would, I am convinced, be a mistake at the present time 
and would result in hardship to numbers who are now in-
directly maintained by the stations, but who, in the event of 
payment by station-holders being insisted upon, would 
become a tax on the Government,"'* 
Except for the policy statement by the government, the 
reality of black/white relations in the Territory remained 
largely as they had grown up during a half century of contact 
and white exploitation, 
W,S, CampbeU said of Spencer that he "was very severely 
and adversely criticised by most of the people in Darwin". He 
added, "No one seems to have a good opinion of him and 
there is a concensus of opinion that he feathered his nest well 
and lost no opportunity of collecting tons of native 
implements and curios besides enjoying a huge fee."'^ This 
criticism seems a little harsh, but perhaps understandable 
given Darwin of 1912 and the influences at work there at the 
time. Indeed, it may have been his advocacy of wages for 
Aborigines which put him offside with many Darwin 
residents. Spencer was an academic rather than an ad-
ministrator. He was employed by the Commonwealth 
precisely so that he might advise on policy and administration 
of Aboriginal affairs in the Territory.'* It should not have 
been a surprise that he would continue with his an-
thropological work; certainly, people in the south expected 
him to do so," and undoubtedly, it was the possibility of 
being able to do this which attracted him to the position. 
Moreover, it cannot be denied that after Spencer's term in the 
Territory, there was a definite policy for the guidance of 
Aboriginal affairs where there had been none before.^" 
Spencer could not be criticized when, during 1914, W.G. 
Stretton the Chief Protector, was retrenched along with 
several other senior officers of the administration as an 
economy measure. Thereafter, there was little that could be 
done other than to keep "in existence the organisation laid 
down by Professor Spencer and Mr. Stretton".2' This holding 
operation continued until Dr Cecil Cook was appointed Chief 
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Medical Officer and Protector of Aborigines in 1927. The 
fact that matters continued for so long says more about the 
resolve of successive governments than the many statements 
of policy. 
Despite a measure of interest in the Aborigines, the govern-
ment was primarily concerned with the European settlement 
of the Territory "at the earUest possible date"." "This means 
agriculture",^' and it was for this reason that the government 
sought the expert advice of W.S. Campbell early in 1911. On 
Campbell's recommendation, the government estabUshed ex-
perimental demonstration farms on the Daly River, and adja-
cent to the railway line at Rum Jungle (Batchelor) — even 
before Gilruth arrived in the Territory, At the same time, 
prospective settlers were offered free farm blocks of from 150 
to 300 hectares on the Daly River, 
By mid 1912, however, the only evidence of the 
government's resolve to settle the north with white people, 
had been the rapid increase in the number of civil servants -
to that stage, twenty-one middle-to-senior appointments, five 
nurses, four police and a number of artisans and labourers,2'' 
But the government persisted in its efforts to promote settle-
ment in the Territory, It was for this reason that it welcomed 
enquiries about settlement in north Australia from Welsh 
settlers in Patagonia, Every facility was made available to R, 
Williams of Wellington, New Zealand, who acted as the 
agent of these aspiring settlers, when he toured the Territory 
during September 1912," Subsequently the report of his visit 
was printed as Bulletin of the Northern Territory, no. 9, and 
expenses to the value of £500 were paid so that he might visit 
Patagonia "on propaganda work in connection with the Nor-
thern Territory", 26 Ultimately, the government agreed to 
assist any of the Patagonians who wished to settle in the Ter-
ritory by advancing the cost of fares to Darwin — aU except 
£8 was to be repaid in accordance with an agreement," The 
outbreak of the world war threatened to jeopardize 
arrangements, but 220 of the immigrants finally arrived in 
Darwin. However, few were of Welsh descent; most were 
Spanish, some were Italians, Austrians or Rumanians.^8 StiU, 
the government welcomed them to the Territory where the 
adult males were offered employment on the railway which 
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was then under construction. The idea was that farming land 
would be set apart for them as soon as they were in a position 
to take it up.^' The whole scheme cost the government 
£2,358. 
Further evidence of the government's endeavour to have 
the Territory settled as quickly as possible, was its agreement 
to subsidize the fares of fifty Maltese labourers who were 
eager to work in the Territory.'" In this instance, it was the 
Cook conservative government that entered into the agree-
ment. The scheme, ad hoc though it had been, was discon-
tinued only after it became evident that Australians were 
eager to go to the Territory in search of work on the major 
construction projects begun during 1914. 
Given the government's emphasis on close settlement in the 
Territory, it is noteworthy that Gilruth should have cast 
doubt on the feasibility of this, very soon after he had entered 
upon his appointment. In terms which were very similar to 
those used by B. Davidson," Gilruth expressed doubt about 
the abiUty of any government "to over-stimulate the 
transference of agricultural settlers from the south to the 
north; or, in other words, the transference of people from a 
sparsely populated area of a comparatively empty continent 
to even a more sparsely populated".'^ 
Though GUruth was not responsible for the experimental 
agricultural farms which had been established before his 
arrival — indeed, he prevented the opening of a third which 
had been recommended by Campbell'' — he fostered other 
experiments which were designed to encourage development 
in the Territory. In 1913, a sheep station was established at 
Mataranka to test the feasibility of sheep farming.'" Subse-
quently, he encouraged the creation of a dairy at Fanny Bay 
with a small dairy herd imported from Queensland. Each of 
these experiments proved initially successful, but each faUed 
within the decade — basically because of the unsuitability of 
the Territory for such enterprise. 
The federal government also took steps to reinvigorate the 
cattle industry. First of aU, it abolished the system of annual 
permits for unoccupied pastoral lands which had prevaUed 
since 1901, when there was a possibility that the transcon-
tinental railway might be built. Then, by means of Ordinance 
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no. 3 of 1912, it "provided for the classification of pastoral 
lands, and for perpetual leasehold tenure subject to 
periodical reappraisement"." This was meant to encourage 
smaU lessees rather than absentee landowners, but it appealed 
to neither government supporters, nor opposition members in 
federal parUament. The government (Labor) supporters ob-
jected to the sizes of the permitted pastoral areas, opposition 
members found it unattractive in its agricultural provisions 
and too Uberal in the case of pastoral areas. Both sides ob-
jected to the reappraisement provisions, and "Ministers were 
reminded that the proper stand-point in approaching the sub-
ject was how to attract settlers; the case was not one of guar-
ding territory against a crowd of urgent claimants."'* In the 
event. Ordinance no. 3 was superseded by Ordinance no. 8 of 
1912, which repealed the perpetual leasehold provisions, and 
fixed terms of twenty-one years for Class 1 land, and forty-
two years for Classes 2 and 3: it provided for a board to be 
appointed to classify the pastoral lands of the Territory. In 
addition to the limits on pastoral leases, the maximum area 
tenable under the different classes was reduced, and a cove-
nant provided that lessees should fence their leases. Or-
dinance no. 8 of 1912 remained the basis for the administra-
tion of Northern Territory land untU 1924, although the fenc-
ing provision was repealed in 1918. However, because earlier 
leases granted under South Australian acts were also 
respected, there remained some confusion in tenure. The new 
initiative had no immediate benefit. AU the best pastoral 
lands had long been taken up, and there had been no 
developments to induce pastoralists to take up other marginal 
lands. 
However, there were some encouraging signs to contem-
poraries within the industry. In 1914, Vestey Brothers, the 
giant British-based meat producers, acquired Wave HiU 
Station adjacent to Victoria River Downs. Later, Vesteys 
acquired ManbuUoo so that it might have a holding station 
near the railway, while further to the north, it acquired Burn-
side and Marrakai to act as depot stations. By 1916, it had ex-
tended its holdings in the Top End to include 21,760 square 
kilometres of pastoral property. During this time, too, BovrU 
Australian Estates increased its holdings in the Territory. 
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These acquisitions offered the possibUity of more extensive 
developments in the industry. 
Railway works brooked large in the Northern Territory 
policy of the Fisher Labor government. Batchelor promised 
that his government would "construct other railways [besides 
the transcontinental railway] to open up the country — 
especially to give access to the regions capable of closer settle-
ment".'"' As a step towards the implementation of this, the 
Labor government appointed a Royal Commission on 28 
March 1913 to enquire into the state of development of the 
Territory, and to suggest the routes of any railways, and the 
siting of any ports which might encourage development. It 
was also required to make suggestions for the location of any 
future capital.'* The Cook conservative government, which 
succeeded that of Fisher on 24 June 1913, also deemed 
railway construction important for the development of the 
Territory. Patrick McMahon Glynn, the Territory's new 
Minister, had the commissioners abbreviate their work, but 
included their major recommendations in his "Outline of 
PoUcy for the Territory" on 18 June 1914." Indeed, before 
the commissioners had even submitted their final report, 
federal parliament had passed the Pine Creek to Katherine 
River Railway Act (1913) which authorized the extension of 
the northern railway to the Katherine River. 
The extension of the Palmerston to Pine Creek railway to 
the Katherine River was, for the Cook government, an im-
portant means of helping to secure a meatworks for Darwin. 
It had long been recognized that the lack of a local market for 
beef was a serious handicap to the Territory's pastoral in-
dustry. On occasions in the past, there had been talk of 
establishing a meatworks at Darwin, but nothing eventuated 
untU 1912, when the Fisher government explored the 
possibility of estabUshing a government-run meatworks 
there."" Then, a private company represented by a 
Queenslander named Frederick, expressed an interest in erec-
ting a meatworks in north Australia, and held discussions 
with government officials in Darwin about this. The govern-
ment persisted with its plans, even to the stage of sending 
C.A. D'Ebro, a Melbourne architect, to Darwin to prepare 
plans for the works. Almost immediately after, there was a 
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change in the federal government. The incoming conservative 
Cook government was committed to encourage private enter-
prise wherever possible,"' and abandoned the idea of a 
government-run works, deciding instead to negotiate with 
Frederick. It was not untU November 1913, that it became 
evident that Frederick was acting on behalf of Vestey 
Brothers. Negotiations dragged on untU 24 June 1914, before 
a final agreement was signed between Sir WilUam Vestey and 
the government. The major condition binding the company 
was that it should construct a meatworks costing at least 
£100,000 and to begin doing so before 1 May 1915: for its 
part, the government agreed, among other things, to proceed 
with the extension of the railway from Pine Creek to the 
Katherine River."^ 
Implementation of the agreement proceeded immediately. 
Construction of both the meatworks and the railway was 
severely hampered by the outbreak of war, and the conse-
quent problems and delays in obtaining necessary materials 
and skilled labour. However, work progressed despite the 
war, industrial disputes in Darwin, and political upheavals in 
Melbourne. The meatworks finally opened in April 1917 at a 
cost of more than £900,000 — three times that which had 
been planned. The construction of the railway extensions, 
eighty-eight kilometres from Pine Creek to the new railhead 
at Emungalan on the northern bank of the Katherine River, 
was completed without any undue problems other than those 
Railway Station, Emungalan, 1921. (NLA) 
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caused by the exigencies of the war. The work was controlled 
by the Engineer-in-Chief of the Commonwealth Railways. By 
March 1915, there were 250 men at work on the railway con-
struction; a little more than twelve months later the number 
rose to 600 — most of whom were migrants."' Indeed, it was 
for this purpose that the Cook government had been persuad-
ed to subsidize the passages of the Maltese labourers to 
Darwin. War-time shortages delayed the construction of the 
iron bridge over the Fergusson River, but by using a tem-
porary wooden structure, the railway was opened for traffic 
on 4 December 1917 at a cost of £445,000."" 
The first shipment of processed meat was made from Port 
Darwin in December 1917. To the editor of the Times, it was 
an event of unprecedented importance: 
. . . to the Territory to Australia, and the Empire. It is the first tangible 
proof of faithful stewardship the Commonwealth has been able to give 
as regards its great tropical territory . . . It is an evidence that at length 
the Wilderness is in process of being subdued. It is a magnificent tribute 
to that type of British Capital which has gone into the four corner [sic] 
of the earth and, in face of apparently insurmountable difficulties, has 
built deep and strong bases of the British Empire. . . . ' • ' 
Even Gilruth, by this time abominated by many in Darwin, 
received a measure of praise "for it was due to his personal in-
fluence that Sir William Vestey decided on making Darwin 
the site for the meatworks, and it has been his advice on 
which the Government acted in constructing the railway to 
the Katherine"."* 
As suggested above, the outbreak of world war in 1914 
hampered construction of the meatworks and the railway. In 
addition, the delays to shipping occasioned by the war in 
1914, were responsible for the poor condition of the dairy 
cattle with which Gilruth had hoped to promote a dairy in-
dustry for the supply of fresh milk for Top Enders. But the 
war had many other effects in the Northern Territory besides 
these, not all of which have been hitherto adequately 
recognized. Thus, the war was a major influence on the later 
Darwin rebeUion which saw the recaU of Gilruth, and later 
the expulsion of H.E. Carey, his successor, Mr Justice Bevan 
and R.J. Evans the Government Secretary. It was not a 
causal factor, but one which had a hothouse effect of en-
28 At the Other End of Australia 
couraging the rapid development of destabUzing factors in 
Darwin, which might not have reacted together in peace-time 
circumstances. 
The war had a profound effect on the tiny European col-
ony which was the Northern Territory in 1914. As in aU other 
parts of Australia, the caU to arms attracted "aU the adven-
turous roving natures that could not stay away, . , .".""^  The 
first to volunteer from the Territory were Lieutenant P.L.R. 
"Pat" Holmes and Captain J.B. O'SulUvan, who had seen 
active service before: they were farewelled at an enthusiastic 
gathering at the Hotel Victoria on 15 August 1914."* Others 
clamoured to follow them. In September, twenty-four young 
men petitioned Gilruth to expedite their enUstment."' In all, 
upwards of 250 went from the Northern Territory to the 
war.^" One of the "boys" from Pine Creek, Alf O'NeiU, was 
rejected on five occasions before finally being accepted. "He is 
probably the happiest man in the party" said the Times as the 
Mont oro sailed with another contingent from Darwin. "Men 
of the calibre of O'NeiU should shame every slacker in the 
N.T. to drop his feeble excuses and enUst at once."" O'Neill 
never returned. Nor did Edmond Johnson — one of three 
brothers who saw active service with the AIF and was kiUed 
overseas." 
Many of those who remained — men and wonien — were 
no less enthusiastic in their fostering of the war effort. The 
Times carried lengthy reports of the war, and regularly 
included letters from local men who were serving at the front, 
thereby fanning the flames of patriotism, and loosening 
wallets and purse strings. In August 1917, C.J. Kirkland, the 
Times' editor, began an appeal for funds for a battleplane. 
When the list closed in 1918, more than £800 had been 
subscribed," although £12,500 was also raised by the Nor-
thern Territory Branch of the Red Cross Society,^" with the 
Patriotic League of the Pine Creek district raising nearly 
£2,500 for "the reUef of sick and wounded soldiers".^^ Ter-
ritorians were delighted to learn that Lieutenant Albert 
Borella, at one time an employee of the Lands Department, 
should have been awarded the Victoria Cross for bravery in 
action at Villers-Bretonneux, though it is evident that he was 
not a well-known Territory identity. ^ ^ He had enlisted in 
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March 1915, after going to the Territory to seek his fortune in 
1913, While not a Territorian of longstanding, he was 
acclaimed a hero, and indeed, was the only Territorian to 
have been awarded the VC, Given their commitment to the 
war effort, Territorians rejoiced at the allied victory. 
Every available flag in Darwin appeared to have been requisitioned on 
Tuesday to honor the signing of the armistice and the cessation of 
hostilities. Bells were rung and a number of steam whistles were blown. 
A large body of school children, marshalled by Mrs. E. Spain, and 
carrying brightly-coloured flags marched down to the Government 
Residency, where they were greeted by the Administrator with a plea-
sant nod. The children were afterwards regaled by the Mayoress (Mrs. 
D.C. Watts), Cr Harold Nelson, and Mr. F.E. Holmes, with soft cool-
ing drinks. . . . During the afternoon the Darwin Brass Band, under the 
leadership of Mr. CM. Clark and mounted upon a lorry, headed a pro-
cession of flag-waving children round the town, the band returning to 
the Government Residency, in front of which they played a number of 
selections being afterwards invited to partake of a thirst quencher. . . . " 
To mark the occasion, Vesteys gave their employees a week's 
hoUday on fuU pay.^ * 
However, as in other parts of Australia, so in the Northern 
Territory, excesses of patriotism were accompanied by an in-
tolerance of anything which appeared to challenge this 
patriotism. By the time of the war, the Lutheran Mission on 
the Finke River in central Australia had been in existence for 
almost forty years. Yet, "patriots" and mischief-makers put 
rumours about Alice Springs that Pastor Carl Strehlow of the 
mission entertained German sympathies. These rumours were 
investigated and found to be groundless.^' But even so, 
members of the Cabinet were uneasy about the mission, and 
considered stopping the £300 annual government subsidy,*" 
and replacing Strehlow.*' Gilruth counselled against this. 
Subsequently however, an Adelaide pastoralist, George Ben-
nett who held leases adjacent to the mission, criticized the 
government for allowing the "German" mission to hold land, 
claiming that it was, in reaUty a cattle station. FoUowing an 
investigation by H.E. Carey, the Government Secretary, the 
subsidy was discontinued after June 1917.*^ 
It was during the flood-tide of imperial patriotism that the 
first prosecution was made in the Territory under the War 
Precautions Act (1914-16) and the Regulations of 1915. It 
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seems that on 2 October 1916, A.H. Swanson, a bilUard-
marker at the Pine Creek Hotel, "unlawfully attempted to 
cause sedition among the civilian population resident at Pine 
Creek". According to the report in the Times, Swanson "had 
employed a most revoking and offensive expression respec-
ting the person of His Majesty the King and foUowed it up 
with a mutinous and disloyal declaration that he would not 
fight for the King".*' He was gaoled for six months and fined 
£100. When the nation was to be given the chance later in the 
October to vote at a referendum, on whether or not conscrip-
tion for overseas military service should be introduced, this 
seems to have been a harsh reaction, though it is consistent 
with the sort of patriotism which was prevalent at the time. 
The conscription issue revealed the depth of feeling in the 
Territory, as elsewhere, about the war. The Times was the 
local champion of conscription, and its opponents were 
deemed to be either of "a maUcious spirit" or "in sheer 
ignorance of the vast issues involved", who, "at a moment so 
critical in the life history of the nation, are taking upon 
themselves a heavy and an awful responsibility".*" The chief 
supporter of the anti-conscription vote was the local branch 
of the Australian Workers Union, the arguments with which 
the Times had "neither the space nor the inclination to 
deal".*' Ultimately, Territorians voted for conscription at the 
two referenda. By 2 November 1916, after most of the votes 
for the first referendum were counted, 588 had voted "Yes", 
503 had voted "No".** At the 1917 referendum, the "Yes" 
supporters commanded a majority of only one vote, 679 to 
678.*^ 
The increased proportion of the "No" vote is significant. It 
is evidence of changed circumstances in the Northern Ter-
ritory, particularly in Darwin, which contributed to the ex-
plosive situation in 1918 and 1919. There may have been 
some who voted "No" in 1917 after having voted "Yes" in 
1916 on learning that members of the AIF generally voted 
against conscription.** But, for the most part, the new figures 
were indicative of the influx of workers and labourers from 
the south who came to the Territory to work on the railway 
extensions and the meatworks construction. 
During the war, nearly a third of the Territory's population 
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came and went annually. As Gilruth claimed, this was "not 
conducive to the best interests of the community".*' For the 
most part, the many itinerant workers were susceptible to the 
influence of the union organizers in Darwin upon whom they 
depended for work, and who were the opponents of conscrip-
tion. In advancing an explanation of the "No" vote, the 
editor of the Times was unnecessarily insulting when claiming 
that "The best of our men have already gone and those who 
remain are not of the type to vote themselves into the service 
of their country."^" However, it was probable that the 
majority of those who had already enlisted in the AIF were 
more politically conservative than those who remained, and 
that those who had gone were the ones least likely to be in-
fluenced by union organizers. 
Table 2 Migration 
Year 
ending 
31.12.15 
31.12.16 
31.12.17 
to and from the Northern Territory, 
Total number 
of whites 
3,327 
3,292 
3,425 
Arrivals 
1,747 
1,162 
1,365 
1915--17 
Departures 
1,096 
1,181 
1,244 
Source: CPP 129-1917/18/19, p. 5. 
The war had other deep-seated effects in the Territory 
apart from merely highlighting differences amongst the 
general population. It was yet another factor in souring rela-
tions between the administration and sectors of the Darwin 
community. 
It had been a constant lament during the South Australian 
period, that the distant government largely neglected Nor-
thern Territory affairs. This complaint was to be regularly 
levelled at the Commonwealth administration also. It certain-
ly had foundation during the period of the war, when, besides 
the actual prosecution of the war, Australian federal politics 
were bedevilled by two elections, two divisive conscription 
referenda, strikes, the Labor Party split, and the efforts of 
W.M. Hughes to remain in power as leader of first, the Labor 
Party, then the National Labor minority government, and 
finally, the Nationalist government. During the war, there 
were four ministers nominally responsible for Northern Ter-
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ritory affairs - J.A. Arthur (17.9.14-9.12.14), H. Mahon 
(14.12.14-14.11.16), F.W. Bamford (14.11.16-17.2.17) and 
P.M. Glynn (17.2.17-3.2.20). It is Uttle wonder that Territory 
affairs received little consideration in Melbourne. GUruth's 
reappointment was indicative of the low priority of Territory 
affairs to the successive ministers. His initial appointment ter-
minated on 24 March 1917, soon after the NationaUst govern-
ment was returned. Although he had proved to be a divisive 
factor in the Territory, and the subject of criticism in parlia-
ment,^' he was reappointed to the position — first in an 
acting capacity, but on 10 July 1917 for the duration of the 
war and six months thereafter.''^ No minister had the time, 
amidst the parliamentary turmoil, to find a successor for 
Gilruth. 
Gilruth's reappointment ensured that the ill-feeling which 
he attracted, continued to sour the remainder of his 
administration. Gilruth and his approach to his task, wiU be 
discussed more fully below; it is sufficient here to highlight 
the fact that the war situation required the implementation of 
unpopular policies, and that Gilruth, as the most senior 
administrator in the Territory, became the target for any 
criticism which these engendered. Early in 1914, External 
Affairs Minister Glynn ordered retrenchments and economies 
in the Northern Territory administration.'" The outbreak of 
war, and the enlistment of seventy-five government officers, 
required additional adjustment and economy. Gilruth was 
criticized for any inconvenience caused, and even charged 
with carrying out a personal vendetta against officers who 
would not bow to his will.''" It is never a happy time for an 
administrator to preside over retrenchments. 
Gilruth was criticized for other decisions too. His in-
sistence on a form of daylight saving soon after his arrival in 
the Northern Territory had been roundly opposed — so too, 
was his attempt to implement provisions of the Daylight Sav-
ing Act in January 1917.^ ^ jhese same opponents criticized, 
and looked for sinister aspects in the administration's use of 
its war-time powers of censorship. Whether or not the 
administration abused its censorship powers is of no real con-
sequence here - Gilruth's opponents claimed that there was 
abuse, and censured the administration accordingly. ^ ^ 
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The war exacerbated many of the problems associated with 
the administration of the Northern Territory at the time, but 
it did not create them. Even before the war started, short-
comings in aspects of the governments' Territory policies had 
become evident. 
Indeed, there were difficulties latent in the arrangement 
whereby a number of federal departments exercized respon-
sibilities in the Territory. Gilruth complained of this in 1915, 
condemning "the entire lack of coordination between the dif-
ferent Commonwealth Departments within the Territory and 
between them and the general Administration of the Ter-
ritory",''^ and pointed out that this resulted in a "great loss of 
efficiency, [and] want of economy". Though he was Ad-
ministrator, many government officials in Darwin were out-
side his control — and were directly responsible to superiors 
in Melbourne — among them being those in customs, the 
post office, pubUc works and railways. His complaints feU on 
deaf ears. Indeed, so long as the Commonwealth government 
controUed the Territory, this fragmentation of responsibility 
was to cause needless confusion and inefficiency, thereby 
compounding difficulties associated with the remoteness of 
governmental power from the Territory. 
In 1916, after visiting the Territory, Senator Newlands 
reeled off a litany of criticism of the government's administra-
tion to that time. He claimed that there was "no section there 
which was not labouring under a grievance".''* One of his 
major criticisms concerned the anomalies and disparaties in 
salaries^' which promoted discontent within the government 
service. This came about because of the government's poUcy 
of contracting untried workers in the south, rather than 
engaging those already resident in the Territory. In a great 
many instances, these new recruits found conditions more 
difficult than they anticipated, which prompted them to com-
plain of any grievances. It was practically impossible to 
obtain satisfactory work for them.*" Moreover, because of 
the contractual conditions, it was impossible for managers to 
dismiss unsatisfactory workers for anything except serious 
offences. Supervisors also complained that the men recruited 
in Melbourne took too long to adapt to the tropical cUmate. 
Then, because their agreements invariably included the provi-
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sion of a return fare to Melbourne, they were eager to leave 
the Territory at the end of their contract period.*' The 
government's recruiting policy and contract agreements 
militated against the creation of a stable workforce in Darwin 
and the Top End. 
The harsh conditions in the Territory which were normal, 
but which apologists continued to regard as extraordinary, 
meant that the government's agricultural policy could not 
have been a success.*2 Yet its failure was hastened because of 
the problems associated with the government's poUcy of 
recruiting labour. At the top level, there was trouble with the 
managers. J.T. Ramsay was appointed as the manager of the 
Daly River farm on 1 February 1912. He arrived in Darwin on 
4 March, and after floods and other setbacks reached the 
farm only on 29 July 1912. In October, he "lost heart", took 
sick leave and resigned.*' J.E. Palmer was appointed to the 
position on 25 November 1912: he resigned for personal 
reasons less than two years later.*" The Batchelor farm fared 
no better. C.N. Woolley, after being charged then acquitted 
of criminal activities, resigned in July 1913.*^ 
There was an even more frequent turnover of farm 
labourers, many of whom were plainly unsuited to the work. 
During the latter seven months of 1913, thirty-four men had 
been employed at the Batchelor farm; only eleven remained 
at the end of the year.** AUhough they were employed under 
contracts, the farm labourers went on strike during 1913, in 
support of colleagues in Darwin. The strike lasted seven 
weeks, and resulted in the destruction of the crops and the 
virtual waste of all effort and expenditure on the farms 
during that season.*^ Then in 1914, the incoming Cook 
government ordered economies. Expenditure was curtailed 
wherever possible. By 1917 "the whole of the work has been 
done by natives, with the help of an occasional white 
labourer, and the farms have become more aboriginal sta-
tions than actual demonstration stations".** By this time, the 
failure of the farms was assured. Their abandonment in 1919 
had been long expected. 
Given Gilruth's coolness towards the experimental farms it 
is ironical that he should have been condemned because of 
their failure. However, because of factors in Darwin at the 
A False Start and Disillusion: 1912-1920 35 
time, it is understandable. It was noted above that Gilruth 
was pessimistic about the success of the government's poUcy 
of close settlement — a feature of which was the promotion 
of agricultural enterprise. He believed too, that one farm 
would have been sufficient for the government's experimental 
purposes.*' The two were estabUshed before his arrival in the 
Territory, and thereafter he was committed to the justifica-
tion and support of the government's policy even though he 
disagreed with it.'" 
The government's attempts to encourage settlers on to 
agricultural blocks on the Daly River also failed to meet with 
the success which had been envisaged. Again, the failure was 
due to inconsistent government policies. Two settlers, 
Thomas and Roberts, who had taken up land there during the 
latter part of the South Australian period, abandoned their 
holdings within two years." To the end of 1913, eighteen set-
tlers had taken up agricultural land under the 1912 Ordinance 
— aU except two of them on the Daly River — though only 
ten settlers were actually on their blocks.'^ Thomas and 
Roberts had abandoned their blocks because of the attractive 
wage rates being offered for unskilled workers elsewhere in 
the Territory. With the commencement of major construc-
tion works such as the railway extension and the meatworks, 
and increases in award wages, such employment became even 
more attractive. By 1920, only five settlers remained on the 
Daly." BoreUa, who won the Victoria Cross during World 
War I, had gone to the Territory to take up land on the Daly 
River in 1913, but was another who preferred the less onerous 
wage employment. He secured a post in the Lands Depart-
ment.'" 
By 1920, the government's efforts to establish an 
agricultural industry had been unsuccessful — at a cost of 
£50,000 to the Commonwealth. Ill-advised activities at the 
Daly River farm had squandered £15,000; those at Batchelor 
£20,000.'5 The only lesson that these farms had demonstrated 
was that obstacles determined by the climate, pests, and in-
deed the total environment, were normal conditions with 
which settlers would have to contend. But this lesson should 
have been learnt from the South AustraUan experience. In 
addition to the money spent on the farms, more than £5,000 
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of the £8,000 advanced to hopeful settlers, had to be written 
off as irrecoverable.'* 
The several major construction projects then being under-
taken in the Territory meant that there was a constant induce-
ment for intending settlers to abandon the uncertain Ufe on 
farms, for the certainty of a regular wage income. During the 
first years of the Commonwealth administration, there was a 
veritable wage explosion for workers in Darwin, with a conse-
quent rapid increase in the cost of living there. The xipward 
movement began in 1912, when the Fisher government 
recommended a reduction in the hours to be worked per week 
from forty-eight to forty-four, and increased wages to a rate 
twenty-five per cent above that ruling in southern states. To 
this was added a special allowance on the recommendation of 
Public Service Inspector Skewes.'^ Subsequently in 1914, the 
infant AWU in Darwin struck because of wage disparities in 
Darwin. The case was taken before the Arbitration Court and 
resulted in a fuU restructuring of wages in the Territory. Mr 
Justice Powers, without visiting the Territory himself, 
ultimately awarded unskilled labourers an increase of from 
1/5 per hour to 1/9 per hour, with agricultural workers being 
awarded £4 per week. At the same time, Powers estabUshed 
the precedent of basing rates on the wage necessary to main-
tain a man with a wife and family in the Northern Territory. 
Gilruth complained of the implications of this rapid wage 
rise, without avail.'* Soon after he observed that, because of 
the high wages prevailing in the Territory, it was possible to 
earn up to £50 per month on piece work." These rapid wage 
rises had a large effect on the cost of Uving in Darwin, and 
was but another destabilizing influence in the town at the 
time. 
The union action which was the matter for arbitration 
before Mr Justice Powers, had been directed at Vesteys. The 
meat company had engaged labourers and artisans in Sydney 
for construction work on their meatworks. These men were 
engaged at rates above those ruling in Sydney, but below 
those in Darwin, though they were guaranteed good board by 
Vesteys. The arrangement was criticized by the AWU, and 
the strike ensued.'"" Powers'judgment immediately increased 
the costs of the Vesteys' operation, while handing victory 
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to the union. As the only significant private enterprise in the 
Territory, the meatworks consequently became a prominent 
target for union actions. 
Perhaps the most potent destabilizing factor was determin-
ed by the increased Territory population. One result of the 
Commonwealth's policy initiatives was to steadily increase 
the population of the Territory from 3,333 in 1911 to 4,752 in 
1916.'"' Much of this increase was concentrated in Darwin. 
Accommodation there had been taxed by the influx of civil 
servants in 1911 and 1912; it was incapable of properly 
accommodating the many labourers and artisans who follow-
ed later. Difficulties of accommodation were magnified 
because of the monotony and almost total masculinity of life 
in Darwin and the construction sites. This new society of 
itinerants never merged with the established society of old-
time residents with their entrenched social conventions. 
Gilruth had not been in the Territory a year, before it became 
evident to him that the very monotony of social Ufe in Darwin 
bred discontent. "Is it surprising" asked Gilruth, "that in the 
absence of all recreation to which young men have been 
accustomed, there should be discontent at the world in 
general — ready and anxious to focus on anything in par-
ticular — due primarily to the starvation of the natural in-
stincts of the gregarious mankind?"'"^ 
Given the factors noted above — and little attention has 
yet been given here to the role of GUruth, or that of the in-
creasingly miUtant union — it is evident that many disturbing 
factors were at work in Darwin and its hinterland during the 
first years of the Commonwealth administration. In a large 
community these factors may have had little effect, but Dar-
win was a tiny community which was isolated from the rest of 
Australia, except for the regular but infrequent shipping 
services, and the telegraph. 
During the period of the war, Darwin was not a happy 
town. Though it was perhaps going too far to suggest, as 
Matthews did in parliament, that it was seething with discon-
tent,'"' the editor of the Times painted a gloomy picture 
when he reported the end of the European war. When noting 
that the people of Belgium and France had been delivered 
from "the heel of the invader", he aUuded to the fact that "the 
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people of the Northern Territory of Australia must wait until 
six months after the war for the first essential to their weU-
being - the utter elimination of the Gilruth regime".'"" 
Circumstances in Darwin came to a head soon after the end 
of the war. On 17 December 1918, several hundred men from 
the meatworks marched on Government House complaining 
about Gilruth's administration, and demanded his removal 
from Darwin. Gilruth confronted the men, and refused to be 
intimidated — only when he turned his back to return to 
Government House was he roughly handled. The incident 
passed. Matters continued to simmer. In January 1919, a 
noisy meeting which was critical of the administration was 
held on the oval near Government House. Again, there was a 
noisy demonstration against Gilruth. Then in February, 
Gilruth was called to Melbourne, and sailed from Darwin on 
20 February aboard the cruiser Encounter which had been 
ordered to Darwin to ensure peace.'"^ 
As has been indicated above, many factors contributed to 
the unhappy situation in Darwin. The "excuse" for the 
December confrontation was an increase in the price of beer 
by 3d.,a bottle.'"* Ever since the government had assumed 
control of hotels in the Top End after 1 October 1915,'"^ 
their control and the supply of Uquor had been matters for 
complaint by interests opposed to the government. The price 
Demonstrators at Government House protesting against the administration of Dr 
Gilruth, 7 December 1918. Note effigy of Gilruth in car, later to be burnt. (NLA) 
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increase in 1918 occasioned pubUc protest meetings and a 
boycott of the hotels after 3 December. At the several public 
meetings, the entire government administration became the 
subject of criticism. 
A great deal has already been written about the causes of 
the "RebeUion", including a 392-page transcript of evidence 
taken by the Royal Commission which was charged with 
seeking an explanation of the event.'"* Gilruth was singled 
out as a major cause of the rebeUion. Even Glynn, his 
Minister, recorded in his diary that "the present administra-
tion is, and has been, out of touch" with the realities of 
Darwin.'"' Yet, there was nothing in Gilruth's personality 
which should have made for confrontation at that time rather 
than another. As early as September 1912, Carey had record-
ed that "Agitators here have openly boasted that they will 
'beat' the Administrator over the earlier hours","" and two 
months later, W.S. CampbeU claimed that "the present disaf-
fection in the Northern Territory . . . is mainly due to an 
utter absence of tact in administration".''' Gilruth did not 
shirk confrontation with the unions, but there is no evidence 
that he became more obdurate or arbitrary as his term as Ad-
ministrator progressed. Indeed, there is evidence that 
Gilruth's single-mindedness was a stumbling block to only 
one faction in Darwin, the union — that faction which has 
continued to enjoy a good press. In addition, it must be 
pointed out that figures derived from the conscription 
referenda and local council elections at the time, suggest that 
the miUtant unionists, though very vocal, did not command a 
significant majority of support in Darwin — if indeed, they 
had a majority at all. By August 1917, there had been a great 
deal of criticism of Gilruth's administration in parliament, 
and his reappointment was roundly condemned by a public 
meeting "convened by the Secretary of the AWU (Mr H. 
Nelson)". "2 Yet, the same issue of the paper, also carried the 
report of a representative group of 200-300 people attending 
a social to welcome Gilruth on his return to Darwin. 
The Ewing Commission criticized successive governments 
for contributing to the unstable situation in Darwin by failing 
to pursue consistent poUcies in the Territory. Events sustain 
this criticism. Perhaps, if Gilruth had received the support of 
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his government, the situation might not have developed in the 
manner which it did. Despite the vitriolic sniping of one such 
as Jensen — who, for insubordination, was dismissed from 
his post as Director of Mines'" — Gilruth was not a party 
political man as was Jensen and several others of the senior 
appointees of 1912."" With apparently good reason, Gilruth 
criticized Minister Glynn when the latter sought information 
about the Territory from others, when he, Gilruth, could 
have suppUed what was needed."' Gilruth unavailinglyurged 
Glynn to visit the Northern Territory to see the problems 
there at first hand; "I find that even the more extended the 
acquaintance I have the more definitely do the difficulties 
present themselves.""* In the same letter, Gilruth urged 
Glynn to clarify the policy of the new government, and 
highlighted the dilemma in which he found himself. "Please 
understand that I do not complain that you have interfered in 
any way regarding administration of any policy, but it is 
obvious to me from the Press and also from Hansard that the 
present Government does not see eye to eye with the late 
Government. At the same time I am not advised of any 
change of policy." And this was in peace time. He received 
even less policy direction during the political upheavals of the 
war years. 
In 1916, when commenting on problems in the Northern 
Territory, Senator Newlands claimed "that as the result of 
mismanagement generally — and I am blaming the Govern-
ment in this respect — no one knows what is going on next in 
the Northern Territory. The Administrator is blamed for 
everything. It is not fair that he should be placed in this posi-
tion . . ."."^ It is evident, too, that distant government 
initiatives for the Northern Territory in matters such as wage 
levels and recruitment, exacerbated social conditions in the 
Territory. Yet these decisions were taken without reference to 
Gilruth, who was expected to defend them. It is certain that 
there was little support for Gilruth forthcoming from those 
responsible for the Territory's administration in Melbourne. 
But this was but another ingredient rather than a cause of the 
problems after 1918. 
Strangely, Justice Ewing's report on the Darwin distur-
bances says nothing of the role played by the miUtant 
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unionists and their leader, H.G. Nelson. Yet, herein Ues the 
major cause of the rebeUion in 1918. Other factors such as 
unpleasant living conditions, the exigencies of war time, con-
fused government, and even tactless administration by 
Gilruth, contributed to a complicated and acrimonious situa-
tion; but they were constant factors throughout the period. 
The major destabilizing factor was the union leaders' desire 
for power in Darwin. Much has yet to be revealed about this, 
but on-going work suggests that there was a conscious poUcy 
on the part of H.G. Nelson to aspire to a position of power in 
Darwin."* There had been industrial unrest in Darwin prior 
to Nelson's advent in 1913, but it had been uncoordinated 
and its direction confused: GUruth had little difficulty in 
breaking the strike of 1913. However, after Nelson became 
organizer of the AWU, the movement became a united and a 
powerful force. The fact that the war drained off many long-
standing Territorians, and the various construction works 
occasioned the influx of many itinerant workers, faciUtated 
Nelson's task of uniting the workers. Between July and 
November, membership of the Darwin branch of the AWU 
increased by almost 400 per cent."' In 1919, Colonel J.L. 
Johnson when commenting on the disturbances, noted that 
"a large number of members of the Unions are foreigners 
who do not understand English and whose only thought is 
that they must in everything support the Union leaders who 
they look upon as the men to whom they are indebted for the 
very high wages earned in Darwin".'2" By late 1914, Nelson 
was firmly in control of union activities in Darwin, and in the 
numerous public meetings which were organized to raU 
against Gilruth, Vesteys, and conscription, he was the most 
outspoken. In mid 1917, by means of a form of preferential 
voting. Nelson, the Secretary, with R. Toupein, the Union 
President, was elected to the town councU.'^i In mid 1918, 
with the election of Toupein and D.C. Watts to the councU, 
the unionists gained a majority,'^^ and on Nelson's motion. 
Watts was elected Mayor. 
By mid 1918, the only power base not successfully 
chaUenged and under the influence of Nelson, was that of the 
administration. GUruth was not the man to surrender this to 
any demagogue. Confrontation between the righteous and in-
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flexible Gilruth and the ambitious AWU Secretary was 
almost inevitable. Thus, the boycott of the hotels in 
December 1918, was but another tacfic in Nelson's campaign 
to increase his influence in Darwin. By this, he hoped to 
secure the replacement of Gilruth by someone more amenable 
to his persuasion. GUruth stood firm. But he was not sup-
ported by his Minister. In February he was called to 
Melbourne, and granted six months leave from 1 June 1919: 
his appointment was not terminated tiU 30 November 1919, 
and he received payment up to 10 July 1920 — six months 
after the Treaty of Versailles negotiation.'2' 
True to form, the government failed to take decisive action 
to remedy the situation in Darwin. It recaUed H.E. Carey 
who had been the Government Secretary under Gilruth, but 
who had joined the firm of Vesteys in 1917, and appointed 
him Director of the Northern Territory for a term of three 
years from 1 August 1919. Gilruth was technically still Ad-
ministrator, and the Minister was confused about the pro-
cedure to be foUowed.'^" Unfortunately, because Carey had 
been so closely identified with Gilruth, he attracted all the 
odium incurred by his former chief. Nelson, now a member 
of Carey's Advisory Council, exploited the situation. In 
September he called a public meeting to condemn clauses in 
the 1918 Taxation Act. Then, on 10 October 1919, before a 
meeting of the Advisory Council which he had convened for 
the purpose. Nelson read a letter which Carey had written to 
Gilruth on 8 July, before he had been appointed as the Direc-
tor. In the letter, Carey made indiscreet references which 
were open to the interpretation that he, Gilruth and Judge 
Bevan were corrupt, and had fostered their own pecuniary in-
terests and those of Vesteys.'^^ Carey was able to explain the 
letter to Glynn's satisfaction, and no criminal charges were 
ever laid, but Nelson's attack was successful. The threat of 
violence was sufficient to induce Carey, Bevan and R.J. 
Evans, the Government Secretary, to abandon the Territory 
on 19 October.'26 For the moment, the power of Nelson and 
his colleagues was paramount. The appointment of 
Staniforth Smith as Acting Administrator from 1 December 
1919 ensured that Nelson's influence was real, but unfettered 
by the mere trappings of power. Smith's one concern was to 
ensure peace in the Territory. 
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The government's appointment of the Royal Commission 
once again indicated the lack of a poUcy for the Territory. 
Glynn appointed Mr Justice Ewing of the Supreme Court of 
Tasmania to look into the recent events in the Territory.'^^ 
Glynn was concerned to Umit the Commission to an enquiry 
into the events from the riots of 1918, to Carey's deportation 
in 1919, and not have it become an enquiry into 
administration in the Territory in general.'2* But Ewing 
pressed for a wider enquiry — and succeeded. The result was 
a farce, and was no doubt regretted by Glynn. As he noted, 
"The loose wording of the alteration rather widely interpreted 
by him permits aU sorts of questions to be raised, even at the 
insistence of a lawyer representing the men who deported the 
officials. . . . It seems a real administrative paradox making 
the members of the mass who want direct rule the directors of 
an Enquiry, arranged in respect of specific allegations and 
now without scope . . .".'2' Nelson who had been the domi-
nant force in marshalling the anti-government forces advised 
Ewing on the conduct of the enquiry, and yet was not called 
upon to give evidence. It is not surprising that successive 
governments and the senior officials in Darwin should have 
been criticized, but it is astonishing that Ewing's report 
should have nothing to say about the role of Nelson and the 
union."" GUruth, Carey, Bevan, and Evans all protested 
against the report.'" These protests, together with the 
minutes of evidence, were submitted to Attorney-General 
Garran for comment, and in guarded terms, he supported the 
criticisms of Gilruth and the others rather than the conclu-
sions of Ewing. "2 Later commentators have been less 
reticent in condemning the shoddiness of the enquiry."' 
The whole episode of the Ewing Commission was 
something of an embarrassment for the government. Later, 
Bevan and Carey brought actions against the government and 
received payments of £2,800 and £375. StiU, the Commission 
provided the government with the excuse to dismiss Carey, 
and endeavoured to draw the curtain on the troubled years of 
the Gilruth regime which had begun in such auspicious cir-
cumstances. 
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Despite the propaganda which had accompanied the transfer 
of the Northern Territory to the Commonwealth, and the 
vast amounts of money and effort spent in seeking to imple-
ment development-oriented policies, precious little was 
achieved by the end of the first decade. Indeed, many of the 
government's initiatives were as iU-conceived and inap-
propriate as those pursued by South Australians earUer. The 
many new scientific reports and studies revealed nothing new 
about the Territory which had not been evident during the 
time of the South Australian administration. 
The tangible achievements of the new adminstration were 
few. The North Australian Railway had been extended, and 
private enterprise had been induced to buUd a meatworks at 
Darwin. However, an increased industrial awareness among 
workers, encouraged by government poUcies, made it increas-
ingly difficult for the meatworks to function profitably, and 
so faiUng to provide traffic for the raUway. 
The administration of successive governments was 
characterized by periods of intense activity, followed by other 
periods of apparent disinterest in the Territory, This permit-
ted and encouraged the growth of a miUtant labour move-
ment in Darwin. The expulsion of the government's represen-
tatives demonstrated the extent to which ministers were 
ignorant of, or disinterested in, developments in the Ter-
ritory. 
There were many developments outside the Territory dur-
ing this time which affected matters there, but these were 
complicating, rather than causal factors. Given the cir-
cumstances of the time, contemporaries were unrealistic to 
believe that the new admiiustration would be significantly 
more successful in stimulating economic development than 
that of South Australia. The surprising thing, however, is 
that the new administration should have fallen so far short of 
its predecessor, and alienated a large section of the popula-
tion. The difficulties facing the federal government in the 
twenties were so much greater because of its failure during 
the previous decade. 
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THREE 
New Directions 
1920 to 1931 
The first decade of CommonweaUh control of the Northern 
Territory failed to realize the hope which had been expressed 
at the time of the transfer. Indeed, the record of administra-
tion of the Commonwealth government was less creditable 
than that of South AustraUa. The CommonweaUh authorities 
failed to appreciate the lessons of the South Australian ex-
perience, and squandered vast amounts of money and effort 
on fanciful schemes which had Uttle chance of success, 
thereby compounding prejudices against the Territory as a 
field of investment. 
Besides dashing the hopes of many who beUeved that the 
Commonwealth would promote prosperity in the Northern 
Territory, the actions — and inaction — of the government 
succeeded in alienating a large proportion of Territorians, 
culminating in the spectacle of its chief officers being run out 
of town. Thus, the first task of the government during the 
second decade was to re-establish its authority — before steps 
could be taken to implement new economic poUcies. 
The government succeeded in resuming control in Darwin, 
but in Uttle else. The record of the second decade of Com-
monwealth administration of the Territory differed Uttle 
from that of the first. It was characterized by long periods of 
apparent disinterest, when the Territory and its administra-
tion were all but forgotten, and short periods of concern, 
during which new, inappropriate schemes were advanced to 
prosper the Territory, before being abandoned after a great 
waste of money and effort. 
However, though Uttle change was effected in the 
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economic well-being of Territorians during the twenties, the 
first tentative steps were taken to provide political representa-
tion for white Territorians in the federal parliament, and also 
to ameliorate the conditions under which black Territorians 
lived. These steps were so tentative that they can hardly be 
called advances, but they provided a basis from which later, 
real advances could be made. Both issues became increasingly 
important during the period in which the Commonwealth 
controlled the Territory. 
It fell to M. Staniforth Smith — appointed Acting Ad-
ministrator in the Northern Territory on 1 December 1919 -
to re-estabhsh the government presence in Darwin. The writer 
in Smith's Weekly said of him that he was sent north in the 
Staniforth Smith greeting Ross Smith, December 1919. (NLA) 
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role of "pacificator", that he was "a peace at any price ad-
ministrator", and that he did what the unions told him to do:' 
certainly H.G. Nelson spoke weU of him.^ This disparaging 
assessment fails to appreciate his achievement, however. 
Smith certainly disagreed with the strictures, and preferred to 
think of himself as the tactful and diplomatic administrator 
who pandered to no faction.' He suggested that criticism of 
himself originated with "a Uttle junta of anonymous reac-
tionaries . . . [who] fondly hoped that he was coming up to 
punish industriaUsts". He was proud of the fact that during 
the fourteen months of his term in the Territory there was not 
a riot, strike or fracas, and that the increase in wages during 
the period was less than anywhere else in Australia. 
Developments in the Territory in 1921 suggest that the 
problems associated with the ascendency of the left-wing 
militants had been simply set aside rather than solved. 
However, the solution of these problems was beyond the 
efforts of one in Smith's position. His appointment was that 
of Acting Administrator, the duration of which was at the 
discretion of the Minister. He had not the security of tenure 
of Gilruth, or of Urquhart, his successor. In addition, his 
standing in the community was not strengthened when his 
application for the position of Administrator received no 
support from the government." 
In 1920, however, a "pacificator" was precisely what was 
needed in Darwin. Staniforth Smith, at one time Mayor of 
Kalgoorlie, a Western Australian Senator, and an Ad-
ministrator of Papua where he had served in various 
capacities for twelve years,^ was well-suited to the position. 
His assumption of duties was facilitated by the fact that the 
Ewing Commission which was then meeting, held the atten-
tion of the Darwin militants of whatever faction. Also, an 
undertaking from Prime Minister Hughes, that the Territory 
would soon be given some measure of political representation 
in the federal parUament, also helped to defuse the situation, 
and contributed to his peaceful assumption of duties.^ Yet, 
his personal achievement in securing a measure of industrial 
peace should not be minimized, for this occurred at a time of 
high unemployment in Darwin which, in turn, was brought 
about by the faUure of the meatworks to open for the 1920 
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season. It was during this time that Smith was able to re-
establish the credibiUty of the position of Administrator. Of 
necessity, this could only have been done with some form of 
accommodation or understanding with the union militants 
who were in a dominant position in Darwin after the recall of 
Gilruth, and the expulsion of Carey, Bevan and Evans. 
Whether or not Smith toadied to the labour militants is of 
little real consequence, and simply confuses any appreciation 
of his role. None was disadvantaged by his tour of duty, but 
all benefited by the period of relative peace, the government 
most of all. 
The truce was broken in 1921. But by this time, the govern-
ment was able to take the initiative. A measure of representa-
tion in the federal parUament which was granted to Ter-
ritorians in 1922, took H.G. Nelson to another stage, and 
helped to defuse continued militant action. In the administra-
tion of the Territory, retrenchment and economy became the 
order of the day. "Subsequently matters settled down", wrote 
F.C. Urquhart, Smith's successor, "and peace prevailed -
not a peace of prosperity, but one of suspended animation 
and poverty, during which out of very Umited means 
unemployment had to be rationed and the ordinary business 
of administration carried on."'' 
Frederick Charles Urquhart was a man totally different to 
his predecessors. Immediately prior to his appointment as 
Administrator on 17 January 1921, he had been Commis-
sioner of Police in Queensland, where earlier he had achieved 
some notoriety for his enforcement of European law upon 
the Aborigines of the Cloncurry district. It was suggested that 
he was sent to Darwin "with a mission to clean up the place".* 
This is certainly how his appointment appeared to Nelson, 
who claimed that Urquhart "was a great tyrant".' Urquhart 
was determined to combat what he saw as popular discontent 
created "by means of grossly exaggerated rhetoric and 
unscrupulous propaganda [of] the extremist leaders".'" Con-
flict with the union militants was inevitable. 
The excuse for the confrontafion and test of strength be-
tween the union militants and the re-emergent government 
presence was the issue of taxadon. Territorians had been 
notorious for the laxity with which they compUed with taxa-
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tion requirements." In May 1920, initiatives were taken to 
sue defaulters for arrears, only to be suspended on the advice 
of Staniforth Smith who had suggested that collection might 
be easier, and any iU-feeling minimized, should the 
ParUamentary Representation Bill, which was then before the 
Senate, be passed.'^ This bill sought Northern Territory 
representation in the federal parliament. It was defeated 
however, and instructions went forth for the collection of 
overdue taxes, which at that time amounted to £14,000." 
Mayor R. Toupein, the one-time AWU President, was one 
of those in arrears. 
Urquhart arrived in Darwin on 13 February 1921.'" Three 
days later, he was a guest at the send-off for the Mayor, 
Robert Toupein, who had decided to leave Darwin, and upon 
whom a notice had been served, to the effect that his depart-
ure would be prevented unless he made good his arrears in 
taxation. As the Times said, it was "supposed to be a non-
political affair", but Harold Nelson took the opportunity 
provided by the gathering to criticize the government, "and 
threw out a direct chaUenge to the local authorities", to the 
effect that he, and many others, would support Toupein 
against the government." 
In the event, Toupein left the Territory by the Bambara on 
18 February, without payment of his overdue income tax. 
The Times headed its report as "A Win for Nelson",'* claim-
ing that the Taxation Department had lost any respect by fail-
ing even to attempt to enforce its ultimatum. The govern-
ment, through the head of the Taxation Department, had cer-
tainly capitulated to the militants. And by 1 March 1921, the 
new year's tax returns were due. 
The government's capitulation strengthened the anti-
taxation push. On 4 May 1921, a public meeting was held to 
"protest against taxation without representation": Nelson 
proposed the motion advocating resistance to the govern-
ment's taxation.'^ In June, the government finally made a 
stand. Prosecutions ensued, and the defaulters — including 
Nelson — were jailed.'* However, the outcome hardly 
represented a victory for the government. Those who were 
jailed were deemed to be martyrs by other Territorians. A 
subscription list was opened to ensure financial support for 
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those imprisoned; moral support was provided by the Darwin 
Town Band playing at Fannie Bay." 
If the issue of taxation resulted in a draw, that associated 
with the visit of Minister Poynton to the Territory in May and 
June 1921, resulted in a setback for Nelson and his col-
leagues. Alexander Poynton, another South AustraUan, and 
at one time a union official and member of the Labor Party, 
but now a member of the conservative Nationalist govern-
ment, succeeded Glynn as Minister for Home and Territories 
on 4 February 1920. Twelve months later, in February 1921, 
he resolved upon visiting the Territory to examine "matters in 
connection with the administration . . . that could not be 
dealt with by correspondence".^" He arrived at Darwin on the 
Mataram on Friday 13 May, and for the following month 
travelled through the Top End, and Ustened to deputations 
from the several lobbies there. It seems that representatives of 
all factions were concerned to present a united front to the 
Minister. It was something of a tactical mistake, then, for 
Nelson to flout the Minister, and work to undermine the 
committee which was elected to draw up the submission to 
him.^' Nelson's failure to disrupt the fareweU to Poynton," 
which was due largely to Urquhart's pre-emptive tactics, 
signalled a definite defeat for the miUtants. 
However, Poynton's visit had more far-reaching effects. 
On his return to Melbourne, he submitted a report to Cabinet 
in which he made recommendations for a better administra-
tion of the Territory. Those which were implemented suc-
ceeded in ensuring a measure of peace in Darwin. Perhaps the 
most Draconian measures were embodied in the Observance 
of Law Ordinance of 1921. This ordinance aboUshed trial by 
jury, except in those cases when the punishment was death; in 
addition, it provided for order at pubUc meetings, the depor-
tation of tax avoiders, and the punishment of those who in-
terfered with others who were pursuing their lawful trades. 
At the end of the year, Urquhart was able to report that con-
ditions in Darwin had been greatly ameliorated, and that 
trouble-makers "could no longer count on the certainty of 
acquittal at the hands of sympathetic juries"." Subsequently, 
the government demanded property qualifications for elec-
tors in local government elections, thereby effectively disen-
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franchising the many itinerants upon whom Nelson and his 
colleagues depended for support. At last the government had 
taken decisive action against the mUitants in Darwin. 
However, in common with many government initiatives, this 
action was taken at a time when the influence of the militants 
was already on the wane. 
The failure of Vestey's meatworks to open for the 1920 kiU-
ing season was a setback for the militants. This resulted in a 
great deal of immediate unemployment and distress. As 
Staniforth Smith reported at the time: "For some months 
numbers of people from various parts of the Territory — pro-
spectors, miners, drovers, carters, and station hands — had 
been congregating in Darwin in anticipation of the high 
wages to be paid during the meat season. A considerable 
number had dribbled in from other States; most of these men 
were penniless and in debt to the storekeepers. . . . The 
Government was confronted with a town of over 2,000 
people, mostly manual workers and their famiUes with not a 
weakh producing industry in the place."^^ In the event, the 
government provided free passages for 216 persons to leave 
the Territory, "principaUy to Greek, Patagonian and Spanish 
emigrants".2' A result of this exodus was a loss of supporters 
for the militants. At the same time, those who remained 
became less strident, with ten per cent of the population in 
want — there being 200 in receipt of rations in 1922.^ 6 
During this time, too. Nelson's grip on the union move-
ment began to slip, and the unionists feU to fighting among 
themselves rather than against the government or Vesteys. 
A thorough reorganization of the labour movement took 
place during 1921. Nelson had been Secretary of the Territory 
branch of the AWU, but the Darwin branches of the Meat In-
dustry Employees' Union, and the Engine-drivers' and 
Firemen's Union had always remained independent. In 1921, 
Nelson received permission from the Annual Conference of 
the AWU to disband the TerrUory branch of the AWU, so 
that there might be organized "one-big union", the North 
Australian Industrial Union.^ '^  Significantly, a condition of 
the amalgamation was that Nelson should not be Secretary.^^ 
Before the end of the year, however, there were calls to re-
form the AWU." Soon after, there was formed the more 
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elaborate Northern Territory Workers' Union'" - and it was 
this union which was the first to be registered by the govern-
ment," and subsequently, under the Federal Arbitrafion 
Act.'2 In 1923, the Territory was free from industrial 
trouble, except for the friction which existed between the two 
rival unions." 
By 1923 however, Harold Nelson had left the local in-
dustrial scene for a seat in the House of Representatives in 
Melbourne. In this manner, yet another divisive influence 
was removed from Darwin. 
The government's decision to support Northern Territory 
representation in the House of Representatives was a direct 
result of Poynton's visit, though it was not due to any 
perspicacity of his. It marked but one stage in a long running 
issue'" which was to persist so long as the Commonwealth ad-
ministered the Territory. Immediately the Territory was 
transferred to the Commonwealth, Territorians had been 
disenfranchised. Those who were politically aware, lobbied 
unavailingly for a form of parliamentary representation: their 
grievance and sense of deprivation was heightened after they 
were given the right to vote on the conscription issue.'^ Also, 
as has been seen above, the lack of franchise gave point to the 
anti-taxation push.'* Gilruth was aware of the problem and 
its destabilizing effect, and had advocated a measure of 
political representation, suggesting that, for electoral pur-
poses, the Territory electors should be divided and attached 
to electorates in Queensland, Western Australia and South 
Australia:'^ however, this was not possible under the terms of 
the constitution.'* Senator Newlands had been convinced that 
some form of representation for Territorians was essential," 
and Judge Ewing contended that the lack of representation 
was a major factor which contributed towards the events of 
1918 and 1919."" Staniforth Smith claimed that parUamen-
tary representation would help to ameUorate the unsettled 
conditions in Darwin, and he claimed that he continued in his 
position only so long as there was a possibility that the situa-
tion might be changed."' Urquhart too, counseUed that some 
form of representation was essential for the good government 
of the Territory."2 
To all the suggestions and demands for Northern Territory 
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representation in federal parliament, the reply by successive 
governments was essentially the same as that deUvered by 
Glynn in 1913. At that time, he pointed out that "the decision 
has always been that it would be premature to introduce 
legislation on the subject until the European population of 
the Territory has materially increased"."' The Darwin 
"Rebellion" finally persuaded the government to support 
some form of representation in the Senate,"" and it introduc-
ed a biU to this effect on 9 September 1920. It was rejected, 
however, because of the smaU population in the Territory."' 
Ultimately, in 1922, a form of parUamentary representa-
tion for the Northern Territory was sanctioned. On 7 
September, the biU was introduced in the House of Represen-
tatives providing for a Northern Territory member of that 
house. In order to appease conservative members, it was 
stipulated that he should not be able to vote on any matter, to 
become Speaker, or a chairman of any committee. Many 
members were concerned lest "a man might enter this House 
with 850 votes and determine, not only the fate of measures, 
but the fate of Governments — determine the death or birth 
of Administrations and of parties"."* The Labor opposition 
sought a vote for the proposed Territory member. However, 
the amendment was lost by eleven votes to twenty-four."^ The 
biU finally passed,"* thus creating a situation analagous to 
that which had been adopted in the United States of America 
in relation to Alaska and Hawaii."' 
Regardless of the handicaps imposed upon the Northern 
Territory member, six aspirants sought representation; David 
Lindsay, himself an aspirant who was barred because of 
residential requirements, described it as "a cushy job at 
£1,000 a year and perks!"'" Despite the number of can-
didates, it soon became apparent that the real fight would be 
between Nelson and the conservative A.C. Love, who stood 
as the representative of the Northern Territory Representa-
tion League." In the event, the contest was not the bitter 
campaign which had been expected. To the astonishment of 
aU, Nelson changed his spots when he sought to capture the 
middle ground by standing as an independent candidate, 
rather than a representative of the unionist section of the 
community. The Times which championed the cause of 
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Love," seemed rather put out when repordng upon Nelson's 
transformation, that it could find Uttle in his platform to 
cavU at." 
The election was a hectic affair in and about Darwin, 
where all but nine of the 686 persons on the electoral roll 
voted.'" In the country however, only about forty per cent of 
the population managed to enrol and record a vote." Harold 
Nelson was elected as the Territory's first representative in 
federal parliament, but only by nine votes — he gained only 
452 first preference votes.'* Given his declining influence in 
Darwin at the time — in part attested by the voting figures -
it was perhaps fortunate for Nelson that the opportunity for 
translation to the federal parliament presented itself when it 
did. However, he made a big impression in Melbourne, and 
proved an able propagandist for the Northern Territory in 
that arena.'^ He consolidated his position at subsequent elec-
tions, but exercized Uttle infiuence on Northern Territory 
affairs in his new capacity. 
By late 1921, many of the destabiUzing influences which 
had been so evident in the latter years of Gilruth's term had 
been neutralized. However, as Urquhart indicated, the resul-
tant peace was of "suspended animation and poverty". This 
was reflected, too, in yet another reorganization of the nor-
thern administration carried out at Poynton's suggestion in 
the pursuit of economy. The amalgamation of the Lands and 
Mines Departments effected an annual saving of £4,500; 
retrenchments in the civil service generally, were calculated to 
save the government between £15,000 and £20,000 
annually.'* As Urquhart indicated, "Retrenchments and 
economy became the order of the day, and were carried to the 
utmost limits consistent with any administration at aU."" 
This effectively subdued the extreme unionism which 
Urquhart found to have permeated the civU service.*" At this 
time also, the government relinquished its control over the 
hotels, and leased them to private businessmen.*' Indeed, 
wherever possible, the government sought "to abolish 
Government activities which savour of commercial undertak-
ings and make room for private enterprise".*^ 
The Northern Territory administration was pruned fur-
ther, in 1925, when the Secretary of the Department, J.G. 
New Directions: 1920-1931 59 
McLaren, after visiting the Territory, recommended addi-
tional "departmental amalgamations and dismissals to save 
between £2,000 and £3,000 p.a.".*' This latest cut was 
prompted by aUegations of impropriety made in federal 
parliament by H.G. Nelson against Colonel C.B. Story, the 
Government Secretary at the time.*" The charges were 
evidently sustained, because Story lost his position as a result 
of McLaren's suggested amalgamation of the staffs of the 
Administrator and Government Secretary.*' 
It was during this period, in 1924, that the residents of 
Darwin celebrated the centenary of British occupation of the 
Territory.** A half holiday was proclaimed on Wednesay 1 
October, and other celebrations were organized to mark the 
occasion.*^ The celebrations provided a welcome break to the 
monotony engendered by the Depression; however, in the 
circumstances there seemed little real cause for lauding the 
achievements of the Anglo-Saxon colonists of north 
Australia. As Urquhart pointed out, the celebrations "gave 
rise to serious reflections in some minds on the small results 
of one hundred years of official occupation by us of an area 
of over half a miUion square miles of country".** Successive 
federal governments had approached the problem of the Ter-
ritory in much the same manner as numerous South 
AustraUan governments had done for nearly fifty years. 
Their record of achievement was not better than that of the 
state. 
Table 3 Northern Territory Population, 1921 
British 
Greeks 
Spanish and French 
Italians and Russians 
Chinese and Japanese 
Malays and Filipinos 
Other colonials 
2,371 4 n 273 277 3,332 
Source: Sir George Buchanan Report, Northern Territory Development and Ad-
ministration, CPP 48-1925. 
Adults 
M 
1,610 
67 
8 
13 
564 
82 
27 
F 
318 
18 
5 
— 
55 
11 
4 
Children 
M 
164 
20 
2 
— 
68 
18 
1 
F Total 
168 2,260 
26 131 
6 21 
13 
54 741 
22 133 
1 33 
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Economic depression characterized the years after 1920 in 
the Northern Territory. The period was ushered in by the 
failure of Vesteys' meatworks to open for the 1920 season. 
The effect was felt throughout the Territory, even by those 
pastoralists who had failed to support the enterprise, just as 
their predecessors had failed to support South AustraUan 
initiatives to subsidize a meat-export service a quarter of a 
century earlier. They had preferred to overland their stock to 
markets in Queensland and South Australia, rather than avail 
themselves of the one third of the capacity of the meatworks 
provided for them under the terms of Vesteys' 1914 agree-
ment with the government.*' During the three seasons which 
the works operated, only one mob of 536 head was 
slaughtered for pastoralists other than Vesteys.^" 
The meatworks closed for essentially commercial reasons. 
In hindsight, C.W.D. Conacher, Vesteys' agent, admitted 
that the firm was "ill-advised to ever have commenced opera-
tions on the scale that they did"."" However, circumstances 
had been propitious when the agreement had been signed 
with the government. They had deteriorated rapidly after the 
outbreak of war. The cost of the meatworks had trebled, and 
labour difficulties had inflated costs. By 1920, Vesteys, being 
an international organization, simply found it unprofitable to 
continue operating the Darwin meatworks. During each of 
the seasons, 1917, 1918 and 1919, the British government was 
contracted to the Australian government to take the entire 
Australian beef output, on terms which were very favourable 
to the producer.^^ However, during the last killing season in 
Darwin, the cost to the company of processing stock was £10 
per head, compared with 35/- at their operations in the 
Argentine.^' The company made a half-hearted attempt to 
negotiate a new agreement but the demands which they made 
were unacceptable to the government.^" Despite speculation 
as the killing season approached each succeeding year, the 
works remained closed, except for a brief period in 1925, 
when they were used for boiling-down operations. Even this 
brief season was bedevilled by the lack of organization of 
droving and other transport arrangements, which resulted in 
standdowns, and could only have convinced the company of 
the wisdom of its earUer decision to close the works.'" 
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The only other significant development in the pastoral in-
dustry during this time was the enactment of the Crown 
Lands Ordinance of 1924. The object of this ordinance was to 
simpUfy the manner under which Northern Territory leases 
were held, and to UberaUze their terms, in the hope that 
pastoraUsm might be encouraged. By the mid twenties, there 
were still many pastoral leases and pastoral permits which 
had been granted under the South Australian acts, and which 
StiU had up to twenty years to run: in addition, other leases 
were held under the terms of the 1912 Ordinance.''* In order 
to simpUfy matters, the government sought to persuade 
pastoralists to surrender those leases which had a relatively 
short time to run, in exchange for new leases with a forty-two 
year term. The ordinance including the new provisions was 
gazetted on 10 May 1923. Under the accepted procedure for 
Northern Territory ordinances — unless members of parlia-
ment objected — it would become operative on the 
nominated day; in this instance 1 July 1923. However, on an 
adjournment motion. Nelson the Northern Territory 
representative, urged its cancellation. Nelson's criticism was 
that it had been devised in secret, and that the lack of any 
development clauses unnecessarily pandered to the large 
pastoral interests.^^ The ordinance was withdrawn, and a bill 
was introduced which included the original ordinance as a 
schedule. This was debated in both houses, and on 4 July 
1924 was withdrawn. An amended schedule was gazetted as 
Crowns Lands Ordinance no. 15 of 1924 in July 1924.''* It 
differed little from the original ordinance: rentals were low 
and stocking conditions were the only ones insisted upon. 
McHugh complained that any arrangement which was 
acceptable to big pastoralists must necessarily indicate "that 
they. . . [had] secured a wonderfully fair deal"," and he sug-
gested thereby that the government had sold out to these 
interests. His criticisms have been echoed by J.H. Kelly.*" 
G.F. Pearce, at that time Minister in charge of the Northern 
Territory, claimed that his only concern was to promote the 
pastoral industry. He emphasized that earlier efforts to 
stimulate this had been unsuccessful, and that something had 
to be tried.*' In the event, this ordinance also failed to 
stimulate the pastoral industry. It failed even in its attempt to 
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consolidate the Territory system of leases. Fifty-two lessees 
preferred to hold their leases under the South AustraUan 
acts.*2 Tax exemptions granted by the Income Tax Assess-
ment Act of 1923 were welcomed by the large pastoraUsts, 
but did nothing to stimulate the industry nor ensure im-
provements on pastoral stations. 
During this time, however, pastoralism in the Top End 
underwent a subtle change. This was effected by the con-
tinued economic depression rather than any government in-
itiatives or stimuU. In general, large companies came to 
dominate the industry as never before. Depression forced 
small pastoraUsts out of the industry, while the large com-
panies sought stations along major east-west stock routes to 
facilitate the overlanding of stock to markets in 
Queensland.*' 
Despite all efforts of governments, agriculture in the Ter-
ritory had never developed in the manner which its advocates 
had hoped. During the period immediately after the war and 
the closure of the experimental farms, it reached its nadir. By 
1920, there were only five settlers remaining on the Daly, and 
they Uved a hand-to-mouth existence.*" If their crops surviv-
ed the natural hazards, there was the strong possibility that 
they might be ruined because of the irregular shipping service 
between Darwin and the Daly.*' 
The Crown Lands Ordinance of 1924 provided for the ad-
justment of agricultural leases in accordance with the 
classification of land, but it had little effect in promoting 
settlement. In 1923, W.G. Evans, a cotton specialist, was in-
vited from India to advise Queensland cotton growers, and 
the federal government took the opportunity to have him in-
spect parts of the Northern Territory for regions suitable for 
cotton growing.** He confined his inspection to the regions 
near the railway line, and it was on his recommendations that 
152 agricultural blocks were gazetted and offered for settle-
ment at Katherine during 1923 and 1924. As a special induce-
ment for settlement, rent was waived for the first twenty-one 
years, or the life of the lessee, whichever was longer. The de-
mand was small — for eleven leases in 1923, and another 
forty-seven in 1924.*'' Bauer indicates that the failure rate of 
the new lessees was high, and suggests that many of the 
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operations were little more than speculative ventures, which 
were encouraged by the waiving of rents, and the Income Tax 
Act of 1923 which provided tax exemptions for those engaged 
in primary industry. But, however hollow, the development 
was noteworthy for the fact that it opened up a new 
agricultural region in the Territory. 
If there was any predominant crop during the early part of 
this period, it was that of cotton. This received considerable 
encouragement from the visit of Evans. In 1925, 12,372 
kilograms were produced.** In 1926, forty-two bales of Ter-
ritory cotton fetched £233/3/9 in Liverpool, which though a 
good price, was too low to yield a profit in the Territory.*' 
This represented the high point; production declined 
thereafter. Those settlers who took up land at Katherine 
preferred peanut cultivation. Peanuts had been a success at 
the Daly River as early as 1915, and land under this crop had 
increased each year. However, success was not forthcoming. 
Natural hazards were a major handicap, and these were com-
pounded by problems of physical isolation and transport dif-
ficulties. A tariff on imported peanuts in 1924, which was 
designed to encourage local production, stimulated the in-
dustry in northern Queensland rather than that in the Ter-
ritory, thus promoting increased competition for the struggl-
ing Territory grower. 
The government certainly tried to encourage agricultural 
production in the Territory. In 1924, the Encouragement of 
Primary Production Ordinance offered financial advances up 
to £600 to bona fide settiers,'" but without any marked 
success. 
The mining industry received Uttle encouragement during 
this time. It is doubtful that it would have responded had any 
been forthcoming. The fields were marginal, many were near-
ly exhausted, and Uke other Territory endeavours, they were 
handicapped by isolation. From the end of World War I, 
when there were 544 men engaged in mining, the number 
decUned to 202 in 1922, and stiU further, to 185 in 1926." 
Production showed a similar decline — during the year 
1920-21, the value of production decreased by £59,266 to 
£18,746, due largely to a sharp fall in the world's metal 
markets, particularly in tin and wolfram." The following 
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year the value of production decUned to £9,908." It was dur-
ing 1920-21 that Carter's ConsoUdation Limited of Pine 
Creek, the "last of the EngUsh mining companies" abandoned 
its leases.'" Carter's ConsoUdated had commenced operations 
during the boom of the eighties." Its demise marked the 
nadir of Territory goldmining. 
This period of the early twenties was certainly one of 
unreUeved depression in the Territory; stiU, successive 
governments continued to encourage economic development 
there. Traditionally, it had been assumed that railway con-
struction promoted development, despite the evident lack of 
success in the Territory. Thus, in the early twenties, in an 
endeavour to be seen to be doing something, it was decided to 
provide more of the same. 
The southward extension of the railway had long been a 
major issue for the transcontinental railway lobby. In 1920, it 
was discussed yet again in parliament, and in November it 
was agreed that the northern Une should be extended to 
Mataranka.'* The Parliamentary Public Works Committee 
first met on 28 January 1921. When it finally reported to 
parUament on 5 October 1922, it recommended among other 
things, that the railway should be extended to Daly Waters, 
and eventually to Newcastle Waters, then eastwards to 
Camooweal in Queensland.''' This recommendation was the 
basis of the Northern Territory Railway Extension Act which 
was assented to on 11 August 1923.'* Work commenced on 
bridging the Katherine River in 1924, but it was 1926 before 
construction commenced on the railway. In the meantime, 
this new ad hoc initiative became part of yet another gran-
diose scheme which was designed to promote economic 
development in the Territory. 
In May 1923, soon after the Bruce-Page government took 
office. Senator George Pearce who, since 21 December 1921, 
had been Minister in charge of the Territory, visited Darwin 
and the Top End, supposedly on a fact-finding mission." On 
his return to Sydney, in words long contradicted by ex-
perience in the north, he "gave a glowing account of the rich 
possibilities of the Territory". He claimed that the vast area 
to the south and east of Newcastle Waters was "magnificent 
pastoral country", and that "the district between Darwin and 
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Emungalan would be the great cotton growing belt of 
Australia". All that was required, according to Pearce, was 
better transport faciUties.'"" And he pledged to follow a 
poUcy which would secure these, and thereby ensure develop-
ment of the Territory's many resources.'"' Such effusiveness 
had long been rendered hollow by the history of European 
endeavour in the Territory. It simply underscored Pearce's 
utter lack of an appreciation of reality in the Territory, and 
indicated how little he had learned on his trip. 
However, in an endeavour to indicate his sincerity, Pearce 
foUowed a precedent which had been long established. He 
caUed for yet another report on the Territory. On this occa-
sion, Sir George Buchanan, a prominent British engineer was 
engaged to enquire into the development and administration 
of the Territory. In July 1925, he furnished the government 
with his report. It is an admirable document, and a valuable 
record of the Territory in 1924-25, yet it told the government 
nothing which had not been known for many years. Thus, he 
concluded that the Northern Territory was "suffering from 
isolation, inefficient system of administration, lack of com-
munications, and constant labour troubles".'"^ This could 
not have come as a revelation. One of his criticisms was 
directed at the division of authority in the Territory — the 
fact that some of the most important departments were out-
side the control of the Administrator'"' — but Gilruth had 
complained of this long before. Buchanan's report changed 
nothing. 
However, Pearce's visU to the Territory had a major effect 
on the Territory administration — its total reorganization. 
This was somewhat paradoxical during a time of ever-
deepening national — and international — depression, when 
the government was eager for economies wherever possible. 
The surprising thing is that it should ever have been im-
plemented. To this time, the Territory had been a cause of 
mounting debt, and continued stringencies would seem to 
have been appropriate. In the sixteen years under Com-
monwealth administration, the total Territory debt had 
doubled to a little more than £12 million.'"" 
As far as Pearce was concerned, the chief need of the Nor-
thern Territory was the provision of transport and com-
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munication faciUties, simUar to those which were provided in 
the settled regions of the states. Thus, in December 1923, he 
had suggested that a commission should be appointed with 
the sole task of providing these facilities.'"' Initially, Pearce 
envisaged such a development commission having respon-
sibility in northern Queensland and the northern part of 
Western AustraUa, as weU as in the Territory, but the state 
governments declined to become involved. In 1925, Pearce 
finally introduced his pared-down scheme into the Senate. 
The Northern Australia Bill passed its second reading without 
division, but was not passed before parUament was pro-
rogued for the federal election; it lapsed as a consequence. 
The bill was re-introduced in January 1926;'"* it met with 
Uttle opposition, and was assented to on 4 June 1926. Few of 
its supporters seemed to have been concerned at its apparent 
cost, although this was the factor which greatly exercized its 
critics outside of parliament.'"'' The success of the legislation 
can be satisfactorily explained by reference to the parliamen-
tary standing of Pearce, the general ignorance about the Nor-
thern Territory of government members and members of 
parUament generally, and the wish to do something — 
anything — to encourage the economic development of the 
Territory. 
The new act, "probably the most important measure of the 
session",'"* proposed wholesale changes in the administra-
tion of the Territory. The most radical change was the sub-
division of the Territory into Northern and Central Australia 
at the twentieth parallel of latitude. Each region was to have a 
separate administration, the head of which was to revert to 
the designation of Government Resident: each Government 
Resident was to have a partly-elected advisory council of 
four. However, perhaps the most important feature of the 
new legislation was to be the appointment of a three-man 
commission which was to have responsibility for develop-
ment works throughout Northern Australia. 
After the manner of so many earUer, discredited, govern-
ment initiatives, the act promised a great deal. Pearce claimed 
that it was a decisive step towards self-government.'"' It was 
suggested that it marked "the beginning of the end of govern-
ing the territory from Melbourne or Canberra"."" When in-
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troducing the bill into the House of Representatives, Prime 
Minister Bruce recognized that the frequent changes of 
ministers controlUng the Territory had had a deleterious 
effect on Territory development, and had promoted a 
dislocation of poUcy,"' yet he did not establish the fact that 
the new act would rectify this problem. In substance, the act 
provided little which could not have been provided under the 
earlier form of administration, and it was evident that the 
worth of the new commission would be dependent upon the 
financial support of parliament and the government. 
"In 1925-26 the AustraUan Government turned in its sleep 
and decided that at last something must be done for the Nor-
thern Territory.""^ So wrote F.C. Urquhart in 1929. Even at 
that time, he dismissed the appointment of the North 
Australia Commission as "expensive eye-wash". Despite the 
hopes held out for the efficacy of this new government in-
itiative when the North Australia BiU was debated in 1926, 
the North AustraUa Commission achieved nothing — except 
a more rapid accumulation of the Northern Territory debt. 
As Urquhart pointed out, the Commission was so hamstrung 
by financial dependence on the Treasury, that it could do 
nothing but "inquire, report and recommend". In 1931, the 
SculUn Labor government abolished the Commission as an 
economy measure. 
Even in the most favourable economic circumstances, it is 
doubtful that the Commission could have stimulated the 
development which was sought for the Northern Territory. 
During the period of world depression in the late twenties, 
there was no hope of it doing so, when it had to compete for 
scarce funds which were required in the more populous — 
and electorally sensitive — regions to the south. 
Despite the economic depression and several years of 
drought in some regions, there were significant developments 
in the Territory during this time — though none was depen-
dent upon initiatives of the Commission. In 1929, the railway 
from Oodnadatta in South Australia was extended to Alice 
Springs, thus opening up southern markets to Central 
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Australian pastoralists. And during this time too, attention 
was drawn to the conditions under which the Territory's 
Aborigines lived, and the first feeble steps were taken to 
ameliorate these. 
The Northern Australia Act was passed in 1926, but it was 
not proclaimed untU 1 February 1927.'" In the meantime -
in August — the appointment of the three commissioners 
was announced, to take effect from 1 September."" The 
Chairman was J.H. Horsburgh, Assistant General Manager 
of the Mount Morgan Goldmining Company of Queensland; 
he was to receive £2,500 per year. The other members, each to 
receive £1,500 per year, were W.R. Easton, Chairman of the 
Northern Territory Land Board, and G.A. Hobler, the Chief 
Engineer of the Commonwealth Railways. The Commission 
was to concern itself solely with development works in North 
Australia — north of the twentieth degree of latitude; and 
within this region it had wide powers — on paper at least. 
These powers included: 
(a) the maintenance and operation of railways; 
(b) the construction and maintenance of roads, excluding 
the area comprised in the town of Darwin; 
(c) the erection of telegraph and telephone lines; 
(d) water boring and conservation; 
(e) ports and harbours. 
[After 8 February 1927]: 
(i) the encouragement and establishment of air 
services; 
(ii) the construction and maintenance of cattle or sheep 
dips; 
(iii) the encouragement and establishment of coastal 
shipping services.'" 
The members of the Commission entered upon their task 
with a will. By 3 January 1927, they had all arrived in Dar-
win. ' ' * Then, from 5 May to 8 July, after the cessation of the 
Wet, they left on an extended tour of the Territory during 
which they travelled 7,240 kilometres. By 6 December, after a 
second extensive tour, the members had prepared an Initial 
Report on a Scheme for Development of North Australia.^^'^ 
The following day, with the approach of the Wet, the 
members left Darwin so that they might meet with the 
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Minister. They did not return to Darwin tiU the middle of 
AprU 1928"* - after the Wet. 
The Commission achieved little, despite the earnestness of 
its members and questions in parliament about its pro-
gramme by Harold Nelson.'" Among other things, the first 
report identified a need for fourteen additional bores on 
existing stock routes. By 1930, the Commission had been able 
to provide only seven'^" — aUhough it had managed to 
accumulate a staff of thirty-one.'2' Federal funds were simp-
ly not forthcoming for capital works. If it had not been 
apparent before, it was evident by 1928 that the Commission 
was of little use. Indeed the Chairman, on his return to Dar-
win in April, "informed the astonished [advisory] Council 
that the Minister would take little or no notice of any recom-
mendations that the Commission made".'^^ As the cor-
respondent of the Bulletin contended, it was an absurdity to 
maintain such an expensive commission, which after only two 
years, admitted to being "useless and helpless". 
The North Australia Commission was a significant drain 
on federal funds at a time of severe financial stress. 
Table 4 Cost of North Australia Commission, 1927-30 
1/2/27 - 30/6/27 
1927-28 
1928-29 
1929-30 
Salaries 
£2,281 
6,321 
6,640 
6,820 
£22,062 
Travel 
expenses 
£ 332 
860 
598 
740 
£2,420 
Other 
expenses 
£ 235 
1,096 
1,183 
444 
£2,958 
Total 
£2,848 
8,277 
8,421 
8,004 
£27,550 
Source: CofA, PDHR, 5 November 1930, p. 72. 
It was a major factor in the increased cost of Northern Ter-
ritory administration during this time. As such, there was no 
surprise when in 1931, the Northern AustraUa Act (1926) 
was repealed. Indeed, except for the Bruce-Page government 
losing face by repealing the act soon after its proclamation, 
the surprise is that the experiment persisted for so long, par-
ticularly since the Bruce-Page government was defeated at the 
general election on 12 October 1929. 
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Table 5 Cost of Northern Territory Administration, 1922-30 
1922-23 ^ £104,734 
1923-24 = £120,215 
1924-25 = £139,800 
1925-26 = £155,769 
1926-27 = £161,177 
1927-28 = £183,811 
1928-29 = £194,463 
1929-30 = £190,064 
Source: C of A. PDHR, 5 November 1930, p. 71. 
The Northern Australia Act was responsible for the large 
increase in the cost of Northern Territory administration at 
this time. Besides splitting the functions associated with 
administration and development, it also dupUcated the 
administrative structure. On 1 March 1927, in accordance 
with the provisions of the act, a proclamation divided the 
Territory into North and Central Australia, and provided for 
separate administrations in each region. A major concern of 
the Northern Australia Act was to increase local responsibility 
in the control of Territory affairs. It served only to bloat the 
ineffectual administrative structure and to increase its cost 
inordinantly. 
In both North and Central Australia, the act provided for a 
Government Resident who was to have the aid of an advisory 
council of four — two members to be ministerial appointees, 
the others to be elected by residents of the region. Major 
R.H. Weddell was appointed Government Resident in North 
AustraUa after Colonel W.O. Mansbridge declined the 
offer:'^' C.A. Cawood was appointed to the identical posi-
tion in Central AustraUa. 
Ineffectual though it was to prove, the creation of a 
separate administration in Central Australia drew attention 
to recent developments there, and underscored the emerging 
role of Alice Springs as a regional centre. European settle-
ment had commenced there in 1871, when a repeating station 
for the Overland Telegraph was built at Alice Springs. In 
October 1888, David Lindsay surveyed the first 104 
allotments for the township of Stuart six and a half 
kUometres distant.'2" At the auction sale on 31 January 1889, 
five allotments were bought. A police station, gaol and court 
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were estabUshed there, and it became the centre of a far flung 
pastoral district, and during the late nineties, a staging point 
for miners seeking their fortune on the Arltunga goldfields 
which had been discovered in 1897, 115 kilometres to the 
east. However, Stuart — officially called Alice Springs after 
the proclamation to that effect on 30 August 1933, when the 
postal, and telegraph stations were moved there in the same 
year - remained a tiny settlement; the goldfields at Arltunga 
had waned long before the advent of the Central Australian 
administration. In 1927, Stuart had a white population of 
about forty, a dozen of them being children.'2' Besides the 
necessary hotel and store, a school had been opened there in 
June 1917, and in 1915, the Reverend John Flynn established 
one of his A.I.M. sisters in the town. In 1926, the social 
centre of the town — along with the hotel — was the recently 
opened A.I.M. hostel, Adelaide House.'^* 
Even in the mid twenties, despite a half-century of Euro-
pean settlement in the Centre, there were still parts of it which 
were virtually unknown. Thus, the exploration of this region 
became the special concern of C.T. Madigan, the companion 
of Douglas Mawson on the latter's Antarctic explorations in 
1911-14, and by this time a lecturer in geology at the Univer-
sity of Adelaide. It was at Madigan's insistence that aircraft 
was first used in geological work in Australia, and the first 
attempt was made at aerial strip photography. This pioneer-
ing aerial survey was undertaken with the support of the 
South Australian Branch of the Royal Geographical Society 
of Australasia, and the loan of two aircraft from the Royal 
AustraUan Air Force. In all, nine flights were made in Central 
Australia, during which more than 5,000 kilometres were 
flown during August and September 1929. Madigan was 
delighted with the success of the venture. 
We had accomplished what we set out to do. We had satisfied ourselves 
that nothing lay within the borders of the Unknown Area [Simpson 
Desert] other than what is to be seen round its margins. . . . We saw 
nothing to warrant further investigations by prospectors.'^' 
Developments such as these did a great deal to help break 
down the sense of isolation in the remote interior. 
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Table 6 Central Australia, Population 1928-30 
1928 1929 1930 
Area 378,502 sq. kilometres 
White population 400 565 590 
Half-caste population f ? 260 
Births registered 9 7 6 
Deaths registered 7 11 3 
Aborigines c5,550 c5,500 c5,500 
Sources: Annual Reports of Government Resident of Central Australia CPP 
151-1929/30, p. 9, CPP 12-1929, p. 8, CPP 18-1929, p. 5. 
In July 1929, white settlement in Central Australia received 
a tremendous fillip with the completion of railway extensions 
from Oodnadatta to Stuart. Prior to this time, the nearest 
railhead was 645 kilometres south, at Oodnadatta in South 
Australia. Stock for southern markets had to be over landed 
there, and supplies for Central Australian residents were 
dependent upon the teams of camel drivers who worked from 
there. The railroad had an immediate effect upon these 
arrangements. After the opening of the line on 5 August, 
until 24 October 1929, 6,718 fat cattle were railed from 
Central Australia to markets in Adelaide.'^* The cost of sup-
plies to the Centre was greatly reduced; that of motor spirit 
by fifty per cent.'^' This in turn renewed interest in mineral 
exploration in Central Australia. At the same time, it en-
couraged tourism to the Centre during the southern winters. 
In 1928, even before the line had been completed, the 
Government Resident noted that the Victorian Railways had 
arranged for a party of eighty to visit Stuart, and that several 
privately organized tours had also been arranged.'^" To meet 
the demand, an additional passenger service was provided 
during the southern winter.'^' 
The completion of this railway had nothing to do with 
initiatives responsible for, or flowing from, the Northern 
Australia Act of 1926. Rather, it must be seen as but one 
more development in the longstanding saga associated with 
the idea of a north/south transcontinental railway. The 
recommendation to construct the railway from Oodnadatta 
to Stuart was made by the Parliamentary Works Committee 
in 1922 — and ratified by parUament soon after; but it was 18 
September 1925 before an agreement permitting construction 
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work was drawn up between the Commonwealth and South 
AustraUan governments. Then, it was not until after the 
Bruce-Page government was returned at the election in 
November, that the agreement was submitted to the federal 
parliament."^ A special session of the South Australian 
parliament was convened to ratify the agreement in February 
1926."' It met with no opposition. Indeed, South 
Australians were eager to give effect to the agreement to 
ensure construction of yet another portion of the transcon-
tinental line."'* 
There were delays in commencing the work. This went 
counter to the terms of the 1925 agreement, but was of little 
consequence. The first sod was turned with due ceremony at 
Oodnadatta on 21 January 1927,'" and work began. By May 
1929, there were 860 men at work on the construction of the 
line: 130 employees of the Commonwealth Railways and 730 
employed by the Victorian Construction Pty. Ltd."* During 
the period of general depression, this provided welcome 
employment. The line was completed to Stuart by July 1929, 
and opened for traffic early in August — only a little more 
than a month after the agreed date. 
At this time too, railway works under the terms of the Nor-
thern Territory Railway Extension Act of 1923, were under 
way in North AustraUa. Work commenced on the raUway 
construction in 1926. It was undertaken directly by the Com-
monwealth using day labour and piecework. At one time, 
there were upwards of 500 men engaged. The line to 
Mataranka was opened for traffic on 1 July 1928, and by 4 
September 1929, trains ran as far as Birdum."' Here work 
hahed. The continued world-wide depression had induced the 
government to abandon plans to complete the line to Daly 
Waters, only seventy kilometres to the south, aUhough much 
of the earthworks had been completed. 
In contrast to the Central Australian raUway, there were 
few immediate benefits to northern residents flowing from 
the railway construction. The settlement which had been 
Emungalan, was transferred to the south bank of the river, 
and became the nucleus of the new town of Katherine."* A 
small railway settiement was established at Birdum."' But it 
induced few - if any - new settiers to take up land. 
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Indeed, in the short term, the railway construction only suc-
ceeded in fuelling renewed social unrest in Darwin, and to a 
lesser extent in Stuart. At a time when there were few employ-
ment opportunities in southern AustraUa, the railways con-
struction in North and Central AustraUa attracted hopeful 
workers in great numbers — despite warnings from govern-
ment officials that insufficient work was available for all who 
sought it. Many unemployed and destitute continued to 
travel overland to Darwin from Queensland and South 
Australia, or stowed away aboard ships from Western 
Australia in search of work, even after those who had worked 
on the Une had left to seek work elsewhere.'"" UntU late 
November 1929, the Destitute Branch of the administration 
had been able to keep the few destitute North Australians 
economically enough, but by 14 November the continued 
need for economy meant that food rationing had to be 
introduced."" 
Circumstances deteriorated during the following year, and 
conjured up spectres of the latter part of the Gilruth regime. 
A house had been made available for the use of the 
unemployed at the "2'/2 mile", at Parap. This enabled the 
more militant of the unemployed to rail against the 
administration, and to organize their supporters in opposi-
tion to it. On 29 April 1930, a large group of the unemployed 
marched to Government House to demand work or full 
maintenance, rather than the rations. WeddeU's claims that 
there were insufficient funds to meet this request did nothing 
to pacify the men. In an attempt to have him meet their 
demands, the leaders locked him in his office, while the 
others camped on the verandah."'^ The stand-off continued 
until the police intervened. Subsequently, the leaders of the 
unemployed, Brozier and Waldie, were arrested together with 
fourteen others. News of the incident, in many instances 
grossly distorted, was given wide currency."" Labour 
organizations throughout Australia were incensed and pro-
tested loudly. Ultimately, the ScuUin federal Labor govern-
ment was persuaded to have all the sentences remitted. This 
only served to encourage the unemployed in their campaign 
for work and wages. 
On 9 November, there was another confrontation between 
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Unemployment in the Depression — occupation of Government House, 1930. 
(NLA) 
the unemployed and the poUce. On this occasion, twenty-
three men were arrested for not obeying police orders.""* The 
following day, five more arrests were made. However, Wed-
dell was again instructed by his political masters to have all 
charges dropped."*' Thereafter, the protests of the 
unemployed became more violent, and they refused requests 
from the Government Resident to hold their meetings in a 
place which would not disrupt traffic in Darwin. In 
December, five men — one of them being Waldie — were 
charged with assaulting police. At last the Minister made a 
stand, and refused to permit the release of those who had 
been arrested, despite requests from Toupein, who had 
returned to the Territory as Secretary of the North Australian 
Workers'Union, and F. Martin, Secretary of the Unemployed 
Committee. On 28 January 1931, another violent confronta-
tion took place when the unemployed again occupied the 
verandah of the government offices. On this occasion, four 
of the police were injured — two of them seriously — and 
two of the unemployed required hospital treatment. Ten 
arrests were made.'*^ Again, the government refused to 
dismiss the charges. 
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The confrontation in January 1931 was decisive. The 
resolute stance of the government, and the increasing tenden-
cy towards violence by some militants, effectively split the 
ranks of the unemployed. The dissatisfaction with the leaders 
of the unemployed was heightened when they insisted that 
those in receipt of relief work from the government should 
make weekly contributions of one quarter of their earnings, 
to a fund to help pay the legal expenses of those who had 
been arrested.'"' There were no serious disturbances after 
that of January. 
Except for the railway construction work which ceased in 
1929, there were precious few employment opportunities in 
the Territory during this time. The taxation exemption for 
those engaged in primary production, which had been imple-
mented in 1923 to apply to 30 June 1927, was extended to 30 
June 1932, but with no appreciable effect on primary produc-
tion. In June 1929, C.L.A. Abbott, the Country Party 
Minister for Home Affairs, paid a visit to North and Central 
Australia.'"* Everywhere he found "a depressing feeling of 
hopelessness".'"' Being a pastoraUst himself, he took par-
ticular notice of conditions in the pastoral industry. He found 
many of the lessees to be old, and to be using methods which 
were very primitive."" "The only efforts at station manage-
ment were on the Vestey properties and even these left a great 
deal to be desired", he observed. Yet like so many before him, 
Abbott failed to appreciate the reality of the Territory at that 
time. As he recounted: "I took away with me the conviction 
that something could be made of this vast country and that 
with a constructive, sympathetic and continuous poUcy the 
Northern Territory could emerge from this [depressed] 
state."'" Nothing could be done immediately, however. The 
federal election in October saw SculUn's Labor government 
oust the Bruce-Page government of which Abbott had been a 
member. North and Central Australia came under the control 
of yet another minister, A. Blakeley, who had been a shearer 
and union official before entering parUament in 1917. 
If it was at all possible, the North Australian pastoral in-
dustry became even more depressed after June 1930, when 
the Philippine's government was determined to prevent the 
import of live cattle from Darwin. "^ After the closure of the 
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Darwin meatworks, Vesteys' Northern Agency Ltd. had 
sought to renew live-beef exports to South East Asian 
markets. In this they had succeeded, and from 1922 to 1930 
the trade had continued.'" It had never been a significant 
one - in its nine years only 46,383 cattle were exported — 
but it did provide a small market for pastoralists who were 
located near the railway Une, and who were able to take 
advantage of it. In June 1930, however, even this outlet was 
closed to them. 
The technology on many of the pastoral stations was 
primitive. Many pastoralists survived during this time of 
depression, but only because of their dependence upon 
Aboriginal labour. Indeed, in 1928, J.W. Bleakley found this 
dependence to be absolute."" Yet, it was during this period 
that attention was directed to the plight of Aborigines, and 
the first steps were taken to improve it. In this, the appoint-
ment of Dr Cecil Cook to the position of Chief Medical 
Officer in February 1927 was significant. 
Cook had devoted himself to the study of tropical 
medicine. After graduating from Sydney University, he had 
undertaken post-graduate work at the London School of 
Tropical Medicine. Subsequently, during the years from 
1923-1925, he studied leprosy in many areas of northern 
Australia.'" He was working at Townsville on a 
Commonwealth-funded hookworm programme, when he 
was asked to accept appointment as Chief Medical Officer 
and Chief Quarantine Officer in North Australia. He 
accepted the positions on the condition that he be also 
appointed Chief Protector of Aborigines. It was Cook's 
belief that medical problems in North Australia could not be 
combatted unless the Aborigines were an integral part of any 
programme. This remained the premise upon which he based 
his poUcy towards the Aborigines."* 
Although Cook saw the improvement of conditions for 
Aborigines as but one of his responsibUities, he tackled it 
earnestly. And so that he might undertake it more satisfac-
torily, he undertook a course in anthropology at the Univer-
sity of Sydney during his recreation leave, in 1930."'' 
Cook's appointment as Chief Protector of Aborigines is a 
significant development in the history of black/white rela-
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tions in the TerrUory. It is perhaps this date rather than 1934, 
as advanced by Elkin and others, which was the "turning 
point in native administration","* though it is rare in history 
for particular dates to be as decisive as the concept suggests. 
Since the wartime administration economies, the protection 
of the Aborigines had devolved upon the poUce. They provid-
ed little protection, as the Coniston kilUngs in Central 
AustraUa in 1928 indicated. Generally the police saw their role 
as protecting the "rights" of Europeans, rather than those of 
the Aborigines. This changed in 1927 — at least as far as 
policy was concerned. Thereafter, Cook sought to convert 
the Aborigine from "an unproductive nomad into a produc-
tive peasant",'" and so helped to lay the basis of the policy of 
assimilation which was to become official government poUcy 
a decade later. At this time though, as with the foundation of 
the Northern Territory Medical Service, the initiatives of 
Cook were his own, and not those of the government. 
Cook's first initiatives were to seek to control the employ-
ment of Aborigines by means of the licences which were 
required, as well as to provide for their regular medical 
inspection. He insisted that prospective employers should 
agree to contribute to a medical fund established for the 
benefit of Aborigines; and he insisted, too, upon higher stan-
dards of hygiene on missions and employment camps.'*" For 
several years, however, the effectiveness of Cook's policies 
was handicapped by a lack of personnel, and his influence did 
not extend beyond those areas over which he had personal 
control: as such, he had little effect upon conditions on 
pastoral stations. 
The deplorable conditions under which Aborigines and 
half-castes lived in North and Central AustraUa was 
highlighted by the report by J.W. Bleakley in 1929.'*' 
Bleakley was at that time Chief Protector in Queensland. His 
enquiry was undertaken at the behest of Prime Minister 
Bruce, and represented a recognition of the growing, but still 
very weak show of concern for the welfare of Aborigines by 
philanthropic societies in southern Australia. No doubt it was 
also prompted by the outcry which accompanied the findings 
of the Royal Commission into the massacre of Aborigines in 
the Kimberley region of Western Australia in 1927. 
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Bleakley's report achieved little. In general, he recommend-
ed that policies then followed in Queensland should be 
implemented in North and Central Australia: in particular, 
he suggested that cash wages should be provided for 
Aboriginal drovers, and where already paid, that they should 
be increased to about £1 per week.'*^ Cook gazetted increas-
ed wage rates for Aboriginal drovers on 27 September 1929, 
but only succeeded in arousing intense opposition from 
pastoraUsts, who insisted that compliance would bring about 
their ruin. On 2 April 1930, on the direction of Labor 
Minister, Blakeley, Cook's instruction was cancelled.'*' 
Soon after the publication of Bleakley's report, and per-
suaded by the debate engendered by the Coniston kilUngs, 
Minister Abbott had convened a meeting of interested parties 
in Melbourne on 12 AprU 1929. The conference was signifi-
cant simply because it had been called. However, it achieved 
nothing, because there were such deep differences between 
the many participants — pastoraUsts, missionary bodies, and 
sundry philanthropic and learned societies.'*" Moreover, 
Abbott, a Country Party member and a pastoralist, was un-
wilHng to raise issues which were deemed to be contrary to the 
interests of the industry. Less than a month earlier, he had 
entertained Northern Territory pastoralists at the Hotel 
Canberra. During the course of the dinner, he had "expressed 
his admiration for the men who went up into North Australia 
to win a competence out of the wilderness", and added: "I 
cannot promise anything concrete, but you will have my sym-
pathy in your problems, and you will have me as your ad-
vocate."'*' In simUar fashion, there were no significant 
results from a conference which Cook convened in Darwin 
during May 1930, to which were invited representatives of 
pastoralists, unions and missionaries.'** Too many of the 
parties had vested interests in maintaining the status quo. 
Late in 1930, the Secretary of the NAWU, petitioned the 
Minister for Home Affairs to insist upon an increase in the 
rates paid to Aboriginal station workers.'*'' However, then as 
later, the union was not so much concerned with the plight of 
the Aborigines, as with the fact that fewer whites were being 
employed in the pastoral industry: the union's reasoning was, 
that if pastoraUsts were forced to pay higher wages to 
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Aborigines, they would be persuaded to employ Europeans 
instead.'** 
More than an examination of conferences and reports, the 
events associated with the Coniston killings in 1928 reveal 
European attitudes towards the Aborigines, and the develop-
ment of black/white relations to that time.'*' It must be 
pointed out, however, that the events took place in Central 
Australia, and were, therefore, not the responsibility of 
Cook. The background can be briefly sketched. The killings 
occurred during a period of drought in Central Australia. It 
was a time when Aborigines and cattle competed for the 
scarce water. On 7 August 1928, the pastoraUst Fred Brooks 
was killed by Aborigines on Coniston Station 225 kilometres 
north east of Stuart — the reason was not clear, although the 
Aborigines claimed that Brooks had had unlawful use of an 
Aboriginal woman."" Constable Murray led an expedition to 
bring to "justice" those Aborigines who were responsible for 
the killing. In fact, he led three separate patrols in August, 
September and October. Seventeen Aborigines were allegedly 
killed during the first expedition, with another fourteen kiUed 
during the third. The trial in Darwin of the two Aborigines 
who were arrested was a farce, and both were acquitted. 
However, many questions were raised about the whole 
episode. On 13 December 1928, the Governor-General ap-
pointed a board to enquire into the incidents. The appoint-
ment of the Board drew angry criticisms when it became clear 
that, because of its composition, it would simply white-wash 
the incident. A.H. O'Kelly, Police Magistrate of Cairns, was 
appointed to lead the enquiry. He was to be aided by P.A. 
Giles, Police Inspector of Oodnadatta, and J.C. Cawood, 
Government Resident in Alice Springs, and thus the local 
Commissioner of Police. Within a matter of eighteen days, 
the Board had examined thirty witnesses and delivered its 
report. It affirmed that there was "not a scintiUa of evidence 
. . . that the shooting of the blacks by the Police Party was in 
the nature of a reprisal or a punitive expedition"."' Accor-
ding to Cawood, "the shooting was justified, and . . . the 
natives killed in the various encounters were aU members of 
the WalmuUa tribe from Western Australia, who were on a 
marauding expedition, with the avowed object of wiping out 
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the white settiers and the native boys employed on the 
stations"."^ The reasons put forward to explain the actions 
of the Aborigines included, "missionaries wandering from 
place to place preaching equality . . . inexperienced white set-
tlers making free with the natives and treating them as equals 
. . . a white woman missionary living amongst naked blacks 
thus lowering their respect for the whites . . . imprisonment 
not being a deterrent to native offenders . . ." ." ' How these 
criticisms applied to marauding Aborigines from the remote 
areas was not explained — but then many inconsistencies in 
evidence were admitted."" It is not surprising that no blame 
was attached to estabUshed pastoralists. Of the thirty 
witnesses, seventeen represented pastoral interests, seven 
others, three of them being policemen, were members of the 
administration: only one Aborigine, the tracker Paddy, was 
called to give evidence. 
Few of the personnel associated with the enquiry, from the 
Minister who appointed the Board, to those who were called 
as witnesses, could take any credit from the manner in which 
the enquiry was conducted. The enquiry clearly demonstrated 
the low regard white AustraUans had for the Aborigines. It is 
little wonder that the efforts of Cook and Bleakley should 
have met with so little success. But, if the enquiry achieved 
little in the Territory, it attracted attention to the plight of the 
Aborigines, and encouraged groups in southern Australia to 
redouble their efforts in support of the Aborigines. 
As suggested by the minutes of proceedings by the Con-
iston enquiry, missions and missionaries were regarded as a 
nuisance by pastoraUsts, and were only tolerated by govern-
ments. At this time, missionaries were concerned primarily 
with Christianizing the Aborigines. At Bathurst Island, the 
Sacred Heart missionaries had installed a saw mill, and were 
teaching the Aborigines to work i t , ' " but the extent to which 
such occupational training was given depended upon the in-
dividual missions and the secular skills of the missionaries. 
There was yet no stipulation that missions should comple-
ment the work of the government. As yet, there was no 
government Aboriginal poUcy. 
Several new missions had been founded during the twenties 
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— aU of them in North Australia. AU received a smaU govern-
ment subsidy,'''* viz: 
Roper River — Anglican Church — £250 
Missionary Society 
OenpeUi — AngUcan Church — £500 
Missionary Society 
Bathurst Island - Roman Catholic - £250 
Goulbourn Island — Methodist — £250 
MilUngimbi - Methodist - £250 
Finke River — Lutheran — £400 
The subsidy to the Hermannsburg Mission at the Finke River 
had been resumed during the 1925-26 financial year: in 
1926-27, the mission was granted an interest free loan of £500 
for the purchase of stud bulls and pumping equipment.'" 
It is evident from reports such as those of Bleakley, and the 
commission of enquiry into the Coniston kilUngs, that the 
Aborigines on the fringes of white settlement in the Northern 
Territory lived in deplorable and degraded conditions. Dr 
Cecil Cook was one of the first to recognize this and to take 
steps to remedy the situation, though for some time he was 
handicapped by a lack of support from the government, and 
the several vested interests in the Territory. 
Government policy was ever concerned with encouraging 
industries in the Territory, and a great deal of money and 
effort was spent to this end. However, little official recogni-
tion was paid to the need to provide amenities for those 
famiUes which it was hoped would be attracted to the Ter-
ritory. Gilruth had noted that the lack of white females in 
Darwin had contributed to the social problems of the town. 
This was but a microcosm of conditions throughout the Ter-
ritory. Visiting experts regularly complained of the problems 
associated with the lack of white women in the Territory. 
Thus, in 1929, Bleakley highlighted the need to "create condi-
tions to encourage white women to brace the hardships of the 
outback", so that "efforts to check the abuse of . . . 
defenceless Aboriginals" might be more successful. He con-
tended that "One good white woman in a district wiU have 
more restraining influence than aU the Acts and 
Regulations.""* But because of the primitive conditions. 
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women were not attracted to the outback. It had been 1902 
when Jeannie Gunn ventured out to the Elsey.''" Thirty years 
later, conditions had changed but little in the remote regions. 
Indeed, in 1963, before the Legislative Council Select Com-
mittee on Political Rights, E. Connellan claimed that a great 
deal yet remained to be done to provide better amenities in 
the interior to encourage permanent settlement. He contend-
ed that a great deal of Commonwealth finance could have 
been better spent helping to provide such amenities, rather 
than directly subsidizing strictly economic ventures.'*" Cecil 
Cook was one of the few to address himself to this problem 
through the creation of the North Australian Medical Ser-
vice.'*' As he said of it, "The purpose was to control and, if 
possible to eliminate tropical infections and to provide that 
high quality of medical and surgical attention to create a 
sense of security sufficient to encourage white women to 
enter and raise famiUes in the area."'*^ 
Cook's creation of the North Australia (after 1931, the 
Northern Territory) Medical Service in 1928 was a major per-
sonal achievement in the face of general official apathy.'*' 
Prior to 1928, the government's role in health administration 
in the Northern Territory was simply that of subsidizing 
private practitioners, and maintaining the small hospital at 
Darwin, Late in 1927, Cook succeeded in having the govern-
ment buy out the one remaining private practice in Darwin, 
that of Dr L. Jones, thus inaugurating the Government 
Medical Service. A year later. Cook founded a medical 
benefits fund which permitted medical services to be made 
available to all sections of the community at minimal cost.'*" 
The Medical Service represented the first exclusively salaried 
medical service in Australia. For some time, the Medical Ser-
vice laboured under great difficulty because of the lack of 
staff: it was not untU May 1928 that W.B. Kirkland was ap-
pointed as the second Medical Officer of the Service. 
However, wUhin a decade. Northern TerrUory Medical Ser-
vice boasted a staff of six medical officers and was respons-
ible for five government hospUals, and a leprosarium near 
Darwin."' The service received a great deal of publicity, and 
its effectiveness was greatiy extended after 1934, when Dr 
Clyde Fenton was appointed Medical Officer at Katherine. It 
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was Fenton who was responsible for founding the Northern 
Territory Aerial Medical Service, which brought every remote 
settlement in the Top End within range of professional 
medical expertise. In 1928, Fenton had unsuccessfully sought 
to fly in the Flying Doctor Service which had recently been 
founded by the Reverend John Flynn, because it was Flynn's 
contention that the doctor should not actually pilot the plane. 
However, he received encouragement from Cook and served 
the Northern Territory Medical Service tiU 1939.'** 
Cook was not the only one who was concerned to 
ameUorate the harsh conditions of the interior. In 1921, the 
Reverend John Flynn had visited the Top End, and had been 
struck by the social and psychological needs of those in the 
remote areas.'*' Immediately after, he persuaded his 
Presbyterian Church to establish the Australian Inland Mis-
sion (AIM) to provide first, a system of itinerant priests, and 
then, nursing sisters to provide spiritual and physical welfare 
to Europeans in the inland. As mentioned, a nursing sister 
was established at Alice Springs in 1915. Two years later, a 
hospital and two sisters were located at the tin mining field at 
Maranboy, and in 1923, another hospital was founded at Vic-
toria River Downs.'** These hospitals became important 
A.I.M. Hospital at Alice Springs, 1927. (NLA) 
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social centres in the remote regions. However, Flynn was not 
content simply with this achievement. Over many years, he 
sought to establish a medical service which might capitalize 
on the developments in the field of aviation, to minimize the 
fear of isolation and to spread over the outback, what he 
termed a "Mantle of Safety".'*' The Flying Doctor Service, 
for which Flynn became renowned, commenced operations 
from Cloncurry in western Queensland on 17 May 1928. 
Subsequently, bases were set up in many inland towns to pro-
vide a network throughout the isolated interior of AustraUa: 
a base at AUce Springs was opened in 1939. However, this 
Flying Doctor Service could not have been a success had it 
not been for Flynn's encouragement of Alf Traeger to 
develop a portable pedal radio transceiver. This was 
perfected in 1926, and tested in Central Australia between the 
Hermannsberg Mission, Stuart and Arltunga. The prolifera-
tion of these wireless sets throughout the outback did a great 
deal to break down the sense of isolation on the many remote 
inland stations and settlements. 
Developments such as those encouraged by Cook and 
Flynn were to have a major effect in overcoming problems 
associated with isolation in the Territory. 
Perhaps the most significant development which was to 
help break down the isolation and remoteness of the Ter-
ritory, was that in the field of aviation. Sir Ross and Sir Keith 
Smith had flown from England to AustraUa in 1919. At the 
time. Administrator Staniforth Smith deemed it to be "the 
most important event in the history of Darwin since 1872, 
when Australia was first connected with Asia and Europe by 
a submarine cable"."" Ten years later, air travel was stiU 
something of a novelty, as is attested by the interest which 
was shown in the search for the Kookaburra which went miss-
ing north west of Stuart in AprU 1929."' However, aviation 
had advanced sufficiently that the Minister for Home 
Affairs, C.L.A. Abbott, should feel confident about making 
his visit to the Territory by means of an aeroplane.' '^ 
The new technology, which had developed during the first 
decades of the twentieth century, was no more evident than in 
the 1930 expedition which set out from Stuart in an attempt 
to discover the fabulous gold reef allegedly discovered by 
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H.B.L. Lasseter."' Lasseter claimed to have discovered the 
reef in about 1900. Two expeditions in 1916 faUed to 
rediscover U. However, in 1930, Lasseter convinced sup-
porters in Sydney of its existence, and on 21 July, an expedi-
tion equipped by the Central Australian Gold Exploration 
Company, set out in search of it. It was a lavishly equipped 
expedition and included a two and a half tonne truck and an 
aeroplane. The promoters were no doubt persuaded to use 
the aircraft because of the success with which the New Guinea 
Gold Company had used aircraft to exploit the goldfields in 
the remote parts of New Guinea at this time. However, as 
with the Kookaburra a year earlier, the outback prevailed 
over the new technology. Mishaps and accidents rendered the 
mechanized equipment useless. Lasseter rode off alone into 
the desert and perished."" 
In several aspects, the fate of Lasseter's final expedition 
epitomized the efforts of successive governments — South 
Australian and federal — to encourage economic develop-
ment in the Territory. The technology then available could 
not prevail against the Territory. Even the lavishly-funded 
schemes failed, and in such a manner as to militate against 
future schemes. By 1930, it had long been evident that the ad-
ministrative arrangements initiated in 1926-27 had failed. 
Thus, on 5 November 1930, Minister Blakeley sought to 
abolish the North AustraUa Commission."' None opposed 
this, though there was considerable debate on the type of 
system which should be introduced to replace it. The Labor 
government sought provision for a local Legislative CouncU 
with ordinance-making powers, though this was strongly op-
posed in the conservative-dominated Senate. A conference of 
managers from the two houses, which was held in AprU 1931, 
failed to break the deadlock. Ultimately the government ac-
cepted a bill without any provision for self-government."* 
Act no. 5 of 1931, aboUshing the North AustraUa Commis-
sion, was finally assented to on 27 May 1931: it reintroduced 
the system of administration which had been tried and found 
wanting in the period to 1926. Yet another scheme, promoted 
as the panacea for the Territory's alleged problems, was 
abandoned in ruins. 
A. Grenfell Price, who was a severe critic of governments' 
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efforts to force economic development in the Territory,"'' 
beUeved that the "new" administrative arrangements vin-
dicated his criticisms. His suggestion was that the government 
"should now treat the region as a pastoral country, and leave 
the problem of closer settlement until the better parts of the 
continent are densely occupied". He contended that "the 
pressure of population and the progress of science will solve 
the main difficulties at some future time"."* Apposite 
though the advice was, it should have been evident from the 
record of successive governments that such laissez-faire 
policies would not be implemented — even by conservative 
governments. Besides, the repercussions of earlier poUcies en-
sured that succeeding governments would continue to tinker 
with the administration of the Northern Territory. 
After two decades of Commonwealth control, the future 
of the Northern Territory appeared to contemporaries to be 
as bleak as it had ever been. It continued to be the grave-yard 
of expensive schemes which were designed to promote its 
economic development. 
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FOUR 
Conservative Hegemony 
1931 to C.1940 
In terms of Commonwealth initiatives in the Northern Ter-
ritory, the decade foUowing the abolition of the North 
AustraUa Commission proved to be little different from so 
many that had gone before. From the defeat of the SculUn 
Labor government in 1932, to the advent of that of Curtin in 
1941, the conservatives provided six different ministers to 
preside over Territory affairs. During this time the Territory 
economy was depressed, but, except for a few short-lived 
boom periods, U had never been otherwise. Except for 
C.L.A. Abbott, the one-time Minister who succeeded 
WeddeU in 1937, the administration in the TerrUory changed 
little during this time. It had been pared to such an extent that 
few additional economies were possible. The major problem 
which confronted the local administration was that of pro-
viding for the many unemployed and destitute who drifted to 
AUce Springs and Darwin: happily there were no new 
instances of confrontation. Despite the period of the Depres-
sion, the government in Canberra continued to speak of the 
necessity of developing the Territory, and on one occasion, 
offered to lease part of the region to a chartered company in 
the hope that this might promote the long-expected period of 
prosperity. When there were no firm tenders, the government 
implemented the weU-used tactic of calling for an enquiry. 
Indeed, during this decade, there were two enquiries into 
Territory development. Again, no major initiatives flowed 
from these. Despite the incentives and lack of government 
controls on Territory industries, there was precious little 
change evident, except in the mining industry. After disillu-
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sion on the Granites fields, rich gold discoveries were made at 
Tennant Creek, which ultimately led to gold mining becom-
ing a major export earner once again. Yet this bonanza owed 
little to direct government stimulation. Perhaps the most 
significant development during this period was in that of of-
ficial black/whUe relations. In 1938, after continued lobby-
ing by interested groups in southern Australia, Minister 
McEwen was persuaded to endorse a "New Deal" for 
Aborigines. Henceforth, at the official level at least, the 
earlier policy of protection for Aborigines was abandoned in 
favour of one of assimiUation. It was to be another decade 
before policy directives could be made effective — but the 
fact that the change had been made at all was significant. Im-
mediate initiatives to implement the new poUcy were 
frustrated by the threat of war and invasion of north 
Australia. Indeed, the threat of war was the major factor 
which determined the attitudes of governments towards the 
Territory during the latter years of this period. Developments 
within the Territory at last became a matter of prime concern 
to federal governments — but the exigencies of defence bore 
little relationship to successive governments' long-estabUshed 
development ideals for the Territory. 
As had happened on so many occasions before, the promise 
of a new development scheme for the Territory raised hopes 
that prosperity was at hand. In December 1932, the southern 
press reported upon a £15 milUon scheme for north 
Australia.' Encouraged by the government's intimations of a 
willingness to have private enterprise develop north 
Australia, "representatives of British capital" had proposed 
the scheme. One of the "representatives" named was G.A. 
Hobler, who had been one of the North Australia commis-
sioners: others included Sir Graham WaddeU, S. Snow, J.B. 
Cramsie and K. WilUams. Apparently the principle of the 
scheme appealed to the government, because in July 1933, 
Prime Minister Lyons announced a proposal for handing over 
vast areas of north Australia to one or two chartered com-
panies.^ The Labor opposition opposed the idea, with 
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Blakeley, the former Minister for Home Affairs, claiming 
"that the hand of Vestey's Ltd. could be clearly seen in this 
'very questionable project' ".^  There was nothing of such a 
sinister nature, and Vesteys' collaboration is doubtful given 
the opposition to the idea by the Northern Territory Pastoral 
Lessees' Association (NTPLA)." Ultimately, the proposal 
came to nought, although on several occasions, the govern-
ment hinted about progress in negotiations concerning the 
chartered company scheme.^ Given economic circumstances 
at the time, and the conditions imposed by the government, 
the success of the scheme was doubtful.* The £15 miUion 
scheme was never realized, and the only response to the 
government's advertisement was an offer from a group of 
pastoralists to accept a loan of one mUlion pounds to export 
their meat to Great Britain.'' This was not entertained. Any 
hope engendered by talk of the new scheme was frustrated. 
When speaking to the Northern Australia Bill in 1926, Prime 
Minister S.M. Bruce noted "the frequent change of Ministers 
controlUng the Territory" and claimed that such "changes 
necessarily mean dislocation, to some extent at all events, of 
ministerial policy . . .'.Mt is doubtful that any of the policies 
put forward to this time could have fostered the sort of 
development which many sought in the Territory — even if 
there had been fewer ministers in charge of Territory affairs. 
However, the succession of ministers certainly helps to 
explain the erratic nature with which policies were imple-
mented. Despite Bruce's observations, the rapid succession of 
ministers which had been a feature of the Territory's history, 
continued after the conservatives returned to power on 6 
January 1932. Until they were rejected again on 7 October 
1941, six ministers were responsible for the administration of 
the Northern Territory — one of them, E.J. Harrison (12 
October 1934 - 9 November 1934) held the portfolio for 
less than a month. It is little wonder that government policy 
continued to be characterized by erratic ad hoc measures. 
As noted above, the development of aviation permitted 
ministers to visU the Territory more easily. They and their 
senior departmental officers took full advantage of this. 
However, ministers' visits, their predilection for enquiries, 
and their short tenure of office, only exacerbated problems 
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associated with the lack of clear direction from Canberra. 
Minister R.A. ParkhiU visited the TerrUory during June and 
July 1932. In his report to the government, he supported the 
chartered company scheme, and in addition, suggested that 
an investigation should be made of pastoral leases in the Ter-
rUory.' However, on 13 October, before anything could be 
achieved, he was succeeded as Minister for the Interior by 
J.A. Perkins. It was Perkins who, on 24 March 1933, ap-
pointed a committee to enquire into Territory pastoral 
leases.'" The interim report of the committee was received by 
the government on 22 November 1933,'' but it was never 
made pubUc, despite the persistent requests from Nelson.'^  
As Rose suggests, there was no need to consider the resuhs of 
the enquiry because the idea for a chartered company was 
stillborn.'^ Thomas Paterson, who succeeded Harrison on 
12 October 1934, paid a visit to central Australia in May 
1935,"* and northern AustraUa in July and August.'^ Subse-
quently, on 23 March 1937, Paterson, through the Governor-
General, appointed yet another commission to enquire into 
"Land and Land Industries in the Northern Territory". The 
comprehensive report by W.L. Payne, Chairman of the 
Queensland Land Administration Board, and J.W. Fletcher, 
a Queensland pastoralist, was completed on 10 October 
1937.'* However, Paterson was replaced by J. McEwen as 
Minister for the Interior little more than a month later, on 29 
November. McEwen refused to make recommendations to 
the government until he had had a chance to visit the Ter-
ritory and see things for himself.'^ Thus, it was not untU 8 
December 1938 — after his visU to the Territory during July 
and August, and on the last sitting day before the Christmas 
recess — that McEwen announced his government's policy 
for the Territory. Shortly afterwards, on 26 April 1939, when 
R. Menzies became Prime Minister for the first time, 
McEwen was succeeded by H.S. FoU. It is little wonder that 
J.A. Carrodus, Secretary of the Department of the Interior, 
should have expressed some "mock" exasperation when he ac-
companied Foil to the Territory in August 1939. As he said at 
a Darwin reception for Foil, "he was placed in the unfor-
tunate position of bringing Ministers for the Interior to the 
Territory, getting them imbued with the possibiUties of this 
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great country, and then before they could really put any 
policy for its development into operation, they either retired 
or were transferred". He concluded with the hope that "that 
would not occur on this occasion".'* The hope was not 
realized. On 7 October 1941, Foil was succeeded by J.S. 
CoUings when the Labor Party under John Curtin assumed 
government. CoUings remained Minister for the Interior until 
July 1945, but circumstances precluded him from exercizing 
much influence in the Territory. Extensive changes to the 
department and policy were required less than five months 
after the Labor victory, following the first bombing of 
Darwin on 19 February 1942, when the administration of the 
region north of Pine Creek became the direct responsibiUty of 
the mUUary authorities. 
The threat of war in the later thirties excused governments 
from making any attempt to implement suggestions flowing 
from the Payne-Fletcher enquiry. After outlining the govern-
ment's poUcy for the Territory in December 1938, McEwen 
warned his parliamentary colleagues that "the extremely 
heavy commitments of the Government for defence render it 
necessary that the expenditure to implement the New Nor-
thern Territory policy will, like all other items of expenditure, 
be kept under review in the light of the current budgetary 
position".)" The delays in coaxing the "New Policy" from 
McEwen suggest that the government was loath to implement 
the recommendations of the enquiry, regardless of military 
demands. However, McEwen's "New Policy" included Uttle 
which was really new.^° The idea of giving assistance to set-
tlers was not new, nor that of developing road and stock 
routes. The significant Payne-Fletcher suggestion, that sheep 
should replace cattle in many pastoral regions, was accepted 
only to the extent that pastoralists wishing to make the 
change would be assisted to do so. McE wan said of the 
railway proposals suggested by Payne and Fletcher, only that 
they would be "further considered". In effect the "New 
PoUcy" was Uttle more than a vague commitment of the 
government to assist developmental projects, "such as roads, 
stock routes, water supplies, perhaps raUways or other 
transport services". In essence, it was identical to the policies 
espoused for decades by successive South Australian and 
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federal governments charged with responsibility for the 
Territory. 
Even given a period of nationwide economic prosperity 
and a guarantee of continued global peace, it is doubtful that 
the recommendations of the Payne-Fletcher report would 
have promoted economic development in the Territory. The 
basic recommendations appealed to neither the pastoralists 
nor the government, yet the accolade from both groups was a 
prerequisite for any recommendations to be implemented. 
The report demonstrated a keen appreciation of the .reasons 
for the economic malaise in the Territory at the time. Because 
of this, it was welcomed by contemporaries, and regarded as 
"the last word . . . upon the problem of the Northern Ter-
ritory", ^ i It made numerous recommendations about diverse 
matters including administration and Aboriginal affairs. But 
its major suggestions were concerned with encouraging 
pastoralists in several areas to change to wool growing. It also 
suggested that two new railway projects would encourage 
this, one south east from Wyndham to open up the Victoria 
River District, the other north east from Dajarra in western 
Queensland to tap the Barkly Tablelands. In addition, it 
recommended that there should be continued taxation relief, 
and a relaxation of tariffs. The suggestion to encourage sheep 
into the Territory, though perhaps soundly based in theory, 
went counter to the trend in the Top End pastoral industry to 
that time. It is true that South AustraUans sought control of 
the Territory because they anticipated grazing sheep in the 
Victoria River District, and for several decades pastoralists 
persisted with attempts to introduce sheep into the 
Territory.22 However, such efforts had met with little 
success, and pastoralists had turned overwhelmingly to cattle, 
except for rare exceptions like Avon Downs which main-
tained sheep until 1950. Nor have high prices for wool in 
more recent times served to encourage pastoralists to diver-
sify. ^ ^ But Payne and Fletcher also suggested that certain 
railway works would be required to encourage the sheep in-
dustry. In the late thirties, it is doubtful that the federal 
parliament would have sanctioned the construction of two 
additional dead-end railways in northern AustraUa. The line 
south from Darwin was a financial embarrassment to the 
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government, and had done nothing to encourage closer settle-
ment in the region through which it passed: there was nothing 
to suggest that two new Unes would be more successful. Also, 
given the spirited debate which ensued each time Territory 
railway works were raised in parUament, it is doubtful that a 
majority of members could have been found to support*either 
of the Payne-Fletcher projects. Even without the threat of 
war, the Payne-Fletcher report was doomed to the "same 
pigeon holing" fate which had befallen so many earlier 
enquiries into Northern Territory development.2'' 
Payne and Fletcher addressed themselves to all matters 
which they considered to have an effect on the Territory's 
development — for this reason, their report is such a valuable 
document. The commissioners were particularly critical of 
the administration of the Territory. Though little in the 
report was new, contemporaries were surprised that the 
criticisms were made so forcefully.2' Payne and Fletcher 
highlighted the lack of coordination between the different 
government departments in Darwin, though this had been a 
feature of the administration which had persisted since 
Gilruth's time:2* yet on this matter, Payne and Fletcher could 
make no specific recommendations. They were critical, too, 
of the impotence of the administrator, and strongly recom-
mended an extension of his powers. In this they were sup-
ported by C.L.A. Abbott — the former Minister of Home 
Affairs in the Bruce-Page government who was appointed 
Administrator in 1937 — who bemoaned the erosion of the 
Administrator's powers since the time of Gilruth.2^ Subse-
quently, this was one matter in which McEwen claimed to 
have accepted the recommendations of Payne and Fletcher, 
and the extent to which this was so, is a reflection on the 
efficacy — or lack thereof — of the commission. In announc-
ing his "New Policy", McEwen indicated that additional 
authority had already been vested in the Administrator, that 
henceforth he would be invited to Canberra annually to 
discuss Territory affairs, and that in future he would be able 
to make decisions on many matters formerly referred to 
Canberra.28 He had already claimed this as the hallmark of 
his policy for the Territory. "Wherever I find it practicable to 
increase the degree of decentralisation I propose to do it",25 
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C.L.A. Abbott. (NLA) 
he had told Territorians at the time of his visit in August 
1938. But McE wen's decision did nothing to guarantee more 
efficient administration. As Abbott suggested when review-
ing the role of the Administrator, the decrease in power was 
caused "more by Ministerial or Departmental action rather 
than by Ordinance".^" Even under McE wen's "New Policy", 
the Minister remained responsible for Territory affairs, and 
also for the amount of power which was to be vested in the 
Administrator. This was a point made later by Abbott, which 
suggests that no real change survived McEwen's term as 
Minister.^' 
McEwen's resolve to decentralize power also went contrary 
to the trends determined by technological change. It has been 
suggested that the instant flow of communication promoted 
by telex machines in the 1950s curtailed the independence of 
the administrator.^2 However, this represented but a new 
phase in the development of communications between 
Canberra and Darwin. Besides facilitating ministerial visits to 
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the Territory, aviation promoted the introduction of air mail 
services. Abbott said that these services "threw official 
Darwin right out of its placid monotony"." The steamer mail 
service had given officials a month in which to respond to 
official mail: the air mails permitted a three-day turnaround. 
While such services promoted closer links between Darwin 
and Canberra, they also promoted increased efficiency within 
the Territory. In 1937, Guinea Airways commenced a service 
between Adelaide and Darwin through Alice Springs and 
Tennant Creek. V.G. Carrington, the District Officer at AUce 
Springs, claimed that this promoted "increased co-operation 
between his office and Head Office at Darwin".^^ 
Just as there were few changes in the Northern Territory 
administration during this period, so there were few political 
changes of any consequence. At the federal elections in 
September 1934, electors in the Territory sent the surveyor, 
Adair MacAlister Blain, to Canberra rather than return H.G. 
Nelson, their first representative. However, this did not 
represent any major change in the political climate of the Ter-
ritory. The conservative vote in the Territory had always been 
a significant one — it finally prevailed. In 1922, when his was 
a household name in the Territory, Nelson had been elected 
with only 452 first preference votes, and a majority of only 
nine: in 1934, Blain was elected with 964 votes, representing a 
majority of sixty-seven.^ ^ Blain campaigned as an Indepen-
dent, on the promise to do whatever was required to secure a 
parliamentary vote for the Territory representative. 
However, it seems that he was elected primarily because he 
was the only conservative alternative to Nelson, who, after 
the 1922 election, had joined the Labor Party. No doubt, 
Blain was helped by the fact that his job had enabled him to 
travel throughout the Territory. He had gone there as Staff 
Surveyor for the North Australia Commission in 1929, and 
subsequently had undertaken official surveys in central 
Australia — including the Granites." The only other can-
didate was the communist, C.A. Priest: he attracted eighty-
five votes, thirty-eight of which went to Blain after the 
distribution of preferences. 
Blain quickly learnt how little influence he had in 
Canberra, Before entering parliament, he had promised to 
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resign within six months if he had not obtained the right to 
vote on all matters. He quickly learned the folly of such rash 
promises. In April, he side-stepped the issue by claiming that, 
with the absence of the Prime Minister at that time, "U would 
be futile to attempt to force it to a conclusion".^^ But Lyons 
was not persuaded to intervene to save Blain.'* The govern-
ment spokesmen continued to argue that the population of 
the Territory was too small to warrant a member with a full 
vote, and consequently the ability to determine the fate of 
governments.'' Blain quietly forgot his promise — thpugh he 
continued to press for a vote on Territory matters, and took 
full credit for the miniscule advance when, in November 
1936, the Territory representative was permitted to vote on 
motions disallowing Territory ordinances."" InitiaUy, Blain 
received scant regard from officers of the Department of the 
Interior. Soon after arriving in Canberra, he complained 
about not being consulted about Northern Territory matters. 
He had apparently forgotten that he had refused an invitation 
to discuss these with members of the Department.*' Though 
he could point to no significant achievements, Blain con-
tinued to champion the cause of the Territory, apparently to 
the satisfaction of the majority of Territory electors. He con-
tinued as their representative for fifteen years. 
While the history of the Territory during the thirties dif-
fered little from what had gone before, there were changes in 
the Aboriginal policy espoused by the government. What had 
been termed a policy of protection gave way to one of 
assimiUation; though, prior to the war, the change was little 
more than in name only. Still, even the change in name was of 
some significance. As was common with subsequent 
developments in Aboriginal policy, these changes were 
strongly urged by theorists and lobbyists in southern 
Australia, who had Uttle appreciation of the situation in the 
Territory and the problems of implementing any poHcy. 
However, these changes were against the advice of the ad-
ministrators in the Territory, who were only too alive to these 
problems and thereby, perhaps forgetful of the ultimate aim 
of any policy — the well-being and advancement of the 
Aborigines. This tension has characterized changes in 
Aboriginal affairs to the present time. The realities associated 
Conservative Hegemony: 1931-c. 1940 103 
with the administration of poUcy has meant that the new 
orthodoxy has all too quickly become heresy to be criticized 
by others. 
This pattern was established early. Cecil Cook left the Ter-
ritory in 1939 resentful of the fact that McEwen's "New Deal" 
for Aborigines had been determined with but little reference 
to him, and that it meant the re-arrangement of the system of 
Aboriginal administration which he had built up over a dozen 
years."2 It grieved Cook that his experience and achievements 
seemed to have counted for little. In 1927, when Cook became 
responsible for the Territory's Aborigines, the official policy 
of protection was little more than a vague concept: a decade 
later, Payne and Fletcher complained of its aU pervasiveness. 
With the benefit of hindsight, it is hard to appreciate the con-
cern of Payne and Fletcher, but it was real, and it gives an 
inkUng of what Cook had achieved with very limited 
resources, but with a professional commitment to the health 
of aU Territorians, white and black. While admitting a 
"general agreement" with Cook's policy, Payne and Fletcher 
were critical of the fact that "In relation to industries general-
ly, the Aboriginal problem has got completely out of perspec-
tive. There is a most undesirable tendency to make aU in-
dustries revolve around the Aboriginal question. Indeed, it 
would seem that if anything occurs to the administration 
calculated to help the Aboriginals, it is proclaimed im-
mediately without regard to its effects on industries actively 
carrying on operations of value to the Territory.'"*' 
Writing in 1944, Professor Elkin spoke of 1934 as "des-
tined to be [regarded as] a turning point in native administra-
tion"."" Here he was referring to an upsurge in "public interest 
in Aboriginal matters" consequent upon the procedures 
followed in the trials of Aborigines for the alleged murder of 
whites in the Territory. Others, primarily anthropologists, 
have suggested that the positive attitude towards Aborigines 
which found expression in McEwen's "New Deal", began in 
the thirties with Elkin, his co-workers, and the many 
humamtarian bodies which came into existence at this time."' 
Yet such assessments mask developments which were already 
in train. Professor W.E.H. Stanner, with the benefit of a 
long historical perspective, and who was himself a 
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"demonstrator" with Elkin in the Aboriginal cause, suggests 
that the changes of attitude and policy towards the 
Aborigines brought about in the thirties were not as great as 
had been suggested at the time, and were "confined very 
largely to a rather small group of people who had special 
associations with their care, administration or study"."* But 
even Stanner's account suggests that the "New Deal" was 
determined only by anthropologists and others outside the 
Territory and the government administration. Their role was 
decisive in the determination of the new poUcy, but it was 
only a part of the whole picture. 
Elkin and others are correct in suggesting that events 
associated with celebrated trials in the Territory in the early 
thirties are significant in any study of the "New Deal" for 
Aborigines. However, the significance of these events Ues in 
the fact that they fostered a climate of opinion which 
facilitated the work of lobbyists like Elkin and his 
colleagues:"' otherwise little flowed directly from these 
events. The very fact that there was widespread interest in the 
Caledon Bay massacre and its sequel, underscores the change 
in public opinion which had already taken place, and suggests 
that the events of 1934 were not a "turning-point". 
There was little which was unusual about the events im-
mediately following the killing of five Japanese trepangers at 
Caledon Bay in Arnhem Land on 17 September 1932. As was 
the usual practice, a police party was sent out to 
"investigate", and to bring the culprits to justice. The onset of 
the wet aborted the investigation. In June 1933, a large police 
patrol again went into the area. One of the party. Constable 
McCoU, was kiUed on 1 August 1933. Following this incident, 
there was talk of a punitive expedition to deal with the 
Aborigines, and, fearful of Aboriginal reprisals against any 
whites, the government sent a squad of poUce to protect the 
Church Missionary Society (CMS) mission at Groote Eylandt. 
All this caused a storm of protest from humanitarian groups 
in southern Australia. Minister for the Interior, Perkins, suc-
cumbed to this, and agreed to the CMS proposal to permit a 
"peace mission" into the area. The missionaries, H.E. Warren 
and A.J. Dyer, succeeded in finding the Aborigines who were 
involved in the incidents, and persuaded them to return to 
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Darwin for trial. The trials in August 1934 were presided over 
by Mr Justice WeUs, and were controversial and sensational 
affairs. Controversy surrounded Judge Wells' apparent 
disregard for the cuUural background of the offenders, and 
the evidently questionable actions used by the police pro-
secutors to sustain their cases. In the event, the three 
Aborigines were found guilty of kiUing the Japanese and were 
sentenced to twenty years gaol: in his turn, Tuckiar, one of 
the three Aborigines was found guilty of murdering McCoU 
and was sentenced to death. A storm of protest broke in the 
southern press, led by academics, missionaries and 
humamtarians. An appeal was made on behalf of Tuckiar to 
the High Court of Australia, and in November 1934 this was 
upheld. 
Even though the events of 1934 were not a turning-point, 
they were certainly a catalyst for the pro-Aboriginal feeling 
which had been developing over many years. As Stanner in-
dicates, this was part of a world-wide change in attitude 
towards dependent peoples."' In Australia, it received expres-
sion in the foundation of numerous groups which sought 
first, the survival, then, the advancement of the Aborigines."' 
These groups constantly petitioned governments for better 
conditions for the Aborigines.'" In this climate, too, the role 
of the several missionary organizations at work among the 
Aborigines received more attention, and their concerns were 
ampUfied by the many humanitarian groups. It was true that 
political groups showed little interest in the Aboriginal 
problem," but it was becoming impoUtic of parliament to be 
seen to oppose the idea of Aboriginal advancement. The ef-
fectiveness of the new lobbies was seen in Perkins' ac-
quiescence of the CMS "peace mission" into Arnhem Land to 
do what was essentiaUy administration business. 
The new awareness of the plight of the Aborigines was sus-
tained by the work of a new generation of anthropologists, 
foremost of whom was A.P. Elkin. In the years from 1927 to 
1930, Elkin had studied Aboriginal cultures in the north-
western, central and southern parts of the continent. This 
quickened in him an appreciation of the need for a positive 
policy towards Aborigines, in contrast to the negative policy 
of protection which then prevailed, and which did nothing to 
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prevent the disintegration of Aboriginal societies when con-
fronted by that of the Europeans." Through societies such as 
the Association for the Protection of Native Races, of which 
he became President in 1933, Elkin lobbied the government 
for a change in Aboriginal policy. Late in 1933, he was ap-
pointed to the Chair of Anthropology at the University of 
Sydney," and was therefore able to mount a more effective 
campaign. He constantly urged the government to employ 
trained anthropologists in the field of Aboriginal affairs." 
Thus, it is perhaps a measure of the success of Elkin and his 
colleagues, that in 1935, Minister Paterson provided a grant 
for Dr Donald Thomson of the University of Melbourne to 
study the Aborigines of Arnhem Land, and where possible, 
to dispel any suspicion and hostiUty generated by the events 
associated with the Caledon Bay kilUngs." 
However, Elkin and the many humanitarian bodies were 
not wholly responsible for the "New Deal" for Aborigines as 
publicized by McEwen in 1938 and 1939. For several years, 
Dr Cecil Cook had urged a positive attitude towards the 
Aborigines in his charge. In the light of later "orthodoxy", 
Cook's attempts to convert the Aborigine from "an un-
productive nomad into a productive peasant"" may seem 
heretical, but they represented an advance on the earUer 
policy of protection and isolation. In trying to implement this 
poUcy, Cook was severely handicapped by a lack of funds 
and personnel, but by means of regulations, and in those 
regions where his power was effective, he did a great deal to 
improve the conditions under which the Aborigines lived." 
In 1937, the "progressive" ideas, which he had long espoused, 
were embodied in a policy statement issued by Minister 
Paterson." This constant urging of those Uke Cook, who 
Table 7 Cost of Aboriginal Administration, 1935 
State 
Queensland 
New South Wales 
South Australia 
Western Australia 
Northern Territory 
Aboriginal 
population 
16,957 
9,724 
3,407 
29,021 
18,000 
Cost to 
government 
£41,128 
53,124 
23,000 
28,340 
7,500 
Source: Memo dated 12 February 1936, Al, 37/30, AAC. 
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were within the administration, was an important factor in 
preparing the government for the new policy of 1938, but it is 
one which has largely been overlooked. 
Cook's achievements appear all the more remarkable when 
it is appreciated that his role as Chief Protector of Aborigines 
was but one of his responsibilities. They are remarkable, too, 
for the fact that they were made despite the criticisms of an-
thropologists who thought that he should be doing more to 
advance the Aborigines, of the pastoralists who believed that 
he was doing too much, of the missionaries who resented his 
insistence that mission facilities should conform to particular 
standards, and of unionists who resented Aborigines under-
taking jobs which could be fiUed by whites. The poUcy urged 
by Cook may not have been as radical as that propounded by 
Elkin - tempered as it was by his appreciation of conditions 
which then prevailed in the Territory — but it was an advance 
on what had gone before. And he succeeded in having it 
adopted by his department and his minister." 
Cook's problem was that of trying to improve the lot of the 
Aborigines, in opposition to vested interests in the Territory, 
and with Uttle or no support from his government. He was 
particularly concerned to implement payment of wages to 
Aborigines in the pastoral industry — only to be frustrated by 
the pastoral lobby. In 1931, Labor Minister Blakeley had 
decided that Aboriginal wages should be £3 per week when 
droving stock, 30/- per week with plant.*" This brought a 
strong protest from the NTPLA, and two months later, in a 
confidential letter to Toupein, the Secretary of the NAWU, 
Blakeley confessed to his lack of power to have the rate 
adopted because of the pastoralist lobby in the Senate.*' AU 
that Blakeley could recommend was the adoption of the rates 
then in force in Queensland, namely, 30/- and £1. Then in 
1932, under a ministerial direction, "settlers and station 
owners were exempted from the payment of drovers' wages to 
stockmen droving with station cattle so that the only persons 
affected by Aboriginal Drovers Regulations are contract 
drovers".*2 In 1933, the continued depression persuaded the 
Minister to make wage reductions even for these.*' 
Cook was also frustrated in his attempts to place 
Aborigines in employment by the North Australia Workers' 
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Union. Being anxious to reserve employment for unemployed 
whites, the union quickly complained whenever Aborigines 
were employed in jobs suitable for Europeans.*" The cam-
paign for award wages for Aborigines was simply a ploy to 
ensure work for Europeans, the belief being that employers 
would always choose a European, rather than an Aborigine, 
should a particular wage be fixed.*^ 
The missions, too, proved a problem for Cook. He was 
insistent that mission stations should provide minimum ser-
vices for Aborigines. He had cause for concern. In 1929, 
there had been seventy-five cases of scurvy at the Hermann-
sberg Mission — thirty-seven of whom had died. In his 
opinion, it was caused by faulty feeding; "the result of lack of 
meat and plant food consequent upon the prolonged 
drought".** Subsequently, in May 1933, there was cause for 
an enquiry into the moral conduct of H. Langford Smith, the 
Superintendent of the Roper River Mission. The enquiry 
"found that the conditions prevailing at the mission were 
most unsatisfactory, and that the person in charge of the mis-
sion [Smith] had been guilty of serious offences against 
aboriginals".*^ Indeed, the conditions of buUdings at the 
Roper River Mission had long been a concern of Cook.*' 
He insisted that missions should be licensed, and that their 
annual subsidies should be made conditional on their confor-
ming to certain minimum standards.*' However, on these 
matters he was not supported by his government. The mis-
sions resented any interference in their operations, and in the 
thirties they had vocal lobbies in southern Australia to guard 
their interests. At this time, the missions played no part in the 
government's Aboriginal policy. The subsidy was an untied 
grant to the missions. Bleakley had recommended substantial 
increases in the subsidies to enable the missions to provide 
reasonable accommodation and services for the Aborigines, 
but this was not entertained by the government. Indeed, in 
1931, it was considered reasonable to expect the missions to 
share in the economies then urged by the government. Small 
though the subsidies were, reductions were made. 
Aboriginal affairs have always been complex, with groups 
interacting in a variety of ways. They were hardly less so 
during the thirties. Many groups of whites in the Territory 
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Table 8 Subsidies to Missions, 1931 
Bathurst Island 
Goulbourn Island 
Elcho Island 
Roper River 
Oenpelli 
Hermannsberg 
Subsidy at 
present paid 
£ 250 
£ 250 
£ 250 
£ 250 
£ 250 
£ 400 
Subsidy 
recommended 
£ 200 
£ 200 
£ 200 
£ 200 
£ 200 
£ 320 
£1,650 £1,320 
Source: Memo dated 29 June 1931, A659, 41/1/1118, AAC. 
were opposed to the endeavours of Cook. However, there 
were other aspects to the question. As was evident from the 
enquiry into the Coniston kUUngs, pastoralists were generally 
opposed to the missions, believing that the missions 
"spoU[ed] the blacks for station work".^" Also, Japanese 
pearlers and trepangers were a constant problem to the ad-
ministration and missionaries in the coastal regions. Despite 
the efforts of authorities, there was increased contact with 
Japanese throughout the thirties.'" It was in order to control 
this contact that the Aboriginals Ordinance was gazetted in 
April 1937, seeking to prevent unauthorized entry of vessels 
into the territorial waters of Aboriginal reserves.'21^ was this 
sort of ordinance that was so roundly criticized by Payne and 
Fletcher. 
Despite the fears expressed by Payne and Fletcher, Cook's 
Aboriginal poUcy was all-pervading in theory only. No Euro-
pean enterprise was jeopardized by this poUcy. It has been 
noted how pastoralists were able to circumvent particular 
regulations. The Aboriginal policy could not withstand the 
mining lobby either. When gold was discovered in the region 
about Tennant Creek in the early thirties, the Warramunga 
Reserve to the northeast of the telegraph station, which had 
been proclaimed in 1912, and which extended over possible 
gold fields, was revoked.^' The revocation claimed that this 
was "in order that a larger and more suitable area may be 
reserved". The shallowness of the reason was evident at the 
time; it was shown to be so later, when the Aborigines had to 
be moved from their new camp about Phillip Creek, because 
of the lack of an adequate water supply. 
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Besides implementing a policy for Aboriginal advance-
ment, Cook was also concerned to implement an effective 
policy for half-castes in the Territory. Since the time of 
Baldwin Spencer, separate schools and institutions had been 
provided for half-castes, and the official policy had been to 
separate half-caste children from Aboriginal parents. 
However, the policy had been applied in a haphazard fashion 
and the "problem" grew worse rather than better. Cook 
attempted to implement a more effective policy. It was his 
concern to have the half-caste population absorbed-into the 
white population.^" He sought to upgrade the institutions for 
half-castes and to urge their training for employment. Thus, 
after the Alice Springs telegraph office was moved to Stuart 
in 1933, the buildings were converted for use as a half-caste 
institution. The institution was under the care of a 
superintendent and a matron, and the education of the 
children was undertaken by two qualified teachers seconded 
from the South Australian Education Department.'' An in-
stitution for half-castes was also established at Garden Point 
on Melville Island, and placed under the care of the Catholic 
Missionaries of the Sacred Heart. Cook estabUshed a trust 
account for those half-castes who were employed, into which 
a portion of wages were paid so that finance could be provid-
ed for a housing scheme: in 1932, six houses were buiU near 
Darwin under this scheme. He sought to have half-castes 
employed wherever possible, and in 1937, even explored the 
possibiUty of placing individuals in domestic employment in 
Canberra.'* He also fostered half-caste marriages which were 
calculated to "dilute" the Aboriginal strain. However, as with 
Cook's Aboriginal policy, his poUcy for half-castes was only 
as effective as his personal influence. 
Cook achieved a great deal for the Aborigines despite in-
numerable problems arising from apathetic governments, 
and lobbies opposed to his ideas. His achievement is evident 
when comparison is made with conditions before his appoint-
ment to the Territory. In 1935, his work in the TerrUory was 
recognized officially, when he was awarded the CBE." But 
soon after, his star began to wane. This period bears much 
closer scrutiny than is possible here, but U seems that per-
sonal attitudes played a great part in Cook's ecUpse. Certainly 
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he lost influence when C.L.A. Abbott succeeded Weddell as 
Administrator in 1937. Baddeley claims that "Abbott began 
to ignore Dr Cook's recommendations on native affairs, 
briefing the Minister for the Interior, Mr McEwen, and ac-
cepting the advice of the visiting anthropologist Donald 
Thomson, without consulting Dr Cook at all".'* It was 
noted above that Abbott was himself a pastoralist, and he 
was fulsome in his admiration of the Payne-Fletcher 
enquiry:" it would have been surprising if he was not swayed 
by the pastoralist lobby and its criticism of Cook's Aboriginal 
poUcy. Even prior to Abbott's appointment, Xavier Herbert, 
who was Superintendent of the Kahlin Compound for a time, 
and an aspirant for a job as an Aboriginal patrol officer, had 
commenced correspondence with Professor Elkin in which he 
had been critical of Cook and his policies.*" It is evident that 
Herbert had little personal regard for Cook: and the fact that 
Cook decUned to recommend him for an appointment in the 
administration only served to heighten his antagonism. It is 
certain, too, that Herbert had Elkin's ear, for Elkin urged his 
appointment as a patrol officer after the pubUcizing of the 
"New Deal":*' however, neither Carrodus, Secretary of the 
Department, nor McEwen were greatly impressed by 
Herbert.*2 Fortunately for Herbert, the success of his novel 
Capricornia which was pubUshed in 1938, relieved him of the 
spectre of unemployment which pervaded so much of his cor-
respondence in the thirties. 
By the late thirties, however. Cook was out of phase with 
developments in anthropology in Australia. Perhaps he sens-
ed his eclipse when he reacted sharply to rumours that the 
anthropologist, Donald Thomson, was to take over his duties 
as Chief Protector." In his letter to Administrator Weddell, 
seeking clarification of his position. Cook emphasized the 
need for the Chief Protector to have a practical appreciation 
of the many administrative problems in the Territory, rather 
than the expertise of a "pure scientist". At that time there was 
no intention to replace Cook.*" However, three years later. 
Cook's "progressive poUcy" for the Aborigines had been 
superseded by McEwen's "New Deal", his departmental 
organization had been dismantled and a Native Affairs 
Branch organized, and the person in charge of Native Affairs 
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was to be one trained in anthropology rather than medicine. 
The new poUcy of assimilation, drawn up at the behest of 
Minister McEwen, showed clearly the influence of Professor 
Elkin. It included all major policy changes which he had long 
advocated. The "New Deal" for Aborigines, like the 
arrangements flowing from the Payne-Fletcher enquiry, was 
determined by the wish of McEwen to make his administra-
tion effective. Part of his preparation for his visit to the Nor-
thern Territory in 1938 had been to arrange for E.W.P. Chin-
nery, who was Head of the Department of Native Affairs in 
New Guinea, to accompany him, so that Chinnery might 
report on the administration of Aboriginal affairs in the Ter-
ritory.*' Subsequently, he called upon Elkin to help draft the 
new poUcy.*^ The "New Deal" for Aborigines and half-castes 
became government policy late in 1938.*'' It was,significant in 
that from that time, the Aborigines were deemed to have a 
future. The aim of the new policy was "to raise the status of 
the aborigines so that they can qualify for the privileges and 
responsibilities of full citizenship; to meet immediate physical 
needs and problems of health; to supply education and train-
ing for useful community services; and to promote civic and 
religious instruction".** Henceforth, missions were to play an 
integral role in this policy of assimilation, acting "as a buffer 
between the tribal state and partial detribahsation".*' Many 
of the features of the new policy were a reflection of those 
long established in New Guinea, and to oversee their 
implementation in the Northern Territory, Chinnery was 
appointed to the new position of Director of Native Affairs. 
Cook left the Territory administration rather than remain 
simply as the Chief Medical Officer: the dichotomy between 
health-administration and Aboriginal affairs was contrary to 
his belief in what was best for the Aborigines, and health 
administration in general. Many factors came together to 
encourage the government to adopt a positive policy towards 
the Territory's Aborigines. The new policy certainly bore the 
hallmark of Elkin and the southern anthropological and 
humanitarian lobby. However, perhaps these lobbies would 
not have been so successful had not Cook prepared the 
administration for the change by his constant efforts on 
behalf of the Aborigines. J. A. Carrodus, the Secretary of the 
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Department of the Interior, was also responsible for helping 
to draft the new poUcy, along with Elkin and McEwen. He 
had long been exposed to Cook's ideas, and had endorsed the 
policy which he had put forward late in 1935.'" While the 
theorists lobbied, it was Cook who tried to implement a 
positive Aboriginal policy in the Territory in the face of 
government apathy and economies, and opposition from 
vested interests. In this his achievements were real. It soon 
became apparent, however, that no government policy could 
be effective unless it was supported resolutely with funds and 
personnel. It was to be another decade before the new policy 
of assimilation was to be in any way effective. 
As mentioned above, the union opposed Cook's efforts to 
place Aborigines and half-castes in employment when it 
meant that white men were denied work. The unions also 
condemned the practice of cooUes, who were indentured to 
pearUng masters, undertaking shore work which could have 
been done by the unemployed." 
The numbers of unemployed and destitute Europeans in 
the Territory during this time was a matter of concern for 
successive governments. At the end of the 1931-32 financial 
year, there were 232 destitutes in the Territory being main-
tained by the government.'2 The problem was as great in 
central Australia as in the Top End. Steps had been taken to 
search north-bound trains for stowaways, but many had 
avoided detection by leaving the train as far as 115 kilometres 
from Alice Springs." As late as September 1937, Abbott 
complained that twenty-two destitute workers had arrived at 
Alice Springs during the previous four months.'" 
In 1932, in an attempt to curb the numbers of men traveU-
ing to the Territory in search of work or reUef, the govern-
ment imposed restrictions on those eligible for relief. 
Thereafter, men quaUfied for reUef work only if they had 
resided in the Territory for a period of twelve months prior to 
31 December 1931,'' or subsequently if they had resided con-
tinuously in the Territory for a period of three years prior to 
making the appUcation.'* Those not eligible for the reUef 
work had their fares paid for them from Darwin to the 
nearest port in their home state. Nelson claimed that the 
stringent poUcy revision promoted hardship, but at the end of 
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1933, the government pointed out that only seven men were 
not eligible for unemployment reUef." In central Australia, 
those with mining experience were eligible for advances for 
prospecting under the provisions of the Precious Metals Pros-
pecting Act. AppUcants received 30/- per week for a period 
of twelve weeks.'* To June 1931, grants totalling £1,800 had 
been given to one hundred persons, while twenty-six who 
were ineligible were provided with fares out of the 
TerrUory." 
The usual form of reUef consisted of labouring work. In-
itially, it was at a rate of one and a half days per week for 
married men, and one day for single men. Subsequently, the 
rate was doubled.'"" The basic wage of 18/1 per day was 
paid.'"' The unemployed and the union regularly requested 
modification of the residential quaUfication. They met with 
no success,'"2 although there was some relaxation of regula-
tions at Christmas time when, for a period of three weeks, 
reUef work was provided for all those who were 
unemployed.'"' However, what could not be achieved by 
means of deputations was brought about as a resuU of the 
cyclone which devastated Darwin during the night of 10-11 
March 1937. In order to aid in the general cleaning up, 
Abbott offered relief work of one day per week for those who 
had been in the Territory for at least twelve months, and he 
recommended to the government that the three-year 
qualification be reduced to twelve months.'"" His 
recommendation was endorsed.'"' 
Table 9 Daily Average of Workers on Relief at Darwin, Pine Creek and Katherine 
For year ended 30.6.34 = 76.8 
For year ended 30.6.35 = 32.8 
For year ended 30.6.36 = 21.9 
For year ended 30.6.37 = 34.1 
For year ended 30.6.38 = 62.5 
Source: Memo dated 17 October 1938, A659,40/1/1045, AAC. 
The threat of war, and the government's commUment to 
defence works in the Top End after 1938, did a great deal to 
generate employment opportunities in Darwin, but for a time 
it only complicated the unemployment situation there. In 
March 1938, the government announced plans for a defence 
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budget of nearly £15,000,000:'"* this included major works 
for Darwin,'"' for which £840,000 was earmarked in the 
financial year 1938-39.'"* This promise of construction work 
attracted 160 workers from Western AustraUa during June 
and July 1939, most of whom were unskilled: on 23 August, 
another seventy-nine arrived by the Koolama.^°^ Great 
though the amount of defence work was, it was insufficient 
to absorb all those who travelled to Darwin in search of 
work. The government even appealed to the NAWU to use its 
influence to curb the influx."" It was only the outbreak of 
war later in 1939, and the alternative employment which it 
provided, that succeeded in arresting the flood. Also, it was 
the war which resolved the issue of unemployment in the Ter-
ritory which had exercized the government for more than a 
decade. 
During the thirties, industrial relations in the Territory 
were generally peaceful — though this was due to the low 
level of economic activity there, rather than any conciliatory 
attitudes of union or government leaders. Administrator 
Abbott was opposed to the union — the secretary of which he 
described as "utterly unscrupulous" and one who would 
"make most complete misrepresentations".''' Abbott found 
it unpalatable that the Secretary, through the NAWU, should 
be "the main arbiter in most matters in Darwin". "2 However, 
this was established long before his appointment to Darwin, 
and was largely due to the fact that "with the exception of 
material transported by rail from Adelaide to Alice Springs, 
all materials and food stuffs required for the Northern Ter-
rUory have to come over the wharf in Darwin:""' and the 
union also controlled the only newspaper in the Territory — 
the Northern Standard - and with it the distribution of the 
Government Gazette. Abbott believed that the Standard was 
not profitable, but U ensured that the union's attUude to par-
ticular issues gained wide circulation. 
Because the majority of the 800-strong union was centred 
in Darwin, most industrial trouble took place there - at the 
wharf or the sorting shed. The fifty or so wharf labourers had 
a very easy time of it. Abbott claimed that they were not par-
ticularly aggressive - "but they are of a somewhat decadent 
type, very ignorant and are very easily swayed and 
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controlled"."" In 1937, he claimed that they worked on an 
average of from three to four days each month, "then retire 
to various shacks, humpies and camps around the foreshores 
and wait until the next boat arrives to discharge her cargo 
. . .". Elsewhere, he complained that the rate at which the 
wharf labourers unloaded ships was only a third of the rate of 
wharf labourers at other ports in Australia.'" But as Abbott 
quickly realized, the union — particularly on the wharf -
was a law unto itself. 
Given Abbott's approval of tough actions taken by 
Urquhart and Weddell, it seems that he entered upon his ap-
pointment determined to oppose the union, and assert the 
authority of the government."* It is little wonder then, that 
he should have been put to the test soon after his arrival in 
Darwin. Cosy arrangements existed for the unionists in the 
sorting shed, as well as for those on the wharfs. Early in 1937, 
the Arbitration Commission decided upon increased rates for 
casual workers employed in the shed. The railway authorities 
then decided to cut down upon the number of casuals, and to 
increase the number of permanent workers. The union op-
posed the alteration and caUed a strike, refusing to unload the 
Marella which arrived in Darwin on 19 July.'" Abbott 
bought into the dispute, and sought government workers to 
volunteer to unload foodstuffs from the Marella. This 
brought about a general strike, intensified opposition to 
Abbott, and engendered calls for his removal from office. 
However, on 21 July, after intervention from Minister Pater-
son, the strike was resolved, with the union gaining its 
demands for a reversion to the earlier working arrangement 
in the sorting shed."* Abbott had played and lost his first 
bout with the union. However, he admitted the mistake in 
needlessly having the government involved in an issue which 
was not of direct concern to the administration. After this 
confrontation, he determined that the government should 
become involved in industrial disputes only to the extent of 
insisting that all sides should adhere to the decisions of the 
Arbitration Commission.''' 
Though economic activity in the Territory was at a low ebb 
during the thirties, the foundation was laid for the resurgence 
of mining activity which was to be the Territory's major 
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income-earning industry for the remainder of the period with 
which we are concerned. However, as with the foundation of 
the industry in the early eighteen seventies, this resurgence 
was ushered in with a short but intense speculative boom. 
It is not surprising that there should have been this interest 
in mining at a time "when aU Australia was looking to a new 
KalgoorUe to put the country on its feet again".'2" In the 
thirties, as in the nineties of the previous century, depression 
had induced men to prospect for precious metals: and in cen-
tral Australia, the government encouraged this by staking 
prospectors for periods of twelve weeks. So it was during mid 
1932, that J. Escreet and a few "mates" discovered fairly rich 
alluvial gold at the Granites, about 600 kilometres north west 
of Alice Springs.'2' This field had been worked by miners 
from Tanami in 1911, only to be abandoned after a digger, 
Stewart, was killed by Aborigines. After this time, U was 
picked over regularly by prospectors, and in 1925, a lease was 
taken up by Muir, Schultz and Peterson, only to be abandon-
ed soon after because of difficulties associated with the lack 
of water, and the death of Schultz.'22 This isolated and 
inhospitable locality became the scene for a new rush. 
News of the discovery caused great excitement in the more 
populous regions of AustraUa. In September 1932, there was 
news of a "sensational find" by C.H. Chapman, the leader of 
a Queensland-financed expedition.'2' Reports in the press a 
week later described this as being possibly "the biggest 
goldfield in Australia".'2" Excitement was heightened by the 
reports from the "picturesque pen" of journaUst Ernestine 
Hill, who visited the Granites at the commencement of the 
rush.'2' Like the speculation surrounding the discoveries 
about Pine Creek sixty years earUer, excitement was heighten-
ed because of the remoteness and mystery surrounding the 
find, and the fact that all news from the Granites was depen-
dent upon garbled telegraphic communication. As F.E. 
Baume said of Ernestine Hill; "it was not for her to reahse 
that a few ounces of gold won by lone prospectors did not 
mean the discovery of a second Coolgardie. It was not for her 
to question the stories given her by some men who were 
unscrupulous and some who were not. She dealt with what 
she heard as news."'26 
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News of the "El Dorado" brought a rush to the Granites. 
For a time, every train to Alice Springs was packed with 
mining managers, miners looking for work, prospectors and 
adventurers, "aU under the lure of the gold".'2' AU available 
transport and prospecting gear in Alice Springs was com-
mandeered for service on the field, with the town becoming 
Uttle more than a clearing house. '2* By early November 1932, 
there were about 200 men on the field.'2' There was talk of 
laying out a town there,"" and Joseph Kilgariff, the store 
and hotel owner in Alice Springs, had made an application 
for a liquor licence for a hotel to be built at the Granites.'" 
Excitement in the discoveries was most evident in the share 
markets of Adelaide and Melbourne during September and 
October. "2 Seven companies were quickly floated in 
Melbourne, five in Adelaide. In one company. Granites 
Gold, £1 shares were quickly bid up to £85.'" As with the 
speculation sixty years before, the boom was a hollow one; it 
broke early in November. Soon after, the same shares which 
were quoted at £85 received no subscribers at 4d. each. 
The first adverse report from the goldfield was made by the 
mining engineers, G. Lindsay Clark and C.G. Gibson, in mid 
November."" C.T. Madigan, a geologist from the University 
of Adelaide who had been sent out by a group of Sydney 
newspapers to report on the field, also condemned the 
field.'" C.H. Chapman, who had been first on the field, con-
tinued to protest his faith in it, claiming that the field had not 
been given a chance. He continued to work his claim with 
some modest success."* However, the majority of diggers 
abandoned the field, so that by early December, the field was 
practically deserted."' Mr O. Rowe, an organizer of the 
NAWU from Darwin, who had traveUed south eager to en-
force arbitration agreements on the field, returned with 
nothing to show for his efforts."* 
The collapse of the boom brought hardship and destitution 
to many. A great number of men had borrowed money simp-
ly to get to Alice Springs; many of these never got to the field 
before the boom collapsed. Others, who had actually made U 
to the goldfield, were not able to obtain work.'" AU were 
thrust upon the charity of the government. And because there 
was no alternative employment in central AustraUa, all that 
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the government could do was to provide free rail passage to 
Adelaide.'"" 
While the goldfield at the Granites proved to be a duffer 
for all but Chapman, that at Tennant Creek proved to be a 
bonanza. SmaU quantities of gold were discovered in the 
vicinity of the Tennant Creek telegraph station in the first 
years of the century, but no major finds were made."" 
However, the nationwide depression of the thirties induced 
hopeful prospectors to pick over the countryside once again. 
Early in 1933, there was a report that payable gold had been 
found by the Peter Pan Gold Mining Company, and applica-
tions were made for three leases.'"2 Subsequently, H.J. 
Udall, owner of the Great Northern Mine, found gold in an 
abandoned mine,'"' after working in the area for two years. 
After treatment at the Peterborough battery in South 
Australia, 625 grams of gold were recovered from an ore parcel 
of just under eight tonnes.'"" At that time, forty-eight leases 
had been pegged out. Udall claimed that nothing had yet 
been discovered to warrant a rush to the field, but the word 
had gone out; by September more than one hundred were at 
work on the field which was about twenty-four kilometres 
long.'"' By early 1934, prospectors in search of a rich find 
were encroaching on the Aboriginal reserve to the north east 
of the telegraph station, and the government was being urged 
to repeal the reservation. The Minister, Perkins, claimed that 
no action would be taken until he was convinced that the 
Aborigines would approve of any change.'"* He must have 
been convinced, because on 12 July 1934, new boundaries for 
the reserve were proclaimed.'"' 
The rush to the Tennant Creek field began late in August 
1933. It was underpinned by other substantial discoveries. In 
January, rich deposits were made sixteen kUometres from the 
Pinnacles mine,'"* reportedly returning 2,860 grams of gold 
from eleven tonnes of ore.'"' By the middle of the year, there 
were nearly 300 men working on a field which then extended 
over sixty-five kilometres."" 
The rudiments of a town were soon estabUshed on the 
field. Constable Muldoon of Barrow Creek was appointed 
the warden of Tennant Creek field, and arrived there in mid 
September 1933.'" Soon after, J. Kilgariff, the publican of 
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Alice Springs, who had been one of the first onto the 
Granites field hoping to establish a hotel there, succeeded in 
just such a venture at Tennant Creek. He erected a substan-
tial building of concrete blocks, which was central to all the 
major mines, and was licensed and ready for trade during 
June 1934. "2 He preferred the certainty of the publican's lot 
to the uncertainty of that of the miner. The township to 
service the field grew rapidly in the following months. In 
September 1934, an area less than a kilometre south of the 
hotel was reserved as the site for government buildings, and 
during the foUowing May, the township was surveyed."' 
Government offices for the warden, post office, police and 
assayer were soon established, and by 30 June 1935, a school 
was on the ground, ready to be erected. At that time, the 
district boasted a population of nearly 600 people, about 
forty-five of whom were women, and twenty of whom were 
children. A smaU hospUal was established at Tennant Creek 
in July 1935, but soon proved inadequate so that a larger 
building was opened on 1 June 1936. Dr Catalano of the 
Northern TerrUory Medical Service commenced work at 
Tennant Creek in October 1935."" In addition to building 
construction, the government provided a bore to ease 
problems associated with a scarcity of water, and began road 
works in mid 1936. By late 1937, the government had 
expended nearly £55,000 in helping to establish the town and 
the field."' 
The field prospered. In the year 1936-37, gold to the value 
of £85,565 was won."* The government estabUshed two bat-
teries at a cost of £15,000, and in April 1940, work began on 
the erection of a third."' To this time, there was no indica-
tion that production had peaked, a fact which encouraged 
companies to abandon inefficient mining methods and to in-
stall large and more permanent equipment. It seemed that the 
immediate future of the field was assured. 
The discovery of gold in the vicinity of Tennant Creek 
proved to be a tremendous fillip to the Territory's aU but mori-
bund mining industry. Moreover, in the latter thirties, gold 
mining was complemented by that of wolfram at Hatches 
Creek and Wauchope Creek. The total value of mineral pro-
duction in the Territory during the year 1937-38 was upward 
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of £230,000:"* wolfram production accounted for £113,765 
of this."' The value of wolfram production had risen 
tremendously: the previous year U had been worth £16,350. 
During the year 1938-39, the average number of men 
employed in the Territory's mining industry was estimated to 
be about 600: 260 of these were engaged in gold mining, with 
250 in wolfram mining, and others were engaged in mining 
for copper, tin or mica.' *" 
For most of the thirties, the fortunes of the pastoral in-
dustry were at a low ebb. The Northern Territory Pastoral 
Lessees' Association, the representative of pastoraUsts in the 
Top End, constantly lobbied for an ameUoration of charges 
and taxes for which they were Uable.'*' Thus when the Ar-
bitration Court was deciding wage rates in May 1932, the 
NTPLA urged a 50 per cent reduction in wages paid to 
members of the NAWU — in the event, the Court ordered 
only a 20 per cent reduction.'*2 In the same vein, the NTPLA 
urged a 50 per cent reduction in wages payable to Aborigines, 
and complained when the Minister agreed to follow the 
Court's lead and impose a 20 per cent reduction.'*' The 
Banka Banka Station, c. 1936. (D. Cottle) 
NTPLA also lobbied unavailingly for taxation exemption on 
all income derived from pastoral pursuits in the TerrUory.'*" 
However, by the mid thirties, the pastoraUsts had few 
justifiable complaints about the manner in which they were 
regarded by the government. In 1936, rents which were due 
had been reduced by 25 per cent by the Minister, and from 1 
January 1936, the government agreed to subsidize a wide 
range of improvements which pastoralists were encouraged to 
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make on their stations; Payne and Fletcher regarded these 
concessions as "exceptionally generous".'*' Yet few 
pastoraUsts evidently took advantage of these concessions. 
To the end of June 1940, concessions to the value of £16,706 
were approved: payments to the value of £2,804 were made in 
the year 1938-39, and were followed by payments of £5,789 
and £3,900 in the following years, but £4,200 remained 
unclaimed.'** 
In the year 1937-38, the pastoral industry earned £560,763 
- more than half the total value of Northern Territory pro-
duction. This represented an increase of £77,400 on the value 
of the previous year.'*' However, this increased production 
was due to the general easing of the world-wide depression 
rather than any improvement or initiative in the Territory's 
pastoral industry. It remained handicapped by the fundamen-
tal problems associated with the isolation and lack of ready 
markets which had dogged it from its inception. 
The only other sector to produce significant earnings dur-
ing this time was the pearl shell industry. In the year 1937-38, 
its contribution to total production was £67,000. Indeed, dur-
ing the five-year period from 1 July 1931, it earned £245,800 
with annual returns of between £40,000 and £71,000.'** The 
Darwin fleet of twenty-five vessels was controlled by five 
pearling masters, and in 1936, employed 244 men, all of 
whom were Asian, and many of whom were indentured.'*' 
However, while the mining and pastoral industries expanded 
during the latter part of the thirties, the earnings of the pearl-
ing industry contracted because of a decline in the price of 
sheU, and intense competition from Japanese pearling fleets. 
The Japanese employed fleets of up to sixty pearling boats 
working in association with a mother ship."" They quickly 
depleted known beds, and contributed nothing to the Ter-
ritory economy. During the year 1937-38, the Japanese were 
estimated to have taken upwards of 4,500 tonnes of shell 
from the beds off Arnhem Land — the local fleet took only 
804 tonnes.'" 
The organization of the Territory's major industries during 
the thirties remained much as it had been for decades. 
However, during the same period, there were changes in 
transport technology which were calculated to minimize the 
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problems associated with the isolation and remoteness of 
centres within the Territory. McEwen, as Minister respon-
sible for the TerrUory, sought to encourage this new 
technology wherever possible, and means of doing so figured 
prominently in the policy statement he made late in 1938. 
The gold rushes to the Granites and to Tennant Creek 
underscored the utility of motor transport, and encouraged 
carriers to capitalize on the demand for their services. The 
poor condition of roads restricted operations largely to 
centres on or near the main road north of Alice Springs, but 
on this, competition was intense. Payne and Fletcher noted 
that costs between Alice Springs and Tennant Creek were 
quickly reduced from £16 per tonne to £9 per tonne. "2 A new 
element of competition was introduced in 1934 when the 
government sought to upgrade services further by operating a 
fifteen-tonne road train. The experiment was eminently suc-
cessful, and within three years, the unit had paid for itself, 
covered working expenses, and succeeded in returning a small 
profit.'" This road train provided a slower service than the 
private contractors, but was able to provide one which was 
cheaper."" Based upon this success, McEwen sought to in-
troduce simUar services in the Top End, with the Inland 
Transport Service being coordinated with shipping services to 
Darwin and railway services to Birdum.'" The outbreak of 
war prevented the scheme being implemented. 
Aviation also developed extensively during this period, and 
was one of the most potent factors which helped to break 
down the isolation of centres in the Territory. This was 
epitomized by the work of Dr Clyde Fenton, who in 1934 
commenced the Northern Territory Aerial Medical Service. 
Unlike the Flying Doctor Service inaugurated by John Flynn, 
Fenton flew his own plane. From Katherine and Darwin he 
traveUed to all remote centres of the Top End."* In recogni-
tion of the value of his work, he was awarded the Oswald 
Watt gold medal in 1938.'" 
Aviation also revolutionized other ventures besides 
medicine. In 1934, largely at the urging of the industriaUst Sir 
Herbert Gepp, steps were taken to mount an aerial, 
geological and geophysical survey of northern Australia. This 
was an historic venture in that it involved the cooperation of 
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three governments, those of Queensland, Western Australia 
and the Commonwealth, in pooUng their resources to in-
vestigate the mineral possibilities of the remote interior. The 
aerial photography was undertaken by the Royal Australian 
Air Force, and while it was primarily a geological study, it 
provided a great deal of information which was of value for 
defence purposes. This aerial survey was complemented on 
the ground by several teams of geologists. The survey com-
menced in 1935, and though Western Australia pulled out in 
1938, work continued in Queensland and the Northern Ter-
ritory until 1941. No spectacular mineral discoveries were 
made, but the survey succeeded in obtaining a great deal of 
geological information which was of value to the mining 
industry generally.'^* 
The year 1938 was a significant one for aviation in the Nor-
thern Territory. By year's end, there were twenty scheduled 
weekly services through Darwin. The air route between 
Sydney and London through Darwin was upgraded during 
the year when flying boats were introduced on the route.'" 
In July, the Dutch Airline, KNILM, began operations 
between Batavia and Sydney.**" And in the September, 
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Guinea Airways, which was formed in 1927 to service the 
goldfields of Guinea Gold in New Guinea,'*' inaugurated a 
regular service between Darwin and Adelaide through the 
major inland centres of Katherine, Daly Waters, Tennant 
Creek and Alice Springs.'*2 This route had been pioneered by 
Australian Transcontinental Airways Limited in August 
1935, but at the time U met wUh little success, and was 
discontinued two months later.'*' 
Just as Darwin took on a new significance with aviation 
developments, so too in a lesser degree, did AUce Springs. In 
1939, it became the home port of ConneUan Airways, which 
on 4 July, inaugurated a regular service between AUce 
Springs and Wyndham with the aid of a government subsidy 
of one half penny per mile.'*" E.J. Connellan had long 
sought such an opportunity,'*' and in this enterprise, he was 
encouraged personally by Minister McEwen, whilst the latter 
was on his visit to the Territory in 1938. Connellan continued 
to enjoy McEwen's patronage and support during the early 
days of the service when McEwen's successors were less 
sympathetic.'** In the same year as Connellan Airways 
commenced operations, a base for the Flying Doctor Service 
was estabUshed at AUce Springs:'*' Connellan provided 
pilots and aircraft for this service. 
The effects of the new transport technology were reflected 
in the township of Alice Springs. Where once it was a 
primitive bush town, by the late thirties it was, according to 
Abbott, "a modern clean and thriving town wUh many 
facilities [including electricity] which were almost unheard of 
a few years ago".'** By mid 1938, it boasted a population of 
864, of whom 551 were Europeans: the others comprised 
twenty-two Asians, and 279 half-castes with twelve 
"others".' *' After the growth of Tennant Creek, U became an 
important distribution centre, a position which was 
reinforced with the mining of wolfram at Hatches Creek. 
And, in the late thirties, it gained in popularity as a winter 
resort for tourists from the south, and tours were organized 
throughout central Australia."" No longer was AUce Springs 
the isolated centre it had been only a decade before. 
Darwin also underwent changes as a result of its decreased 
isolation and the recognition of its strategic importance. In 
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1938, the Northern Standard spoke of the town "entering 
upon a new era".'" It pointed to the replacement of "the 
original ragged scattered buildings" with "modern tropical 
architecture", the provision of additional electricity 
generating plant, plans for a new water supply and additions 
to the hospital and Aboriginals' compound. Indeed, ideas for 
the replanning of Darwin had already been drawn up by 
W.T. Haslam, a senior architect of the Department of In-
terior, "2 and in 1939, the Standard spoke of Darwin being 
transformed into a miniature Canberra.'" 
Darwin had long been deficient in suitable accommodation 
for visitors and itinerant workers. The problem remained 
acute untU the evacuation of Darwin after it was bombed 
early in 1942."" In the short term, the situation was ag-
gravated by the cyclone which devastated Darwin during the 
night of 10-11 March 1937. Only one Ufe was lost, that of an 
Aboriginal, but Abbott claimed that it caused considerable 
damage to all buildings in Darwin, with a rough estimate of 
costs being between £30,000 and £50,000.'" The dearth of 
tourist accommodation was exacerbated by the increased 
frequency of commercial air traffic through Darwin, and was 
little reUeved by the construction of the Hotel Darwin by 
members of the Guinea Airways group after 1936. "* Worker 
accommodation was stretched to the limit with the influx of 
labourers eager for employment on defence works after 1937. 
The new works were calculated to change Darwin completely. 
Also, the promise of a reticulated water supply meant that the 
use of weUs and latrines which had been required hitherto 
would be superfluous. Thus it was, that the years after 1937 
saw a considerable increase in building activity in Darwin. 
The physical changes reflected an increased faith in 
Darwin. In the latter part of 1937, the Bank of New South 
Wales established a branch there, followed in March 1938, by 
the Commonwealth Bank. At this time, too, a Chamber of 
Commerce was formed.'" 
As suggested above, much of the construction work in 
Darwin was undertaken for defense purposes. This became 
necessary after July 1938, when the government announced 
plans to station 750 service personnel in Darwin."* Besides 
reinforcements for the army garrison already posted there. 
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there were also plans for a naval patrol base and a detach-
ment of the airforce at the airport. 
Prior to the late thirties, the Northern TerrUory did not 
figure prominently in debate on AustraUa's defence. Some, 
Uke F.C. Urquhart, suggested that a sparsely-populated Ter-
ritory was a security risk.'" However, during the thirties, 
governments had neither the financial nor political resolve to 
divert substantial funds to the north for defence purposes. As 
late as 1937, there were stiU experts ready to argue that the 
sparsely-populated north was a most effective barrier against 
invasion. 2"" 
However, early in 1932, the decision was taken to station a 
small garrison at Darwin to protect the four oil tanks which 
had been built there for the Royal AustraUan Navy.2"' Con-
struction of barracks began immediately, and in September 
1933, the first of the fifty-two who were to form the garrison, 
arrived in Darwin.2"2 
The threat of war during the latter years of the decade 
prompted the government to increase the military presence in 
Darwin. The first of the 250-strong Darwin Mobile Force 
arrived in Darwin during March 1939.2"' When the 
remainder of the Force arrived, practically the whole of the 
town turned out to see "the biggest military parade ever held 
in the Northern Territory . . . Marching to the beat of drums 
and the skirl of the bagpipes, the 200 newcomers impressed 
with their soldierly bearing and display of a high degree of 
efficiency. "2"" 
The fact that the arrival of the new garrison could make such 
an impression in Darwin reflects a great deal on the history of 
Darwin and the Territory prior to World War II. 
The outbreak of war in 1939 — more particularly the 
bombing of Darwin in 1942 — made a dramatic break in the 
history of the Northern TerrUory. The bombing underscored 
the fact that the Territory was a region of great importance, 
and no longer a backwater. Before then, the Territory was an 
unknown region about which strange and fantastic stories 
were told: it was Xavier Herbert's Capricornia, or the land in 
Conservative Hegemony: 1931-c. 1940 129 
which a Bishop had 150 wives, or that in which flying doctors 
performed mighty feats to bring medical relief to the most 
remote regions. AU this changed after 1939. Through their 
war service, many Australians came to know the Territory 
directly. Soon after the war, the Territory became the respon-
sibUity of one minister for an unbroken period of twelve and 
a half years. Under his urging, post-war development took on 
a sense of sustained purpose which had been absent before. 
During this time, too, Territorians received a measure of self-
government, and the "New Deal" for Aborigines became a 
reality. 
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War and Reconstruction 
1940 to 1950 
For forty years after Australia's federation, the Northern 
Territory was a part of the nation which held Uttle interest for 
the vast majority of Australians. This situation changed 
dramatically for a short time during 1942, when there was a 
real fear that the country might be invaded through the 
Northern TerrUory. Troops were rushed to the battie zone, 
and control of the northern part of the Territory was taken 
from the civil administration and vested in the military 
authorUies. 
However, the sense of urgency quickly passed. By mid 
1943, after the allies took the offensive, the affairs of the 
Northern Territory once more receded into the background, 
as government officials and parliamentarians began to think 
about post-war reconstruction in those areas which were 
polUically more sensitive. 
Much has been written about the bombing of Darwin, and 
the conduct of those who had been sent there to repel any 
enemy attack. However, in the wider context of the role of 
Australia - and Darwin — in World War II, this was an inci-
dent of little importance. Before the attack, Darwin was an 
important staging point for troops, ships, and supplies which 
were required in the theatres of war to the north. The 
strengthening of defences there, during 1942, was but one 
aspect of the wider strategy for the defence of AustraUa. 
Subsequently, Darwin became an important base from which 
the war could be carried to the enemy. The bombing on 19 
February 1942, which represented but two raids of about 
sixty, did not affect Darwin's role in the overaU strategy. 
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However, the bombing of Darwin must loom large in any 
history of the Territory — in part because Darwin was one of 
the few parts of AustraUa to be subject to attack - but also 
because the period contrasted with much of the history of the 
Territory in peace time, which was so unspectacular. 
Events in the Top End foUowing the bombing changed 
noticeably from those before. The civil administration was 
replaced by military control; the citizenry were evacuated 
only to be replaced by a larger military population - which 
by its very nature had none of the social, ethnic, and class 
divisions which characterized the earlier frontier society. Life 
in the Territory was never quite the same after the war. But 
long-term benefits accrued to Territorians during this time. 
In order to move troops and suppUes about the Territory, 
sealed roads were formed between Alice Springs and Darwin, 
and between Tennant Creek and Mt Isa. Darwin was provid-
ed with a reticulated water supply from the newly-constructed 
Manton Dam, and increased reserves of water were tapped at 
Alice Springs. Increased power generation was provided at 
both Darwin and Alice Springs. These proved a boon to new 
and returning Territorians. Traditionally, successive govern-
ments had been concerned to increase the quantity of Ufe in 
the Territory by providing funds for all manner of 
developmental projects, but they had been loath to provide 
funds for basicaUy uneconomic projects which would in-
crease the quality of Ufe there. It had been left largely to 
people Uke Cook, ConneUan, Flynn and Fenton to provide 
those facilities which helped to mitigate the effects of the 
isolation in the interior, and which were so important in help-
ing to persuade settlers to live there. The rebuilding of Dar-
win was hampered by post-war shortages in essential com-
modities, but the war provided the Territory wUh capital 
works which were to bring long-term benefits to Territorians. 
It is doubtful that these would have been provided at such a 
time, had they not been demanded by defence needs. 
While post-war reconstruction in Darwin was slow, the 
political advancement of Territorians received a fiUip when, 
in 1947, provision was made for the creation of a Legislative 
Council for the Northern Territory. The measure of self-
government provided by this new body was more iUusory 
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than real, but it provided a vehicle from which successive 
generations of Territory politicians could campaign for, and 
achieve, an increased measure of self-government. In many 
ways, the war years were a watershed in Northern Territory 
history. 
More than in most regions of Australia, the inhabitants of 
the Northern Territory had long been inured to the idea of an 
approaching war. There had been an increasing military 
presence since 1932. Thus, Australia's declaration of war on 3 
September 1939 made little difference to Territorians; day-to-
day activities continued as they had done before. The period 
of the "phoney war" was longer in the Territory than 
elsewhere. This may have helped to promote attitudes and a 
certain laxity which contributed to the inglorious defence of 
Darwin in February 1942. 
As with their fathers a quarter of a century earlier, men 
hastened to join the armed forces for service overseas. Soon 
after Australia's declaration of war, it had been decided that 
there should be a Northern Territory section — a mechanized 
battery - in the force of 20,000 men then being estabUshed. 
By 6 October, seventy Territorians had sought enUstment.' 
Men travelled great distances so that they might join the 
second AIF. The Standard carried the stories of several of 
them. G.L. Terry was working at Finke in central AustraUa, 
when he heard of the outbreak of war. He "jumped the rattler 
for the 140 miles to Alice Springs. He rode on motor trucks 
and the mail lorry for the next 650 miles to Birdum, where he 
again jumped the rattier for Darwin."^ From Tennant Creek 
he was accompanied by G. Williams who was carrying his 
swag across Alexandria Station when he heard of the war, 
and he immediately set out on foot to enlist. R.G. MiUon, a 
station hand of Spring Creek Station in the Kimberleys, 
resigned within a hour of hearing of the war, and walked 225 
kilometres to Wyndham to take the steamer to Darwin to 
enlist there. 
But there was not the same sense of adventure and 
crusading which had characterized those who enlisted in the 
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Great War. Of the seventy who sought enlistment in the Nor-
thern Territory unit during the October, only twelve were 
Darwin residents. And the first eager volunteers had to join 
the Darwin militia unit which had been formed in August 
1939,5 because at that time the army was not prepared to 
receive them. There were many men who volunteered at Alice 
Springs in the October, and who were then given medical 
examinations, but who had not been called up by the follow-
ing May. As V.G. Carrington, the District Officer at Alice 
Springs remarked to Abbott, this made for dissatisfaction 
and a dampening of the ardour of those who had hastened to 
volunteer.'* 
In mid 1940, efforts were made to round up the many 
Italians who were working on the mining fields at Hatches 
Creek, Wauchope and Tennant Creek.' And in July, they 
were sent to the internment camp at Tatura in Victoria.' 
Otherwise, Territorians experienced few immediate changes 
because of the war. The build-up of troops and the various 
defence works was good for the local economies. 
In October 1939, the military officials explained the small 
number of Darwin volunteers for the second AIF on the fact 
that so many of the adult males in the town were engaged on 
defence works and essential services. Certainly there were 
many and varied defence works under way at this time. Work 
continued on the construction of the dam on the upper Man-
ton River, permitting reticulated water into Darwin in 1940. 
Similarly, work continued on the enlarging of the army bar-
racks at Larrakeyah. And in 1939, work commenced on a 
miUtary airfield about three kilometres east of the civil 
aerodrome. Work was sufficiently advanced that it could be 
occupied by no. 12 Squadron of Wirraways in 1940. The new 
hospital at Kahlin was extended in 1940 because of the 
increased demand for hospital accommodation occasioned by 
the increased population in Darwin. It opened for civilian use 
in January 1942.' In December 1940, the 19th Army General 
Hospital was established at Berrimah. In 1940, an anti-
submarine boom was constructed across the mouth of the 
harbour. And numerous dwelUngs were constructed to help 
to overcome the shortage of accommodation for workers in 
Darwin. 
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Until April 1940, the officer commanding the Darwin area 
was Lieutenant Colonel H.C.H. Robertson. It was his task to 
select sites in the Top End for miUtary installations. But his 
major concern was to have upgraded the lines of communica-
tion between Darwin and the south. His major achievement 
in this regard was to have construction of the north/south 
road approved as a miUtary necessity in September 1940.* 
The formation of the road between Alice Springs and Dar-
win was perhaps the most beneficial of the Territory's war-
time legacies, for before that time, Darwin was virtually an 
island, accessible only by sea and air. Subsequently there was 
an all-weather overland route to the south and east. The 
Department of the Interior's Inland Transport Service 
already operated on the road between AUce Springs and Ten-
nant Creek, thus the first defence priority was to form a road 
between Tennant Creek and Larrimah. This "90 day wonder" 
was performed by construction teams from the South 
AustraUan Highways Commission, the Queensland Main 
Road Commission and the New South Wales Department of 
Main Roads.' Concurrently, the Department of Interior car-
ried out improvements on the road between Alice Springs and 
Tennant Creek. The new road to Larrimah was completed by 
December 1940, and was ready for the first military convoy 
early in 1941. It was named after John McDouall Stuart by 
the Governor-General, Brigadier-General Right Honorable 
Alexander Hore-Ruthven.'" 
In 1941, communication with the south was further upgraded 
with the installation of a carrier telephone and telegraph Unk 
between Darwin and Adelaide.'' This was undertaken at the 
request of the military authorities. 
U was Lieutenant Colonel Robertson who was instrumen-
tal in purchasing the first of the army farms at the Adelaide 
River in 1940. This was the forerunner of a number of farms 
which were estabUshed to provide fresh food for the troops in 
the Northern TerrUory.'^ Given the failure of so many 
agricultural enterprises in the TerrUory to that time, U is 
noteworthy that by 1944 these farms were supplying food for 
Army camps at Adelaide River, (wet season) 1941-42. (NLA) 
more than 55,000 persons.'^ This success gave the He to the 
idea that the Territory was unsuitable for agricultural pur-
poses, but it also underscored the need for a ready market for 
such produce. At the conclusion of hostilities and the 
"repatriation" of troops, the local market disappeared, and 
except for the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research 
(CSIR), taking over some farms for experimental purposes at 
Katherine, the agricultural initiative was lost. 
The war was a long time in coming to the Northern Ter-
ritory. This sapped the morale of troops and long-standing 
Territorians. Pastoralists complained that troops passing 
through station properties disturbed cattle and left gates 
open."* Troops complained of the inactivity in the tropical 
Top End. 
Members of the AIF who had volunteered for overseas ser-
vice and who were stationed in the Territory, were particular-
ly grieved that they did not have the same pay and pension 
privileges as those of their comrades overseas.'^ In September 
1941, matters came to a head with a weekend of "the wildest 
scenes that Darwin has seen for many years". '* Pay weekends 
had always been a rowdy time, but on this occasion, an all-in 
fight occurred which involved soldiers and civilians at the 
stadium on the Friday. On the Saturday, a riot occurred in 
the heart of the town. "The public bar of the Victoria Hotel 
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was stormed and ransacked. Nearby shop windows were 
smashed and looted."^^ The government subsequently pro-
mised that "anomaUes would be cleared up", and that 
members of the AIF serving in Darwin "would get a fair deal 
from the Government".'* However, throughout the war, one 
of the greatest problems encountered by miUtary com-
manders was that of maintaining morale. Something of the 
extent of the problem was highlighted by the flight from Dar-
win after the bombing of 1942. This provided but a tem-
porary relief to the years of monotony. The fact that war 
games (such as the "attack" on Darwin in August 1941) in-
variably ended with the attackers being repulsed," did little 
to prepare the troops for the reality of war when it came. 
The Darwin waterfront was another destabiUzing factor in 
the Top End which promoted ill-feeling between civiUans and 
military personnel. These problems became acute after 
American forces were established at Darwin. They were un-
familiar with Australian labour relations, and sought to have 
the army unload supplies. The increased strategic value of 
Darwin and the general war emergency meant that inward 
freight increased by 500 per cent during 1940.2° The inade-
quate port and wharf facilities meant that there were dif-
ficulties in handling this freight, and these difficulties were 
compounded by the numerous industrial disputes engineered 
by the left-wing wharf labourers. They unsuccessfully sought 
a special tropical aUowance,^' and later a war loading," and 
indeed, employed any stratagem in order to hamper the war 
effort which they branded an "imperiaUstic war". Defence 
authorities recommended that military personnel should be 
solely responsible for the handUng of miUtary supplies, but 
the UAP Menzies government was "plain scared" of the effect 
that this might have on labour relations throughout 
Australia. ^ ^ Fortunately, circumstances changed somewhat 
after the entry of the Soviet Union into the war on the side of 
the allies in June 1941. Thereafter, the left-wing militants 
came to view the war rather as a "holy war" which they 
should support. This change of attitude was made easier by 
the defeat of the conservative government at the federal elec-
tions on 7 October 1941, and the fact that Australia's war 
effort came under the control of a Labor government led by 
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John Curtin. In December 1941, Eddy Ward, the Labor 
Minister for Labour and National Service, flew to Darwin, 
and succeeded in having the wharf labourers agree to work 
longer hours and to permit the introduction of additional 
wharf labourers from Queensland.2'' These "flying wharfies" 
arrived in Darwin soon after, but were able to effect little 
change before the bombing of February 1942. The govern-
ment's decision on 7 February to appoint a Port Superinten-
dent to direct all activities on the Darwin waterfront, was also 
a belated effort." 
Civilian Darwin had traditionally been riven by factions. 
Problems associated with this were brought into relief in the 
period of uncertainty prior to Darwin's entry into the war, 
and had a bearing on the events of 19 February 1942. The 
spectre of direct involvement in the war became a matter of 
immediate concern after Japan's declaration of war on 7 
December 1941. Three days later, the British capital ships 
Prince of Wales and Repulse were sunk off the Malayan 
coast. On 15 February 1942, Singapore surrendered. But, at a 
time when war was imminent, a fact which was highUghted by 
the Cabinet decision of 12 December 1941 to evacuate all 
women and children from Darwin, civil leaders in the town 
were embroiled in an argument about air raid precautions. 
During the war games of August 1941, the role of the ARP 
committee was dismissed as Uttle more than a joke by civiUan 
and miUtary personnel alike. Following this, the committee 
stepped up Us pressure on the Administrator for some form 
of legal status. Judge Wells bought into the problem on 
behalf of the ARP committee, though he strongly criticized 
much of the advice which had been given by it.^ * Later, on 23 
January, members of the ARP committee threatened to 
resign unless Abbott gave them legal authority for their work. 
Unsatisfied on this score, aU except the Chief Warden and the 
permanent officer resigned on 26 January 1942. Wells carried 
the fight to Attorney-General Evatt, and Minister of Interior 
CoUings in Canberra, but to no avail.^ ^ At the time of the 
bombing, there was no formal ARP organization in Darwin, 
though former members hastened to do what they could in 
the emergency. WeUs held that Abbott was totally responsible 
for mishandling the situation, and claimed that so long as 
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Abbott was Administrator, the Darwin pubUc would refuse 
to cooperate with the government.^^ Abbott certainly did 
nothing to unify Darwin during his tour of duty there, but the 
fact that WeUs should pubUcly oppose the Administrator 
only made any lack of cooperation more Ukely. 
The event for which civilians and military personnel had 
been preparing for so long — however inefficiently -
occurred on the morning of 19 February 1942. But perhaps it 
was precisely because of the long period of anticipation, that 
when the moment of truth came, so many civilians and military 
people were found wanting in resolve. The story of the bomb-
ing of Darwin has been told elsewhere in detaU. '^ It is un-
necessary here to do more than make mention of the major 
issues, because, despite the drama of the occasion, and the real 
fear of invasion that it engendered, the bombing of Darwin 
was of little consequence to Australia's war effort or to the 
Territory's history. 
Despite the fears of those in Darwin at the time and in 
Australia generally, the Japanese attack on Darwin was not a 
prelude to invasion. The Japanese sought only to destroy the 
port and military instaUations, thereby preventing Darwin's 
use as a staging point through which the alUed forces might 
oppose Japanese aggression against Timor.^ ^ The Japanese 
succeeded in their objective. 
On 19 February 1942, Darwin was devastated by two aerial 
bombardments, in which 243 lives were lost. The first raid oc-
curred shortly before 10.00 a.m., and was flown by the same 
carrier-based force which had destroyed the American Pacific 
fleet at Pearl Harbour on 7 December 1941. This first attack 
was directed primarily at the town and harbour. The town 
was taken completely by surprise, and the attack was com-
plete. Only two planes failed to return. At that time, fifty-five 
ships were in the harbour: eight of these were sunk, with 
many others being damaged in some way. The new airfield 
was strafed and the squadron of American P40s destroyed. 
The first raid lasted about forty minutes. The second struck 
two hours after the first. This force of fifty-four land-based 
bombers from the Celebes, directed their attack at the RAAF 
airfield. Damage was extensive, though fortunately there was 
little loss of life during this second raid. However, U was this 
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second raid which destroyed the morale of those who were so 
badly shaken by the first raid. 
The devastation of Darwin, and the concomitant loss of Ufe 
was an indictment of the military forces which were meant to 
have been defending Darwin. The likeUhood of an attack 
should have been anticipated given the proximity of the 
Japanese forces. Only five days earlier, on 14 February, a 
convoy had left Darwin to reinforce allied troops in Timor. It 
had been attacked by Japanese aircraft, and had been forced 
to return on 18 February. Yet, early warnings of the 
approaching Japanese were ignored. The alarm was first raised 
by Father McGrath of Bathurst Island, who radioed 
authorities soon after 0930 hours, that enemy planes were en 
route to Darwin. This message was passed to the RAAF at 0937 
hours. But U was almost 1000 hours, at the time the first bombs 
were falUng, before the public alarm was given. The early 
warning would have saved many lives. It would have permitted 
ships in the harbour to weigh anchor, and U would have 
enabled citizens to take adequate shelter. There would have 
been no wharf labourers at risk had adequate warning been 
given. 
Members of the armed forces were also largely responsible 
for exacerbating the panic which pervaded Darwin im-
mediately after the second raid. When Wing-Commander 
Griffith ordered men at the airfield to disperse and to regroup 
a little down the track, many simply cleared out. Lockwood, 
who was a witness of the bombing, noted that 278 men were 
stUl missing four days after the bombing.3' When men who 
were supposedly trained for combat conditions should flee 
so ignominiously, it is little wonder that civilians should have 
done so. 
In the light of the reality, it is interesting that Prime 
Minister Curtin should have assured the nation that, "In this 
first battle on Australian soil it will be a source of pride to the 
public to know that the armed forces and the civilians com-
ported themselves with the gallantry that is traditional in the 
people of our stock."^^ One would hope that Curtin was 
ignorant of the facts when he made such a claim! The follow-
ing day, the Minister for Air, Mr Drakeford, claimed that "as 
far as could be ascertained, there were 39 casualties (15 per-
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sons killed and 24 wounded)"." If this statement was made in 
aU honesty, it denotes great confusion in the system of com-
munications between Darwin and Sydney. However, after the 
initial confusion had been resolved, it was evident that there 
had been only fifteen civilian deaths in the town — ten of 
which occurred at the post office. Only after the completion 
of an official enquiry did the government admit to the 
number of deaths in the order of 240 — even then Curtin 
claimed that damage to the town "was very smaU"." Five 
days later, the Bulletin repeated these details claiming that in 
the three services, only eight men had been killed." Thus, 
measures were taken to gloss over instances which ran 
counter to the perceived ideals of Australia's soldiers. 
That the government was concerned about the debacle in 
Darwin was evident from the fact that on 3 March 1942, Mr 
Justice Lowe of the Victorian Supreme Court was appointed 
to enquire into the events of 19 February. His enquiry 
achieved nothing but the recording of firsthand accounts of 
the bombing. Though it must be understood that because he 
conducted his enquiry at a time when many beUeved that 
invasion was imminent, his chief concern was to complete the 
enquiry as rapidly as possible. Lowe heard witnesses at 
Darwin from 5-10 March and in Melbourne from 19-25 
March. His main conclusion was that in all areas, there was a 
decided lack of leadership from those in positions of autho-
rity. He rightly criticized the RAAF officers who were 
responsible for the tardiness of air raid warnings, and the 
retreat into the bush, but he also criticized the civil admin-
istration — more particularly the Administrator C.L.A. 
Abbott — for failing to provide proper leadership. This was 
somewhat surprising, for he admitted in his report that "the 
evidence also disclosed the existence in some sections of the 
population of a lack of confidence in and resentment towards 
the Administrator. It so happened that most of the witnesses 
who gave evidence before me on this matter were of this 
section . . ."^ ^ The military leaders were clearly remiss in their 
failure to exercise sufficient control over their men, but U was 
a difficult matter for the civil administration to do likewise. 
Abbott protested that he did what he could after the bombing 
— and that he did not leave Darwin until 2 March, although 
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on 21 February, the army had assumed control over Darwin, 
and all parts north of Birdum, under the terms of the 
National Security (Emergency Control) Regulations." 
However, given the civiUan factions in Darwin at the time, 
and the opposition to Abbott from the union and its sup-
porters, it is doubtful that Abbott could have exercized 
leadership, even if he had possessed this quality in the extent 
which Lowe expected. At least Abbott remained in Darwin to 
organize the evacuation of the civil administration, and to 
Uaise with the military authorities after the union leaders had 
fled. Unlike the military leaders and their men, Abbott stood 
in a different position with civiUans. He did not have the 
authority to order civilians to remain in the town, which after 
the miUtary evacuation, was ahead of the line of defences. 
Abbott countered the charges which Lowe made against 
him,^' and it is significant that his case was championed by 
the Labor Senator CoUings who had long been in receipt of 
complaints about Abbott from the working community of 
Darwin. This was the section upon which Lowe had 
depended for much of his evidence, yet CoUings remarked 
that the complaints he had received about Abbott "were 
biased and made with little sense of fairness or 
responsibility".^' Abbott was never exonerated. 
The day of 19 February was not the occasion for pride 
which Curtin had suggested. Besides the cowardice and panic 
which pervaded the town, wholesale looting of abandoned 
homes and premises commenced on the evening of 19 
February, and continued for several weeks.'*" This was led by 
members of the Provost Corps. It was still taking place while 
Mr Justice Lowe was in Darwin conducting his enquiry."' 
Despite the infamy, there were also numerous acts of 
courage on 19 February. Thus, in recognition of "unselfish 
and courageous conduct during the first bombing raid on 
Darwin", Roy Ivan Sinclair, who had recently been sentenced 
to three years gaol, was granted a free pardon by the 
Governor-General.'*^ Only three days before the bombing. 
Judge Wells had corresponded with the Minister suggesting 
that long-term prisoners should be sent to Alice Springs, with 
those serving less than six months being freed."^ After the 
first raid. Wells had aU the prisoners freed. The gaol was in a 
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particularly vulnerable position near the civil airport. Sinclair 
who had been a soldier, and who was trained in first aid, im-
mediately reported to the ARP office, and for as long as 
required, worked tirelessly to provide help wherever it was 
required. His pardon was the first granted since the inception 
of the Commonwealth. 
Darwin and other centres in the Top End were attacked on 
fifty-eight occasions between March 1942 and the end of 
November 1943."'' On no other occasion, however, was there 
loss of life and property comparable to that which occurred 
on 19 February. In part, this was due to the increased effi-
ciency of the early warning system, and in part because of the 
evacuation of civiUans, and the new location of army head-
quarters and some squadrons of aircraft in the bush to the 
south of Darwin. 
The evacuation of civilians from Darwin had begun late in 
1941. On 12 December, five days after the commencement of 
the Pacific war, the War Cabinet recommended the evacua-
tion of the 1,066 women and 969 chUdren from Darwin and 
the surrounding area."^ Within a week, 750 women and 
chUdren had been evacuated by sea. The last ship left Darwin 
on 15 February 1942. The last evacuee plane flew out on 18 
February. Efforts were also made to transfer administration 
records to centres in the south."* On 30 January 1942, the 
records of the Lands Titles Office and the Lands Branch were 
transferred to Alice Springs. On 10 and 11 February, the 
records of the Mines Branch were transferred to Tennant 
Creek, and on 11 February, those of the Native Affairs 
Branch were taken to Mataranka. The evacuation of civilians 
and records took on a new urgency after the bombing. The 
evacuation which took place from Darwin on the day of the 
bombing was chaotic, but soon after the civil and military 
authorities assumed effective control. It was the lot of V.G. 
Carrington, the District Officer at Alice Springs, to co-
ordinate the evacuation of aU women, children and old men 
from the region north of Birdum. Special trains were organiz-
ed for this purpose, and by 3 March, there were only about 
one hundred civilians remaining at Darwin."^ But, while 
people had been eager to flee from Darwin, there were many 
old-timers in more southern centres who were loath to leave 
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their homes. At Rum Jungle, a Mr Flynn, a seventy-year-old 
ganger refused to be evacuated, as did Mr and Mrs Hayes of 
Brock's Creek, despite an order from Judge WeUs. Mrs 
Hayes threatened to take poison rather than be removed."* 
After 21 February 1942, that area of the Territory north of 
Birdum was placed under military rule — though at no time 
was it under martial law. Until after the war, civiUans 
required passes to enter this area. Thus, for a time after 1 
March 1942, Alice Springs became the centre for the civil ad-
ministration for the Northern Territory. 
Table 11. Civilians in the Northern Territory, 18 July 1944 
Alice Springs 597 
Finke River 67 
Darwin 51 
Lake Nash 46 
Maranboy 70 
Pine Creek 17 
Borroloola 11 
Newcastle Waters 21 
Barrow Creek 87 
Hatches Creek 45 
Tennant Creek 122 
Adelaide River 17 
Timber Creek 75 
Wave Hill 75 
Rankine River 60 
Arltunga 99 
Daly River 13 
Anthony's Lagoon 37 
Katherine 40 
Roper River 13 
Total: 1,563 
Source: Memo, 18 July 1944, AWM 625/5/17. Figures exclude employees of Allied 
Works Council and government departments in the Territory. 
During March 1942, Australia braced itself for invasion. 
The Philippines fell to the Japanese, and on 17 March, 
General D. Mac Arthur passed through Darwin to reorganize 
headquarters in Melbourne. Throughout AustraUa, defences 
were stiffened. Nowhere was this more necessary than in the 
Northern Territory. In February 1942, the Australian forces 
in and about Darwin under the command of Major-General 
D.V.J. Blake, consisted of two infantry brigades — the 3rd 
under Brigadier A.R. Allen and the 23rd under Brigadier 
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E.F. Lind - in all about 14,000 men. However, the standard 
of the troops who were expected to hold Australia's northern 
frontier was not high. The only experienced troops were two 
AIF unUs - the 2/14 Field Regiment and the 2/4th Pioneer 
Battalion — and one militia battalion (the 19th) which had 
been in Darwin during most of 1941. The other five militia 
battalions - the 7th, 8th, 27th, 43rd and the 19th Machine 
Gun Battalion — had all been called up since the entry of 
Japan into the war: the 7th and 8th Battalions arrived in 
Darwin only during February."' The deployment of these 
troops was a tactical error. Their task was to protect Darwin 
and the RAAF aerodromes in Darwin and at Batchelor: for-
ward detachments were grouped at Shoal Bay, Lee Point and 
Bynoe Harbour.'" But unless the enemy attacked these loca-
tions, these troops would have been ineffectual. Had the 
enemy landed elsewhere and captured the north/south road, 
the defenders would have been isolated. 
In March, the defences of northern Australia, together 
with that of Australia generaUy, were strengthened with the 
return of four AIF brigades from the Middle East. On 27 
March, Major-General E.F. Herring assumed command of 
the AustraUan forces in the Territory. Indeed, at this time, 
the whole command structure was replaced. Brigadiers R. 
King and I. Dougherty took over the 3rd and 23rd Brigades, 
and AIF officers were placed in command of the 7th, 8th, 
19th and 2/4 Pioneer Battalions. The headquarters of the 7th 
Military District were removed to Katherine, and the two 
brigades were redeployed along the main road south from 
Darwin, so that they might more readily respond to any 
enemy invasion. Morale and efficiency improved, particular-
ly in May, when the 19th Brigade, one of the units recently 
returned from the Middle East, was moved to the Top End. 
By the end of the year, there were major camps at Birdum, 
Larrimah, Mataranka, Pine Creek and at several locations 
between Adelaide River and Darwin.'' 
American troops were also used to strengthen the Ter-
ritory's defences. In February, the 147th and 148th U.S. Field 
Artillery Regiment had been stationed at Darwin." A month 
later, there were 5,000 American troops in Darwin, with 
airmen stationed at several of the centres in the interior." 
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During 1942, American troops were stationed at Birdum, 
Katherine, Pine Creek, Adelaide River and Darwin.'" 
RAAF bases were established along the length of the main 
north/south road at Darwin, Daly Waters, Batchelor and 
Alice Springs." Other aerodromes and strips were carved out 
of the jungle at places such as the 28 mile, 34 mile, Hughes, 
Fenton, and Carson.'* These assumed an important role 
when, during 1942 and 1943, the alUed strategy in the Pacific 
area moved over to the offensive. 
During April 1942, the allied forces in Australia an-
ticipated invasion. This fear receded during the latter half of 
1942, particularly after the American victories in the Coral 
Sea and at Midway early in June 1942, and the allied victory 
over the Japanese land forces in New Guinea in September. 
Subsequently, Darwin and the Northern Territory again 
became important as a base from which to attack the 
Japanese to the north west, and as a staging point for troops 
and suppUes going to or from battle zones. The posting of a 
squadron of American Liberator bombers to Darwin in 
January 1943, meant that the attack could be taken deep into 
Japanese-held territory.'^ The arrival of three RAAF Spitfire 
squadrons at Darwin early in 1943, and the increasingly effi-
cient radar, provided a more effective defence for Darwin.'* 
Thereafter, Japanese air raids suffered increasing losses. The 
last heavy raid on the Territory airfields was on 6 July 1943:" 
they ceased completely by the end of November. 
All centres in the Northern Territory were affected by the 
war — perhaps none more so that Darwin. Soon after the 
bombing, Darwin was "almost deserted and peaceful in its 
very quietness".*" The army and airforce had moved to 
defence lines to the south, leaving the town in the hands of 
the navy. The whole of Darwin society had been transposed 
elsewhere. Chinese had been pressed into the AlUed Works 
CouncU or evacuated; the Aborigines and half-castes had 
been evacuated. Not untU later in 1942, when the immediate 
threat of invasion had been removed, did army and airforce 
unUs move back into the town. At this time, Darwin was little 
more than an entertainment centre. 
A description of Darwin today would be incomplete without reference 
to the picture shows screened in that area. Programmes begin shortly 
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after dusk each night in different areas. Vehicles arrive from miles 
around and discharge American and Australian soldiers and airmen. 
The navy is also in attendance with a truck load or two of white-shirted 
ratings. Every man carries his own seating accommodation, be it soap 
box, stretcher, stool, cane chair or armchair. Seated in the open in the 
clear tropical night, the men far from home watch the entertainment.*' 
Alice Springs too underwent immense change during the 
war years. It was the centre of the Territory's civil administra-
tion and the railhead through which troops and supplies 
moved to centres further north. In the first years of the war, 
the European population of Alice Springs had been 764 per-
sons. This was augmented by members of the civU ad-
ministration from Darwin, employees of the AlUed Works 
Council and at one time during the war, up to 5,000 troops.*2 
It is little wonder that there should have been disturbances in 
the town.*^ 
Table 12. Northern Territory Force Ration Strength, 20 April 1944 
D^^^*" Springs ^ ^ ^ ' ^ '^°^^' 
A.M.F. 22,795 5,539 U 4 0 34,574 
R.A.N. 
R.A.A.F. 
U.S. Army 
Civilians 
Natives 
21,421 1,856 433 23,710 
49,216 7,395 1,673 58,284 
Source: Minute dated 18 May 1944, AWM 625/5/28. 
Besides great numbers of AustraUan and American troops 
in the Territory, there was also a great number of civiUans of 
the Civil Construction Corps of the Allied Works CouncU. 
The Council had been established on 17 February 1942 under 
E.G. Theodore, to coordinate all construction work required 
as part of the war effort: the Civil Construction Corps was 
formed on 14 April 1942.*" The main north/south road had 
deteriorated rapidly during the Wet. Thus in 1942, it was 
determined to strengthen and seal the highway between 
Larrimah and Alice Springs, together with the highway 
between Tennant Creek and Mt Isa.*' At the same time, the 
Corps was also required to form several airstrips in the jungle 
in the Top End. 
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The main north/south highway proved to be of immense 
value during the war. Normally three convoys, each of thirty 
trucks, left AUce Springs each day for Larrimah, to return 
eight days later. Staging camps between Alice Springs and 
Larrimah were established at Ti Tree Well, New Barrow 
Creek, Cabbage Gum Bore, Banka Banka, Elliott and Daly 
Waters.** Supplies for civiUans living north of Alice Springs, 
and those who were not employed in defence work were 
carried by the army up the track, with the civilians, chiefly 
pastoraUsts, being responsible for ensuring transport to 
their stations. The administration's Inland Transport Service 
Ufted supplies from Newcastle Waters to Wave Hill and other 
localities.*'' Those civilians to the north of Daly Waters 
simply purchased supplies from the nearest army supply 
depot. Even though they paid 33 '/s per cent over and above 
the cost of articles, the total prices were far below those 
which prevailed before the war.** 
The war severely dislocated the Uves of white Territorians: 
but the effect on black Territorians was immeasurably 
greater.*' For the first time, Europeans in the Territory far 
outnumbered the Aborigines. More importantly however, 
these temporary Territorians had not the same prejudices 
towards the Aborigines which had long been held by white 
Territorians — many of whom were evacuated from the Top 
End at this time. In addition, the many army camps, rather 
than the towns and pastoral stations, became the major 
points of contact between blacks and whites. Furthermore, 
miUtary personnel rather than civil servants or missionaries, 
became responsible for regulating the cultural contact. For a 
time, the relationships were determined by the needs of the 
war effort, and in accordance with military protocol, rather 
than those traditions which had prevailed hitherto, and which 
resembled those between conquered and conquering peoples. 
While the army was little concerned about black/white rela-
tions, it also showed little concern for cultural differences 
among the Aborigines. Thus, as Catherine Berndt observed 
whilst undertaking anthropological research at the time, the 
Aboriginal population of the several control camps which 
were established, were mixed "not only in regard to place of 
origin and cultural background" but that they also 
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represented "the whole gamut of contact experience, from 
old Darwin hands, and jaded cattle station sophisticates to 
people associating with Europeans for the first time".''" Once 
in these camps, the Aboriginal labourers and their depen-
dants were subjected to the rigours of army discipUne in rela-
tion to work routine, messing arrangements, and standards 
of hygiene, and all were introduced to the vagaries of a cash 
economy. The cultural dislocation was all but total, and it un-
doubtedly had profound and long-term effects on individual 
Aborigines and tribal groups. Unfortunately, there seems to 
have been few, if any, long-term benefits from this inter-
regnum in the area of black/white relations or the develop-
ment of government Aboriginal poUcies. 
The overriding demands of the war effort handicapped 
Chinnery in his efforts to establish the Native Affairs Branch 
of the administration, and to implement policies and imtia-
tives flowing from the "New Deal" for Aborigines. Through-
out the war — and for many years after — the major concern 
of the administration was simply to slow or curtail the "drift" 
of Aborigines from reserves to the towns.'' This "drift" 
existed before the war, but it became more pronounced with 
the build-up of troop numbers and the muUipUcation of con-
tact points. At a particular race meeting in Darwin in 
December 1940, officers of the Native Affairs Branch were 
called upon to patrol the course for the sole purpose of keeping 
Aborigines away.''^ Constable Johnson, the Protector at Pine 
Creek, complained that many of those who had been 
attracted there from Darwin and other regions were not adept 
at fending for themselves in the bush; he complained too of 
the fact that troops considered them as curios and pUed them 
with trinkets and tobacco.''^ The incidence of venereal disease 
in the Aboriginal women became a major fear of military 
officers,''" and V. White, the Secretary of the Native Affairs 
Branch, wrote seriously of the need to protect the European 
troops and workers from the Aborigines."" 
Throughout the period of the war, the officers of the 
Native Affairs Branch could do little more than respond to 
crises. Immediately prior to the bombing of northern 
Australia, the Branch had been called upon to supervise the 
evacuation of full and part Aborigines from the war zone: 
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headquarters were transferred to Mataranka, to supervise 
those who had been evacuated from Darwin to Pine Creek, 
Katherine and Mataranka.'* Subsequently they were called 
upon to supervise the many control camps which were 
estabUshed in the vicinity of army establishments — though 
not so close that the Aborigines had easy access to them. 
These camps were to help, 
"1) To combat contact with troops and Road Construction workers. 
2) To provide work for natives who were deprived of employment by 
the evacuation of the civil population and for those who had migrated 
to centres of settlements in search of tobacco etc; [and] 
3) To assist the Army in the health sphere, in relation to malaria and 
VD control."" 
There had been only two supervised camps prior to the 
war; at Darwin, and at Jay Creek under T. Strehlow. After 
the bombing, another camp was estabUshed at Mataranka, 
and soon after, others were established at Katherine, 
Adelaide River and at Koolpinyah. Later in the year, a camp 
was established at Maranboy, and others followed at Cullen 
Creek and Larrimah. Smaller camps were opened at ElUott, 
Banka Banka, Barrow Creek and Dunmara. DeUssaville con-
tinued until AprU 1943. In August 1942, all natives at AUce 
Springs were removed to the reserve at the Bungalow.''* This 
had previously been used for part-Aborigines who had been 
evacuated to Balaklava in South Australia.'" 
These were the camps of which Mrs Berndt spoke. During 
the war, upwards of a thousand Aborigines Uved in them — 
Aborigines who were employed by the army, together with 
their dependants who also drew rations. At first, the 
Aborigines had been seen as a hindrance to the war effort — 
even a potential fifth column — though subsequently they 
became a valuable labour force which enabled troops to be 
freed for other purposes. A smaU number of Aborigines had 
been used to perform menial tasks about the Darwin garrison 
as early as 1933.8" The call for their employment about 
military installations increased with the build-up in troop 
numbers, though these requests were constantly opposed by 
the Native Affairs Branch*' — until after the evacuation of 
Darwin.*2 For the most part, the Aborigines were given un-
skilled tasks, which included clearing bush, loading vehicles 
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or carting wood, but many were also given training in semi-
skilled mechanical tasks in the army workshops.*^ In a more 
direct manner, others were employed in intelUgence work for 
the army. The anthropologist, Donald Thomson, a squadron 
leader in the RAAF during the war, and who had worked 
amongst the Arnhem Land Aborigines in 1935-36 - was 
seconded to the army for the purpose of raising and comman-
ding a special reconnaisance unit of about fifty Arnhem 
Landers. With this unit, he patrolled Arnhem Land. Similar-
ly, W.E.H. Stanner, who had undertaken anthropological 
field work in the Top End during the thirties, was instructed 
to recruit and lead another observer unit of Aborigines.*" 
The employment and accommodation conditions offered 
to the Aborigines by the army were vastly superior to those 
which had been offered by the traditional employers of 
Aboriginal labour. That the Aborigines should have readily 
adapted to these conditions, and worked satisfactorily, gave 
the lie to the arguments used by the pastoralists in seeking to 
justify the poor conditions for Aboriginal workers which 
generally prevailed on the pastoral stations. 
The attraction of the work, and conditions provided by the 
army, drained many Aboriginal labourers from the 
Territory's pastoral stations. To help resolve this dilemma, 
Vesteys' Australian Investment Agency agreed to employ the 
anthropologists R. and C. Berndt, hoping that they might help 
to recruit labour for their stations.*' When it was realized 
that the Berndts were concerned rather to improve the condi-
tions under which the Aborigines were housed and employed, 
Bingle of Vesteys threw all manner of obstacles in their path, 
and sought to poison their relations with Chinnery and the 
Native Affairs Branch.** 
Unfortunately for the Aborigines, and those who were 
concerned to ameUorate tUeir working conditions, the oppor-
tunities provided during the war years disappeared as quickly 
as they had arisen. The army made no provision to ease the 
problems associated with its withdrawal — resulting in the 
sudden unemployment of the Aborigines, and the closing of 
the control camps. This was left to the officers of the 
understaffed Native Affairs Branch. Except as an example of 
what might be achieved in accommodating the two cultures. 
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the war-time experience counted for little. Indeed, in so far as 
U raised the expectations of many Aborigines, and yet 
dislocated the normal Territory economy, the war years set 
back efforts to come to terms with the differences between 
blacks and whites in the Territory. 
As the threat of war receded, long-standing Territorians 
were eager to return to their homes — or their remains. It is 
evident from those who sought permits to return, that many 
had a trying time of it in the south, where they found accom-
modation difficult to obtain and hard to keep, and the 
weather not to their Uking.*' Arrangements for the supervi-
sion of the return of civiUans and the devolution of power 
had been made early in 1945, when on 14 February a sub-
committee was formed at a meeting at Victoria Barracks in 
Melbourne for this very purpose.** Arrangements proceeded 
smoothly after peace in the Pacific. Civil administration was 
re-estabUshed first in the region south of Pine Creek, and 
subsequently extended northwards to Darwin on 28 February 
1946, with the repeal of the National Security (Emergency 
Control) Regulations, and the Ufting of the last restrictions 
on civilian entry to Darwin. Administrator Abbott re-
occupied Government House at Darwin in July 1945, and 
from there supervised the return of the several government 
departments which had been evacuated to southern centres.*' 
A check to these arrangements occurred in October 1945, 
when Abbott learned of the army's decision to cease supply-
ing rations to civUians. However, by that time, Thomas 
Brown and Sons were soon expected to recommence opera-
tions.'" Subsequently, civiUans were permitted to return to 
Darwin, only if they gave an undertaking not to caU upon the 
army or the administration for assistance. On 26 May 1946, 
Abbott left Darwin on sick leave before reUnquishing his 
position to A.R. Driver on 30 June." It fell to Driver to 
oversee the reconstruction of Darwin. 
Arthur Robert Driver was a Western Australian, born at 
Albany on 25 November 1909, and educated at the Hale 
Street School in Perth and the University of Western 
Australia, where he graduated as a civil engineer. In this 
capacity, he worked in the Western Australian Department of 
Public Works from 1928 to 1940, until he enlisted in the army 
for war service. 
158 At the Other End of Australia 
While the restoration of the civil administration was a 
straight forward matter, that of reconstructing Darwin and 
resettling civilians was not. Many civilians were loath to 
accept the apparently niggardly compensation from the War 
Damage Commission, and negotiations dragged on till 
1950.92 jhg problem was that compensation was based on 
1942 values'^ — regardless of the cost of replacing property 
at post-war prices, which were inflated because of shortages 
of materials. Thus, one claimant who had lost a house and 
contents valued at £900, and who was offered £750,for the 
house in 1940, was awarded £310 by the government 
assessors. This was reckoned on the purchase price of £325, 
and £75 added for improvements with £90 deducted for 
depreciation.'" 
Irrespective of any compensation payments, however, 
post-war reconstruction in Darwin and throughout the Ter-
ritory was handicapped by shortages in essential buUding 
materials. These problems exempUfied the lack of concern 
which governments felt for the Territory, and which was in 
large part due to the lack of poUtical clout of the Territory 
voters. The supply of building materials in all states was deter-
mined by the Department of Post-War Reconstruction, in 
accordance with quotas which were themselves determined by 
1938-39 consumption figures. But there were no figures to 
"indicate the pre-war consumption of developmental 
materials in the Territory"." Thus, there was no quota for 
materials for the Territory, and any orders placed through 
usual trade channels in the states were satisfied according to 
the priorities operating in the particular states.'* At the very 
least this caused delay; in many instances it meant the com-
plete cessation of reconstruction works." Matters were com-
plicated further in the short-term by the government selling 
off many of the defence installations. In many instances, 
these were purchased by southern interests, dismantied and 
removed from the Territory, when they might have been used 
locally.'* The shortage of housing accommodation had long 
been a problem in the Territory." It was exacerbated by post-
war shortages. Records indicate that buildings had been 
destroyed or demoUshed on 132 allotments since 19 February 
1942.'"" In the post-war period to the end of July 1949, the 
government's building programme was responsible for: 
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— reconditioning 120 houses — 101 of them in Darwin 
— spending £82,000 on hostel accommodation 
— building 36 new houses — 33 of them in Darwin 
— purchasing 5 houses and flats.'"' 
Yet, this accommodation was inadequate even for govern-
ment personnel. Little consideration was given to private 
citizens. 
Six years after, Darwin still has a wartime atmosphere, which must be 
utterly unique in the Commonwealth of Australia. 
The gaunt rafters of the old Bank of New South Wales still reached 
out into the dawn this morning. Almost obliterated, the words 'founded 
1817' are just recognisable on this bank's scarred wall. 
Gordon's Don Hotel stares out over the water with blank windows 
like war-blinded eyes. . . . 
In Wood Street the body of an old 'blitz buggy' lies askew just off the 
roadway. 
On the waterfront, Darwin Harbor still reeks of the blitz.'"^ 
Yet perhaps the greatest hindrance to Darwin's post-war 
reconstruction was the decision of the Labor government to 
acquire all land in and about Darwin to facilitate the planning 
of a new city on the Canberra model. The bureaucratic delays 
in implementing the Darwin Lands Acquisition Act (1945) en-
couraged the renaissance of the low form of accommodation, 
so recreating the blight which the act sought to abolish. The 
act represented a colossal bureaucratic experiment in town 
planning which showed little regard for the many citizens 
who were to be affected. Again, it is doubtful that such an ex-
periment would have been undertaken had the Territory been 
a more politically sensitive area. 
The idea of replanning Darwin on the Canberra model had 
been proposed before the war, when R.A. Mclnnes, the City 
Planner from Brisbane, had been instructed to draw up a 
plan. It developed during the war years, doubtless encourag-
ed by the opportunities provided by the evacuation of Dar-
win, the destruction of much of the city, and the philosophies 
of the federal Labor government.'"' Though of a conser-
vative persuasion, Abbott applauded the idea of the govern-
ment acquiring aU freehold land, for it would "give control 
over all people returning and . . . entirely prevent the Chinese 
quarter forming again. [Indeed], If land is acquired from the 
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former Chinese residents, there is really no need for them to 
return as they have no other assets.'""" The biU received little 
opposition in federal parliament, and received the Royal 
Assent on 16 August 1945 - the day after the end of the war. 
In accordance with this act, all freehold land within an area 
of 144 square kilometres about Darwin — 443 blocks — was 
acquired by the government from 17 January 1946.'"' 
Once again, there soon became apparent the vast disparity 
between the intentions of the government, and its ability to 
carry them out. The task of compensating aU those whose 
freehold land was acquired was a gigantic one, because 
former owners were dispersed throughout AustraUa. By July 
1948, only seventy per cent of claims had been settled. '"* This 
only succeeded in frustrating those who wanted to return to 
Darwin to take up the threads of their lives. Preference was to 
be given to former owners to receive a re-allotment of sites, 
and, provided the buildings thereon did not conflict with the 
new plan, they might retain those buildings on a ninety-nine 
year lease.'"'' However, it was not until the Darwin Town 
Area Leases Ordinance became law on 29 July 1947, that 
leases were made available for terms of up to ninety-nine 
years. And prospective new lessees had to wait until after 23 
April 1949 — after the survey of the first two residential areas 
of the new Darwin — before obtaining such leases at the first 
land auction. At this auction, a total of eighty-three lots were 
auctioned — fifty-two in Darwin, and thirty-one at 
NightcUff. In the meantime, those engaged in business had 
the security of only fortnightly tenancies or short-term leases, 
while the claims of pre-acquisition owners were being con-
sidered. "The first Darwin Town Area Lease for business 
purposes was granted in February 1950, and thereafter addi-
tional leases for industrial purposes were made available, but 
it was not until 1952 that sites in the main business area were 
leased as Darwin Town Area Leases."'"* So long as tenancy 
remained insecure, those returning to Darwin were dissuaded 
from building with substantial materials. "Galvanized iron 
shacks reminiscent of a Chinatown that had been razed rose 
in the main streets," wrote Douglas Lockwood. "The dream 
city became a night-mare."'"' 
One of the chief problems of post-war reconstruction was 
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the fact that the federal government had little particular 
interest in what transpired: it was left to pubUc servants to 
provide the neat solutions. In the federal government scheme 
of post-war reconstruction, development of the Northern 
Territory was to be seen as but one feature of the develop-
ment of northern Australia generaUy, and, as such, to be 
undertaken by the federal government in partnership with the 
governments of Queensland and Western AustraUa. In 1946, 
the three governments estabUshed the Northern Australia 
Development Commission with D.C. Coombs at its head,"" 
for the purpose of estabUshing the development potential of 
the north, and making recommendations on the manner in 
which it might be realized. Little came of this. In 1946, the 
Council for Scientific Industrial Research (CSIR) commenc-
ed a survey of the Katherine-Darwin Region,'" and two 
years later established the Katherine Research Station. "^ 
This work continued, but the NADC was disbanded after the 
Labor defeat at the poUs in December 1949, after which 
Coombs was made Governor of the Commonwealth Bank. 
Administrator Driver found his task frustrating, and he 
continually complained of the problems which had dogged 
successive administrators since the Commonwealth had 
assumed control of the Territory, particularly those associated 
with the remoteness of the Territory from Canberra, and the 
division of responsibility for Northern Territory affairs 
among several ministers."' Indeed, as communications 
between Canberra and Darwin improved, and as the Com-
monwealth assumed new functions which were administered 
by departments created for the purpose, the relative influence 
of the Administrator decUned. The Administrator continued 
to be responsible for the "general administration of the 
Government's poticy in relation to the Northern 
Territory","" but generally his minister was a junior one, 
with many more and powerful ministers also having direct 
responsibility for Northern TerrUory matters. Thus, in 1948, 
a number of important Commonwealth functions were not the 
responsibiUty of the Administrator, including postal matters, 
customs collection, pubUc health and medical services, civU 
aviation, defence, works and housing, railways and legal 
matiers.'" Driver urged that aU matters affecting the Nor-
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them TerrUory should be the responsiblity of one depart-
ment, with the departmental head being located in Darwin. 
However, though this was taken up by others, U was a 
quarter of a century before the idea was implemented. 
Driver had other more immediate problems in his efforts to 
administer the Territory in the early post-war years. He 
found it "almost impossible to obtain the number and stan-
dard of officers required for the successful and full function-
ing of this Administration", and he found "an almost com-
plete lack of junior leadership". "* As with so many Northern 
Territory fields of endeavour, the more able pubUc servants 
found better prospects elsewhere in the CommonweaUh 
public service organization. Driver counselled the formation 
of a Northern Territory Public Service with a career structure 
and incentives to attract able officers. However, while 
appreciating the ill-effects of the contemporary situation, the 
Public Service Board warned against Driver's suggestion, 
because it was feared that any Territory public service would 
prove to be "too small to provide a satisfactory promotion 
pyramid for a career service"."^ 
Table 13 Organization Chart — Northern Territory Administration, 1948 
Administrator 
D 
Government Secretary 
D 
Chief Clerk 
D 
_r 
Director 
of Lands 
D 
m Director 
of Native 
Affairs 
D 
Director 
of Mines 
A.S. 
Accountant 
D 
Chief 
Veterinary 
Officers 
A.S. 
Special Services 
D 
Advisory Teacher 
Da 
Police 
Db 
Prisons 
Db 
O = Darwin 
A S . = Alice Springs 
a = Officer of S.A. Ed. Dept. 
b = Branches of N.T. Public Service 
Source: Attachment Secretary Department of Interior to Executive Officer of 
NADC dated 14/12/1948 Fl, 46/681, AAD. 
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The problems associated with the administration of the 
post-war Northern Territory highlighted the political 
impotence of residents there. As C.L.A. Abbott observed at 
that time, the Labor Party was concerned with "other things 
than the Northern Territory", and he quoted Chifley as say-
ing that there were "not too many votes around the Northern 
Territory"."* Blain, the Territory's parliamentary represen-
tative in the House of Representatives had been a vocal 
champion of Territory issues Uke his predecessor, but he had 
no influence on matters of policy. Indeed, for the latter part 
of the war, "Gunner" Blain was a prisoner of war in Malaya 
after his capture at Singapore on 15 February 1942, and the 
Territory had no direct voice in parliament at all, though 
Archie Cameron had been deputed to look after its 
interests."' 
Politics in the Northern Territory were uncomplicated and 
stUl very much dependent upon personalities. Even though a 
prisoner of war at the time, Blain was returned as the member 
for the Northern Territory at the federal elections in 1943. He 
had the forethought to lodge his nomination form before 
leaving AustraUa. He was re-elected despite the dispersion of 
TerrUory electors, a large field of candidates and although — 
or perhaps because — he was a prisoner of war and thereby 
something of a local hero. He was successful again in 1946, 
when Territory affairs were stiU in turmoU, but he was 
defeated when J. Nelson, the Labor candidate and the son of 
H.G. Nelson, the Territory's first representative, took the 
seat at the election in December 1949. Nelson took the seat 
for Labor despite the rejection of Chifley's Labor govern-
ment, and the frustration caused by his government's poUcies 
in the Territory. Nevertheless, this result simply underscored 
the personal, rather than the party political nature of politics 
in the Territory at the time. 
However, in the years after the war there emerged a new 
poUtical sophistication. This was demonstrated by the forma-
tion of a branch of the Labor Party in Darwin in 1947,'2" but 
more particularly by the formation of the Northern Territory 
Development League at Alice Springs during the latter war 
years. 
The Northern TerrUory Development League proved to be 
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the training ground for many men who became significant 
figures in TerrUory affairs in subsequent years. E. Connellan 
was one of the founders, and the first President of the 
League. Others involved in its formation included J. Nelson 
who succeeded Blain in the federal parUament, R.C. Ward 
who became one of the leaders, and was one of the most 
brilUant debaters of the Northern Territory Legislative 
Council and was later Chief Justice in the Territory, and 
D.D. Smith, the Resident Engineer at Alice Springs, who also 
served on the Legislative Council. The League was formed to 
promote the Northern Territory, to lobby for self-
government and to urge development and population growth 
by every means possible.'^' Early in 1945, it campaigned 
successfully on behalf of the peanut farmers of the Daly 
River when boat services to their farms were discontinued: 
arrangements were made by the government to substitute a 
road service.'^2 
The League was not without its problems, however. 
Connellan claimed that the original aim of the League was 
subverted by Smith and others who used it as a vehicle for 
"minor political issues, such as the removal of the present ad-
ministrator [Abbott]". '2' Connellan himself held no brief for 
Abbott, but resigned because of the activities of the clique.'" 
However, the League survived. Abbott's replacement in 1946 
defused that particular issue, so that members could return 
to the larger issue of self-government for the Territory. 
The League could claim some measure of success when, by 
means of amendments to the Northern Territory (Ad-
ministration) Act in 1947, the federal government created a 
Legislative Council for the Territory. The League was not the 
only champion of self-government. This had constantly been 
urged by the labour union in Darwin. H.G. Nelson, too, had 
long campaigned for it, and he had persuaded SculUn to 
permit debate on the issue in December 1930.'2' More recent-
ly Abbott, '" and later Driver,'" had urged an increased 
measure of self-government for the Territory. However, 
during 1946, when the Chifley government was considering 
the implementation of some form of self-government for the 
Territory, the League was the acknowledged champion of 
this cause, and it was the League to which the government 
had recourse for advice. '^ * 
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It is not clear why the Chifley Labor government should 
have established the Legislative Council at this time — given 
Us general lack of interest in Territory affairs. It simply 
claimed that it was time that Territorians should be given a 
measure of self-government.'^' However, as with so many 
initiatives of so many governments, it is evident that this con-
stUutional "breakthrough" was more an Ulusion than a 
reality. At the meeting on 6 August 1946, Cabinet adopted 
the proposal to establish an Advisory Council for the Nor-
thern Territory."" This can hardly be deemed an innovation, 
when it is remembered that such a Council had been 
estabUshed to help Gilruth administer the Territory more 
than thirty years earUer. Subsequently, on 30 October, 
Cabinet renamed the advisory body, a Legislative Council, 
but left unaltered other arrangements concerning its 
organization.'" The enabUng legislation was introduced into 
parUament by Lemmon, the Minister for Works and Housing 
on 14 May 1947. It met no real opposition in either house, 
though Blain ridiculed the pretentious title for what was to be 
simply an advisory body."^ McEwen was certainly exag-
gerating when he claimed that in this bill "we have the beginn-
ing of a democratic government in the Northern 
Territory":"' thirty-one years later, Territorians still had no 
self-government guaranteed by a constitution. However, it 
was a start. Thereafter the cause of self-government became 
focused on demands for the reform of the Legislative 
CouncU. And it was this CouncU which gave the elected 
tribunes of the people a legitimate forum from which to press 
for additional constitutional change."" 
The Northern Territory Legislative Council, which was con-
stUuted in 1947, was modelled closely on that which had 
operated in the TerrUory of New Guinea."' The CouncU was 
to consist of the Administrator, with seven official members 
nominated by the government, and six members elected by 
Territorians. It was empowered to frame ordinances for "the 
peace, order and good government of the TerrUory". The 
majority of nominated members was meant to ensure that 
government poUcy was not overturned by the CouncU, but to 
safeguard against any possibility of embarrassment, the Ad-
ministrator was given both a deliberative and a casting vote. 
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Even then, the Administrator could reserve any assent for the 
Governor-General, who could disallow any ordinance within 
six months of any assent being given by the Administrator. "* 
This was hardly a constitutional "breakthrough". 
Despite the safeguards, and the CouncU's lack of real 
power. Driver, himself a novice in parliamentary practice, 
had a trying time breaking in the first members of the 
Legislative Council. The first hint of trouble occurred even 
before the CouncU had met. On 4 December 1947, L.C. 
Lucas, the Director of Works, objected strongly to his 
Director-General in Melbourne about his nomination to the 
Council. He made it clear that he accepted his nomination 
under sufferance, and insisted "on exercising any legislative 
duties as I see fit and to act and vote with complete 
independence of Departmental or other Government dicta-
tion".'" 
The necessity of having the Council meet as early as possi-
ble, precluded careful preparation, and the tutoring of the 
new councillors. The legislation constituting the CouncU 
made no provision for earUer legislation to continue in force 
until the Council was to sit. Thus there were already a 
number of ordinances and amendments which awaited the 
CouncU."* 
There were nineteen candidates for the first general elec-
tion on 13 December 1947. R. Ward and J. Nelson, pioneer 
members of the Northern Territory Development League, 
secured the seats allocated to Alice Springs and the outer elec-
torate of Stuart, F.C. Hopkins and M. Luke gained the two 
Darwin seats, with W. Fulton winning that of Batchelor, and 
Dr V.H. Webster, of the Department of Health, that of 
Tennant Creek. They were joined at the first meeting of the 
Council on 16 and 17 February in Brown's building by A.R. 
Driver, the Administrator and the nominated members, R.S. 
Leydin the Government Secretary, H.C. Barclay the Director 
of Lands, R.W. Coxon the Director of Mines, F.H. Moy the 
Director of Native Affairs, L.C. Lucas the Director of 
Works, J.G. McGlashan the Chief Medical Officer, and 
W.S. Flynn the Acting Deputy Crown Solicitor. 
The first Council was something of a Pandora's box. On 
the second day of the first two-day sitting, problems arose 
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when Dr Webster caUed for a select committee of the Council 
to enquire into the operations of the Department of 
Works."' This caused heated debate, with Driver threatening 
to name Webster. The session closed after Driver promised to 
seek advice on whether or not such a committee could be 
formed. The calUng of a "Cabinet" meeting of nominated 
members prior to the second session suggested to the 
Standard that unnecessarily devious tactics were being used 
by the administration, and that perhaps all nominated 
members were not united.'"" It became evident that Lucas 
remained disaffected, when, at the second session early in 
August 1948, he moved that public servants should not be 
permitted to be nominated to the Council.'"' His motion was 
defeated with the administrator being required to use both his 
deliberative and casting vote. This prompted a statement 
from the Secretary of the Department of the Interior "on the 
subject of the responsibilities of nominated Members of the 
Legislative CouncU" which pointed out that, as public 
servants, their first duty was to support government 
policy.'"^ Lucas resigned.'"' This simply compounded 
Driver's problem. The Minister of Works and Housing 
decUned to replace Lucas, and the Administrator was not per-
suaded to appoint a subordinate to the Council. Thus, Driver 
determined to have the CouncU meet without the fuU comple-
ment of official members, though this meant that he would 
always have to cast a vote to retain control of the Council.'"" 
Webster also continued "to stir the possum". During 1949, he 
served on a select committee which enquired into the Health 
Department, of which he was an employee. His involvement 
ensured that the report was critical of the Department. For 
this he was dismissed from the Department. The issue was 
discussed, but unresolved, at the Council meeting in June.'"' 
He was returned at the second general election on 10 
December 1949, but was forced to resign because of the lack 
of employment opportunities in the Territory. It was this 
Webster experience which, in 1953, prompted an amendment 
to the legislation which banned public servants from being 
permitted to serve as elected members of the Legislative 
CouncU.'"* 
The first Council sat through tumuUuous sessions. 
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However, the ground rules had been laid. The second 
CouncU proved to be less difficuU for Driver to manage. Ad-
ministrator F.J.S. Wise, former Premier of Western 
Australia, brought considerable parliamentary experience to 
the CouncU, and consoUdated the ascendency of the ad-
ministration and the government bloc during the early fifties. 
Although the war had severely dislocated the administra-
tion of the Territory, and the social Ufe of the major popula-
tion centres, it had proved a filUp for the major Territory in-
dustries, by providing guaranteed — though temporary -
markets for pastoralists and miners. Moreover, the improve-
ment of transport facilities and communications throughout 
the Territory because of the demands of the war, meant that 
the sense of isolation in the interior was not as onerous as U 
had been before, and conditions in these industries improved 
as a consequence. 
Immediately after the war, air routes throughout the Nor-
thern Territory were re-established and extended. Qantas 
resumed air services to London through Darwin on 8 April 
1946, using Lancaster and Liberator aeroplanes. Qantas also 
acquired and converted the navy camp at Berrima into com-
fortable accommodation for staff and transit passengers:'"' 
this represented one of the few financial initiatives in post-
war Darwin. Connellan negotiated an agreement with the 
government, and a £4,200 subsidy to provide additional air 
services throughout the Territory:'"* this was achieved 
despite sniping from D.D. Smith, who believed that 
ConneUan's service would compete with the Department's 
road service.'"' In November 1947, the new TAA replaced 
Guinea Airways on the service between Darwin and Brisbane 
in place of Qantas. The MacRobertson Miller Aviation Com-
pany quickly restored its service from Darwin to Perth via 
Wyndham, and in 1948, was eager to fly into other centres in 
the Territory."" 
Road transport throughout the Territory was greatly 
facilitated by the construction of the Stuart and Barkly 
Highways, and indirectly, by the sale of a great number of 
surplus vehicles immediately after the war. In the period to 
April 1946, 35,487 surplus motor vehicles were sold at Alice 
Springs, Elliott, Darwin and other centres in the TerrUory.'" 
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Many of these went to buyers outside the Territory, but local 
pastoralists and others had ample opportunity to acquire 
these and other plant, and thereby improve the amenities of 
theU stations."^ 
The "repatriation" of the thousands of servicemen meant 
that Territory pastoralists were once more deprived of ready 
markets for their turnoff. To combat this, an effort was 
made in 1947 to re-open the live export trade with the 
PhiUppines.'" Like so many Territory enterprises, the hopes 
which were raised after the first shipment of 910 head on 9 
September, were not realized. A second shipment was made a 
month later, and two were made early in 1948. There the new 
export trade foundered. Inadequate loading faciUties at 
Darwin, and unsatisfactory railway schedules caused pro-
blems and delays which made the trade uneconomical. The 
only other recourse for Territory pastoralists was to overland 
their stock to markets in other parts of AustraUa. In the year 
to the end of June 1946, 80,370 head were exported to 
Queensland, with 48,864 being overlanded to South 
Australia. In the foUowing year, the numbers were 60,754 
and 43,931."" 
While pastoral economies in the immediate post-war 
period reverted to the low levels which had prevailed before, 
pastoral politics during the same period took on renewed pro-
minence, in part magnified by the new Legislative CouncU. 
The issue involved was the extension of pastoral leases in the 
Northern TerrUory, and the question whether or not large 
absentee lessees should receive preferential treatment. 
In 1945, the second quarter resumption of pastoral leases 
under the terms of the 1924 Ordinance feU due. Bovril and 
Vesteys were involved, and, immediately after the war, com-
menced negotiations with the government for an extension of 
current leases."' Vesteys claimed that the majority of leases 
had only eighteen months to run, and that this short term 
precluded heavy expenditure on development."* Negotia-
tions continued into 1948, with Lord Vestey and Lord Luke 
attending conferences in Canberra. The pressure which was 
brought to bear by the large companies is evident by the ap-
pointment of a Cabinet sub-committee to represent the 
government in these negotiations."'' Finally, an agreement 
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was signed in July 1948. Basically, it provided for extended 
leases, provided the companies agreed to undertake develop-
ment works."* The bill for the ordinance was brought before 
the Territory's Legislative CouncU. Here the new provisions 
were roundly condemned by the elected members, because of 
the apparent special treatment being given to Bovril and 
Vesteys. And, with Lucas voting in accordance with his 
conscience. Driver had a hard time of it to ensure that the 
government's poUcy prevailed. The elected members also sent 
a telegram to Minister for Interior, Johnson, complaining of 
the terms of the agreement.'" The 1948 Ordinance finally 
passed the Legislative Council, but the associated regulations 
were never gazetted, thus the new law never became 
operative. 
The Territory's pastoralists continued to lobby to maintain 
their interests and privileges in the Territory. C.L.A. Abbott, 
while Administrator, had forged strong ties with the 
Northern Territory Pastoral Lessees Association, even to the 
extent of attending meetings of the executive committee."" 
For a long time, the Association had had ready access to the 
Department of Interior, having been regarded as the body 
representing pastoralists in the Territory.'*' Indeed, the 
NTPLA — long dominated by the large companies with in-
terests in the north of the Territory — was perhaps the best 
organized and most effective pressure group in the Territory. 
Early in 1947, the Association petitioned the Minister for 
greater rural — i.e. pastoral — representation in the Legisla-
tive Council.'*^ Later, it sought membership of the govern-
ment's Northern Australia Development Committee.'" 
Neither request was granted, but the fact that they should 
have been made is indicative of the position of influence 
which it possessed. It was regularly called upon by the Ad-
ministrator for discussion on pastoral matters affecting the 
Territory.'*" 
The mining industry as yet had no lobby to compare with 
that of the pastoralists. In the post-war period however, this 
industry faced a brighter future than pastoraUsm. 
Mining activity continued in the TerrUory during the war 
years, though after 1942, this was mainly given over to the 
production of wolfram and mica for miUtary purposes. Gold 
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mining about Tennant Creek came to a virtual stand-still. 
The government batteries closed down, and the only men left 
on the field were those who were over the miUtary age, and 
those who were considered unfit for military service.'*' Still, 
gold to the value of £78,000 was won during the year 
1942-43.'** Most mining activity, however, was concentrated 
on the wolfram deposits at Hatches Creek and the mica field 
in Harts Ranges. This activity was sustained by government 
assistance to miners in the provision of everything necessary 
to work the mines, and by means of a guaranteed price for all 
that was produced.'*' 
The government's assistance scheme ceased in 1949, and 
with it, much of the activity on the wolfram and mica 
fields.'** However, by this time, activities had recommenced 
at Tennant Creek. A battery-manager was appointed in 
March 1946, and the Number 3 government battery resumed 
operations soon after.'*' By 1948, gold was by far the most 
important mineral to be mined in the Northern Territory. It 
accounted for 55.5 per cent of the value of total mineral 
yield, with Tennant Creek producing 97 per cent of the total 
gold yield.'''" At that time, the principal companies at work 
were, the Whippet Gold Mine NL, the Skipper Gold Mine 
NL, and the AustraUan Development NL, which worked the 
Noble's Nob Mine, and which, in 1949, accounted for 45 per 
cent of the gold production at Tennant Creek.'''' 
The immediate post-war period promised a new boom 
period for mining in the Northern Territory. The value of 
production at Tennant Creek increased from year to year, 
then in 1949 uranium deposits were discovered by J.M. White 
at Rum Jungle, about one hundred kilometres south of 
Darwin. Investigations during the next few years estabUshed 
the existence of four separate ore bodies, and gave promise of 
yet another prosperous development.'" 
The peariing and agricultural industries could not look to 
the future with such confidence. Pearling operations were not 
re-established until 1948. In the period to June 1948, only two 
tonnes of shell had been raised. The Malay and Kaepanger 
labour proved to be less capable than the pre-war indentured 
Japanese labour.'" As far as the agricuUural industry was 
concerned, the only cash crop grown in the Territory at this 
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time was that of peanuts. About Katherine, this had virtually 
ceased because of the army resumption of farms during the 
war, and pending the outcome of CSIR experiments. On the 
Daly River, production was carried on in a very unsatisfac-
tory manner. In 1947, field-officer Clough claimed that "In 
the whole of my experience in the Northern Territory I have 
never seen a more primitive way of living than on the Daly 
River."'''" The state of peanut production there reflected the 
squalor. 
Just as the outbreak of war had frustrated the attempts of 
the then newly-created Native Affairs Branch under E.W.P. 
Chinnery, to implement the "New Deal" for Aborigines 
which had been formulated by McEwen, so the problems 
associated with the resettlement of the Aborigines after the 
war postponed the "New Deal" yet further. The army 
authorities simply relinquished control of the Aboriginal 
camps in March 1946, leaving officers of the Native Affairs 
Branch to rehabilitate approximately 1,000 Aborigines who 
had been employed by the army, together with their many 
dependants.'" Many of these had no inclination to return to 
their tribal territories. They preferred to remain where they 
could have access to the European goods which appealed to 
them."* For the officers of the Native Affairs Branch, the 
most evident solution was to settle the many Aborigines on 
settlements, which indeed, was the object of the "New Deal". 
This policy had largely derived from Chinnery's experience in 
New Guinea, where the village and its organization were 
regarded as the vehicle for implementing native policy there. 
Unfortunately, while the locations of the control camps were 
ideally placed for the Aborigines to work at the army camps, 
they were badly sited for peace-time purposes.'" Thus, one 
of the first tasks of the Branch was to estabUsh new settle-
ments. By mid 1947, new settlements were estabUshed at Cat-
fish Reserve on the Victoria River, Hooker Creek, Snake Bay 
and at Haast's Bluff, while Beswick Station had been pur-
chased."* 
The formation of these settlements was fundamental to the 
policy of the Native Affairs Branch. The poUcy as formulated 
by Chinnery stated that: 
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. . . in regard to full blooded aborigines . . . everything possible should 
be done to stop the drift of natives into the towns; to provide water, 
where required on the aboriginal reserves; to make the reserves 
habitable and more attractive to the people who live in them; to 
establish Government stations in suitable centres for the general welfare 
and training of natives in crafts and industries to enable them to take a 
larger part in the industrial life of the country and to encourage them 
ultimately to develop the resources of their own reserves; in cooperation 
with medical organisations to provide adequate health services 
throughout the native settlements; to give financial assistance to mis-
sions enabling them to introduce and develop agricultural and other in-
dustrial pursuits appropriate to the training of their people and their 
ultimate development of the reserves.''" 
Minister for the Interior, Johnson announced this publicly on 
25 October 1946.'*" It seemed to bespeak a policy of separate 
development, rather than one of assimilation. Like so many 
of successive governments' Northern Territory policies, it was 
concerned primarily with tangibles, so that its implementa-
tion could be readily measured by quantifiable means. 
Because Chinnery was so closely identified with the for-
mulation of this policy, it was perhaps regrettable that he 
retired as Director of the Branch in 1946. On 31 October, 
Minister Johnson announced that F.H. Moy was to succeed 
to the position. It is interesting to note that Professor Elkin 
should have noted that there were few suitable contenders for 
the position.'*' However, measured in the tangible terms of 
the official policy, Moy's appointment was very successful, 
and recognized as such by Elkin only twelve months later. '*^  
Elkin had considerable influence on the administration of 
Aboriginal affairs in the Northern Territory at this time. He 
corresponded with each new minister who took charge of the 
Northern TerrUory portfolio to offer his services and his 
advice on a range of matters.'*' He seems to have had a very 
good relationship wUh both Chinnery and Moy, and cor-
responded freely wUh both of them.'*" They, in turn, 
frequently sought his advice on matters of administration. In 
1947, arrangements were made to have cadet patrol officers 
attend Sydney University to study anthropology under 
Elkin,'*' thereby ensuring that his philosophies permeated 
the Branch. Elkin also sought to advance his ideas on 
Aboriginal affairs through the several organizations of which 
he was a member. Thus, as early as 1947, he advocated "in-
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aUenable tUle to the lands preserved for their use",'** and 
electoral franchise.'*'' 
Elkin was particularly concerned about the wage rates and 
living condUions for Aborigines on pastoral stations.'** As 
he urged Moy, when commenting upon the Berndts' report 
on the Aborigines in the pastoral industry, "If you can bring 
the employer/native-labourer relationship onto a better basis 
— in other words, perform a real revolution there, you will 
have laid the foundation for real progress in your work.'''^' 
However, the resolution of this problem was not as simple as 
that of merely providing new and better facilities for 
Aborigines on reserves and settlements. Europeans had 
vested interests in resisting efforts to improve the conditions 
of employment of the Aborigines. Something of this attitude 
is evident in comments made by Administrator Abbott, when 
he argued against the prohibition of Aboriginal employment 
in the towns. He claimed that this "would be a definite hard-
ship upon many white women and would also debar certain 
good natives from having regular and pleasant 
employment"."" On 8 and 9 January 1947, a conference was 
held at Alice Springs between representatives of the ad-
ministration, including Moy and those of the Northern Ter-
ritory and Central Australian Pastoral Lessees Associations. 
The purpose of the meeting was to discuss Aboriginal 
employment on pastoral stations. Despite expressions of a 
readiness to improve conditions for Aborigines in the 
pastoral industry, it was resolved to maintain the status 
quo. '" The Native Affairs Branch had neither the political 
clout to insist upon better conditions for Aboriginal pastoral 
workers, nor statutory power to ensure that any im-
provements were effected. 
It has been said previously that the war years were something 
of a watershed in the Territory's history. In the period after 
the war, governments continued to urge development in the 
Territory. The pastoral, mining and agricultural industries 
continued to be encouraged in the hope that they might in-
augurate the economic miracle for which capitaUsts had 
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hoped since the first colonization of the Territory. However, 
in the period of reconstruction after the war, issues which 
were not concerned solely with economic and quantifiable 
development became important. A Northern Territory 
Legislative Council was established, and the Native Affairs 
Branch was consolidated. The intangible issues of self-
government and Aboriginal advancement became increasing-
ly important during the following decades. 
Just as the war period is a distinct one in the history of the 
Territory, so too, is the period of reconstruction untU about 
1950-51. F.J.S. Wise replaced Driver as Administrator in 
1951. J.A. Carrodus, the Secretary of the Department of the 
Interior who had provided a measure of stability despite the 
rapid turnover of ministers, was replaced by W. A. McLaren 
in 1949. He, in turn, was succeeded by Lambert in 1951, 
when the administration of the Northern Territory was 
lumped with that of Papua and New Guinea, in the new 
Department of Territories. But thereafter, there was stability 
at the highest level, with the new Minister, Paul Hasluck, 
destined to remain in the one portfolio for twelve years. Moy 
resigned in May 1953 and was ultimately succeeded by H.C. 
Giese, who was appointed Director of the new Welfare 
Branch in July 1954, and who was to remain there until 1972. 
In many ways, the Territory, and Territorians black and 
white, were to benefit from this period of stability. 
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SIX 
Hasluck and the Department of 
Territories: 1951 to 1968 
In 1951, the Commonwealth government once more "turned 
in its sleep". Again, the administration of the Northern Ter-
ritory was reorganized. On this occasion, it became one of the 
functions of a new Department of Territories, wherein ad-
ministration was to be divided on a functional basis, with 
each branch head being responsible "for certain aspects of the 
Department's work in all territories and not for all aspects in 
one particular territory".' Paul Hasluck, the new Minister, 
denied that the change had been made with any "clear pur-
pose", remarking that it was simply "a matter of convenience 
to find some rail to which another untried pony could be 
hitched".2 However, the change in the upper echelons of ad-
ministration was complete. Hasluck, the new Minister, com-
menced duties in May 1951. A month later, CR. Lambert 
was appointed Secretary of the new Department, and before 
June was out. Driver had tendered his resignation as Ad-
ministrator, to be replaced by F.J.S. Wise, a former Labor 
Premier of Western Australia. 
This thorough reorganization ushered in an unprecedented 
period of stable Northern Territory administration. 
Thereafter, the Territory's administration remained a func-
tion of the Department of Territories until February 1968, 
when it was again subsumed in a Department of the Interior. 
During this time, there was only one change in the minister 
responsible for the Territories' portfolio. Hasluck, who was 
appointed in 1951, remained the Minister for TerrUories for 
more than twelve years untU December 1963, when he 
transferred the responsibility to C.E. Barnes. He was by far 
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the longest serving minister responsible for the Territory: 
Barnes held the post for the second longest period. 
Throughout this period, the Liberal-Country Party coali-
tion - under R.G. Menzies till January 1966 — remained 
firmly entrenched in federal government. When Menzies 
retired after his record term as Prime Minister, the Liberal-
Country Party hegemony seemed as strong as it had ever 
been. The coalition was aided by the long period of post-war 
economic prosperity (for which it claimed credU — but over 
which U had little control), and by the disarray of the Labor 
Party, the aUernative government. Chifley died in June 1951, 
soon after Labor's electoral defeat of that year, and was 
replaced as Labor leader by H.V. Evatt, the former Attorney-
General and Minister for External Affairs. Given the conser-
vatives' apparently popular strong anti-communist stance 
during this time, and Evatt's reputation for being "soft" on 
communists (apparently demonstrated by his opposition to 
the Communist Party Dissolution Bill in 1950, and his in-
volvement in the Petrov Royal Commission in 1954), he was 
never wholly trusted by the electorate as an alternative Prime 
Minister. He resigned the leadership in 1960 to be succeeded 
by A.A. Calwell. In the election of 1961, the Labor Party 
came close to unseating Menzies, but from that time, 
CalweU's star waned, and while he was leader, he was given 
little chance of becoming Prime Minister. Throughout this 
period, the Labor Party was handicapped in its bid for power 
by the schism of its ranks, and the formation of the right-
wing Democratic Labor Party in 1956. The DLP never gained 
a member in the lower house, but its distribution of 
preferences ensured the election of many conservative 
members ahead of their Labor opponents. 
The Australia-wide economic boom was reflected in the 
many changes which were wrought in the Northern Territory 
at this time. The mining and pastoral industries prospered, 
and the public service muUipUed, all of which promoted a 
rapid increase in the Territory's European population. In 
1951, this comprised 15,609.^  Seventeen years later in 1968, 
by which time the growth rate was 9.22 per cent per year, the 
number had increased to 46,584: at the same time, the 
Aboriginal population stood at 20,953." Hope in the 
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economic prosperity of the Northern TerrUory was rekindled 
anew. During this time, the leaders of the European com-
munity in the Territory lobbied for, and gained, a more pro-
minent role for the elected members of the Territory 
legislature, and finally their federal parliamentary represen-
tative was permitted to vote on all matters which came before 
the lower house. 
Perhaps the most significant change in the Territory during 
this period, was to be seen in the new legal status of the 
Aborigines. This was won in the face of stiff opposition from 
entrenched Territory interests, most notably the pastoraUsts. 
Whatever their material and cultural disadvantages, by 1968, 
the Aborigines were no longer subject to legal restraints simp-
ly because of their ancestry. 
This virtual revolution took place against a background of 
intellectual ferment. The period of continued post-war pros-
perity, when unemployment rarely, if ever, edged above two 
per cent of the work force, was one during which the pro-
Uferation of universities and other tertiary institutions enabl-
ed an increasing number of young people to have access to 
higher education. It was a time, too, when Australians 
generally became more outward-looking, and conscious of 
affairs in neighbouring regions. They became aware of 
United Nations' criticisms of Australia's administration of 
the Territories of Papua and New Guinea. The activities of 
Indonesia's President Sukarno — his annexation of Dutch 
New Guinea in 1962, and his policy of confrontation with 
Malaysia — caused concern and threatened to destablize the 
region. Australians generally were relieved when he was top-
pled by a coup in 1965. By that time, however, there were 
other matters of concern. The Menzies' government's deci-
sion to send army instructors to Vietnam in May 1962 went 
virtually unnoticed, and his government was comfortably 
returned at the 1963 election. Later that year, however, his 
triumphant government introduced military conscription for 
Australian youths, and the battle lines were drawn. Dissent 
became more popular and respectable as the AustraUan com-
mitment to the Vietnam war increased: in 1965 a battalion 
was committed there, with another being sent to Borneo. 
The sixties were marked by an increasing questioning of the 
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Status quo, and the championing of the causes of oppressed 
minorities. The Aborigines were a disadvantaged minorUy, 
and their cause was fostered eagerly. This is not meant to 
deny that the cause was just. Nor is it meant to disparage 
those who devoted their efforts to it. However, it is evident 
that many of European descent entered upon it with only a 
shaUow and passing intellectual commUment, and no real 
appreciation of the complexities of the problems involved, or 
of what had been achieved by those who had devoted 
themselves to Aboriginal advancement before the Aborigines 
had become a popular cause. A great deal was achieved in a 
short time, but at the cost of confusion amongst the 
Aborigines and Europeans aUke, and acrimony amongst 
those who were concerned to advance the Aborigines, but 
who denied that there was any better way than their own. 
Later events were to show that there was not one Aboriginal 
problem, but many, aU requiring different solutions, and 
about which, few experts agreed. These later events were to 
demonstrate also, that the campaigns for legal equaUty for 
Aborigines and Europeans were easy affairs, compared to 
those which were to be waged to change long-held attitudes 
about the Aborigines and their place in society. 
Paul Hasluck has written of his time as Minister for Ter-
ritories, and herein he has revealed a great deal about the 
manner in which poUcies were determined and implemented, 
and of the many political considerations which affected 
these. It is doubtful that such considerations were less impor-
tant during earlier - or later — periods. 
U was noted above that Chifley dismissed ideas for Nor-
thern Territory development because there were few votes to 
be gained there. In the cavalier manner in which he created 
the Department of Territories "out of bUs of Interior and bUs 
of External Territories", Menzies seems to have endorsed this 
judgement.' 
It is evident too, that the Northern TerrUory had had few 
stiong ministers. An exception was McEwen but he did not 
remain in that position for long, for experience in Territory 
Paul Hasluck unveiling Stuart Memorial plaque, 1960. (NLA) 
affairs was not calculated to be a means of advancement in 
the ministry. Hasluck observed that the portfolio "was not 
highly esteemed and it was of scant political significance".* 
By 1968, it was still "known as the portfolio nobody wants''.^ 
Moreover, Hasluck claimed that his long tenure of the 
Department "killed" him politically, and that he "knew all the 
time" that it was doing so. He admitted too, that he entered 
upon his job with little zeal, and he recorded that twelve years 
later, Menzies had difficulty in finding a successor: two 
members to whom the job was offered "each recoiled in 
horror from the prospect".* With this attitude prevailing 
towards the portfolio, it is small wonder that Northern Ter-
ritory affairs should have received such little attention hither-
to. Unlike his predecessors, Hasluck demonstrated a concern 
to take his responsibility seriously and to impress himself on 
the Department, but Barnes his successor, preferred to allow 
matters simply to continue in the established manner. Barnes, 
like Hasluck, accepted the portfolio because it was a means 
of joining the ministry, and because "tail-enders" could not 
be choosy.' 
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Besides his enthusiasm or lack thereof, the status of the 
minister was an important determinant of the extent to which 
policies were implemented in the Territory. Happily for both 
the Northern Territory and Papua New Guinea, Hasluck 
became a member of the Cabinet which Menzies appointed in 
1956: though he owed his appointment to the fact that he was 
the senior Western Australian available at the time, rather 
than for any importance attached to his portfolio.'" Member-
ship of the Cabinet was important because it was there that 
policy decisions were endorsed and supported by budget 
allocations. As far as strict policy formulation was 
concerned. Cabinet membership, though important, was not 
vital. Because TerrUories was of such little moment, and 
because Hasluck seemed to be doing a good job, ministers 
readily endorsed whatever Hasluck recommended: in twelve 
years, there was never any discussion on the policies for 
Papua and New Guinea, despite United Nations interest in 
the TerrUories." It was a different matter as far as the con-
test for budget funds was concerned, however. According to 
Hasluck, budget allocations were determined by the strength, 
influence and ambition of individual ministers, and the need 
to gain, or retain, poUtical advantages, rather than by ra-
tional argument, or the assessment and comparison of the 
range of choices which were available.'^ Hasluck wrote of 
some of his former colleagues that they "would probably say 
that they were a team of hard-headed politicians and not a 
bunch of academics".'^If Hasluck found it difficuU to secure 
extra funds to implement his policies for the Territory during 
the period of conservative hegemony and post-war economic 
prosperity, it is readily apparent why less influential ministers 
should have been unsuccessful, even if they had been in-
terested enough in fostering the Territory, during periods of 
war, recession and political instabUity. When Hasluck was 
promoted to the Defence portfoUo, the Territory lost Us 
Cabinet representation. 
Hasluck was critical of those ministers who were either lazy 
or not shrewd enough, and who, as a consequence, became 
the tools of the public service.'" When reflecting upon his 
career, he noted that in each of the TerrUories he "was vir-
tually the Premier and the whole of State Cabinet".'^ He ac-
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cepted the responsibilities of the portfoUo and acted accor-
dingly. Though he was later criticized for becoming a "one-
man show'"* and for his "desire to gather unto himself all the 
reins of government",'"' it is undeniable that Hasluck was 
concerned to advance the Northern Territory, and that he 
worked to this end. Perhaps, as his critics beUeved, his sense 
of caution frequently outweighed his concern, and that more 
could have been achieved more quickly in terms of political 
or Aboriginal advancement. But the achievements of the 
dozen years of his enlightened despotism were real and 
abiding. In this regard, it is interesting that Harold "Tiger" 
Brennan should have welcomed Hasluck's replacement in 
1963, "This gives us new heart" he is reported as having said, 
"Hasluck was there for so long that his department got into a 
groove. The new Minister might shake some of those 
Canberra officials out of their lethargy."'* Such was not to 
be. Three years later, Brennan observed that "Whereas the 
Honourable Paul Hasluck ran the Department of Territories 
with a strong hand and knew what was going on, the present 
Minister appears to be run by the departmental heads and 
others at his disposal."" 
It had been the lament of successive Administrators that 
the Canberra public servants ran both the Minister and the 
Department of the Interior.^" Hasluck was aware of this, and 
claimed to have taken steps to redress the balance.^' He in-
sisted that the Administrator should have direct access to 
him, and that the original submissions of his Northern Ter-
ritory officers on any matter should be put before him, no 
matter what alterations were made subsequently by other 
departmental officers. UnUke most of his predecessors, 
Hasluck sought to be fully informed of Territory affairs. He 
regularly visited the Territory so that he might be briefed by 
branch heads without the interference of Canberra officers, 
and he insisted that he should be accessible to anyone else 
who wished to discuss Northern Territory matters." The 
problems inherent in the formal administration of Territory 
affairs and policy remained,^^ despUe Hasluck's alleged 
efforts to ameliorate their effects. Indeed, critics of the 
government's policies in the Territory's Legislative CouncU 
continued to complain of the very dominance of the 
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Canberra bureaucracy which Hasluck claimed to have 
ameUorated.^ " However, senior officers of the administration 
welcomed their more responsible role during this period. 
The sense of purpose and authority which Hasluck brought 
to his portfoUo was evident in the appointment of F.J.S. 
Wise to succeed A.R. Driver as Administrator in 1951. It was 
obvious that Wise was chosen for neither personal nor 
political reasons. He had been the Labor Premier of Western 
Australia from 1945-47, and as state leader of the Labor 
Party, had campaigned for Hasluck's opponent at the federal 
election of 1951. However, he was a skiUed parliamentarian, 
and a man of wide administrative experience. Moreover, he 
was an acknowledged expert in tropical agriculture, having 
been an adviser to the Western AustraUan government on the 
F.J.S. Wise, Administrator, 1951-56. (F.J.S. Wise) 
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subject from 1929-33, and a Minister for Agriculture — 
together with other portfolios — from 1935-49. 
The appointment of Wise was almost universally applaud-
ed: ^ ^ it proved to be eminently successful. Wise enjoyed a 
close relationship with Hasluck, and had ready access to him 
through both official and unofficial channels. His earlier 
career provided him with many insights and contacts in the 
Canberra bureaucracy. Whilst engaged in Chifley's rural 
reconstruction programme, Wise had come to know Lambert 
who later became the Secretary of the Territories Depart-
ment; he was unphased during his many disagreements with 
the secretary. Wise attracted the goodwill of all Territorians, 
even that of the militant unionists who were initially cool 
towards him because of an earlier strike breaking role whilst 
Premier, and because he had accepted the appointment from 
a Liberal Minister. The news of his retirement in June 1956, 
because of ill-health, was universally regretted.^* 
Wise presided over five years of intense activity in the Nor-
thern Territory. During that time of post-war reconstruction, 
government spending more than doubled from about £3 
milUon per year to more than £6 million: private enterprise 
invested upwards of £3 miUion in new building, while the value 
Aerial view of Darwin, 1958. (NLA) 
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of mineral production increased from £650,000 in 1950 to 
about £3 million in 1955-56. '^ Wise, with his experience and 
contacts in Canberra, and his understanding with Hasluck, 
was the perfect appointment for the time. So too was that of 
his successor. 
Hasluck's essential conservatism and concern to hasten 
slowly was demonstrated in the appointment of J.C. Archer 
to succeed Wise in 1956. It was typical of the Minister, and 
another example of the manner in which he put his signature 
upon Northern Territory administration at this time. Again, 
neither personal nor political considerations motivated the 
appointment, but simply the perceived needs of the Territory 
administration at the time. The strength of Wise was in his 
ability to formulate and implement grand designs; but an ap-
preciation of the details held no interest for him. Thus, dur-
ing a time of economic boom in the Territory, when the 
public service was increasing rapidly, Hasluck decided upon 
an Administrator with experience in routine administration. 
To fiU the position Hasluck appointed Archer, who was 
formerly Deputy Secretary in the Department of Territories, 
and thereby at one time, junior to Lambert. Archer had not 
the charisma of Wise, and preferred to work in accordance 
with public service protocol, but he worked strenuously for 
the devolution of poUtical power to the Northern Territory, 
and for a delegation of financial responsibility. His low pro-
file earned him the nickname of "Cautious Clarrie". 
However, despite accusations to the contrary^* — and 
perhaps the hopes of Lambert who, no doubt, endorsed the 
appointment — Archer was far from being merely a rubber 
stamp to directives which flowed from Canberra. Perhaps the 
measure of his success is to be seen in the amendment of the 
Public Service Act of 1961, which created the position of 
Assistant Administrator, who was to be directly responsible 
to the Secretary in Canberra, and who was to take over the 
powers to control the Northern Territory administration." 
Hasluck again forsook personal and party political con-
siderations when he appointed R. Nott to the position of Ad-
ministrator in 1961. It seems that Nott's appointment was 
determined primarily by Hasluck's concern to advance the 
agricultural industry in the Northern TerrUory at a time when 
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initiatives were being taken in the Ord River district of 
Western Australia. Like Wise, Nott was a Labor man, having 
been Minister of Agriculture in New South Wales from 1954 
to 1961,^ 0 but to "Tiger" Brennan and others, "Nott was not 
Wise".^' He had not the political acumen of Wise, the grasp 
of administrative detail of Archer, nor the toughness of both 
of his predecessors. When Hasluck was promoted to the 
Defence portfolio at the end of 1963, and the Territories port-
folio passed to Barnes, after having been turned down by two 
others, the control of the Department once more returned to 
the Canberra bureaucrats — to the frustration of all Ter-
ritorians, within and without the pubUc service, who were 
concerned to have increased power reside in the Territory. 
The issue of self-government and self-determination 
highlighted the essential conservatism of Hasluck in his ad-
ministration of the Northern Territory, as in Papua and New 
Guinea. 
Over the years Territories Minister Paul Hasluck had brought to his job 
energy, intelligence and capacity. Few could have been more sym-
pathetic to New Guinea's problems or more devoted to the Territory's 
people and their welfare. Few, at the same time, have matched him in a 
reluctance to recognise fully the winds of change and anticipate their 
effects — a reluctance which in his case accompanies an insistent pater-
nalism." 
The issue of constitutional reform had been raised fre-
quently since the Commonwealth had assumed control of the 
Territory. Until the creation of the Legislative CouncU, 
however, the champions of political advancement lacked 
cohesion, and a platform from which to publicize their cause. 
It is no surprise that the caU for self-government became 
more strident during the fifties, even though it remained that 
of a vocal minority. 
During this period, meetings of the Legislative CouncU 
were frequently stormy affairs — "The best free show in 
town"." For the most part this was due to the frustration 
borne of the very organization of the Council, which ensured 
the majority of government nominees. The frustration was 
not confined to the elected members, and it was one of the 
first tasks of Wise to insist that government poUcy prevailed 
even amongst the government members. Late in 1954, Wise 
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was forced to use both his deliberative and casting votes to 
ensure the passage of the Local Government Ordinance, 
when A.L. Rose walked out of the debate. Continued 
restiveness on the part of official members prompted a 
strongly worded confidential circular from Hasluck, wherein 
he outUned "The Position of Official Members of a Ter-
rUorial Legislative Council", and left no doubt as to the 
official member's role. 
He was made a member so that he could explain and justify Govern-
ment actions and policy and so that he could help maintain the Govern-
ment majority. Those were the reasons why he was selected and those 
were the terms on which an appointment was made and accepted. The 
reasonableness of the Government's claim is reinforced by the fact that 
the official (as a pubUc servant) has had the opportunity in his depart-
mental capacity of making his views known to the policy-making 
authority and by the fact that the Minister is obliged in all circumstances 
to take responsibility for the official acts of departmental officers. A 
further practical consideration which should have some influence on the 
official member's viewpoint is that delegations to the Administrator and 
his senior officials by the Government will come more easily with con-
fidence that officials, on their side, appreciate their obligations to the 
Government.'" 
Thereafter, the elected members could get no more than 
moral support from the government members on any issue 
which was critical of government poUcy. 
The sense of frustration was felt keenly by those elected 
members who were eager for constitutional reform. The 
meagre payment to members - £125 in 1953 rising to £150 in 
1957, £400 in 1960 and £500 in 1963^ 5 _ meant that those 
who stood for election were necessarily self-employed men 
who were successful in business, the professions or the 
pastoral industry. They were men of ability, with a keen sense 
of duty, and firm ideas about the political future of the Ter-
rUory - a future in which some of them hoped to play pro-
minent roles. 
The elected members were united on the need for increased 
self-government for the Northern TerrUory. N.C. Hargrave, 
a solicitor from Alice Springs and perhaps the most effective 
member of the Council at this time, was one of the prime 
movers in the campaign. The demagogues, R.C. Ward, a 
solicitor from Darwin, and H. ("Tiger") Brennan, a prospec-
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tor and miner, who represented the seat of Batchelor, were its 
chief spokesmen and pubUcists. Criticisms of the government 
in the Council had no effect. Thus, early in 1957, Hargrave 
successfuUy moved for a Select Committee of the Council to 
investigate the "Necessity or Otherwise for Constitutional 
Reform in the Northern TerrUory".^^ The completed report 
was presented to the CouncU seven months later." Amongst 
other recommendations, it urged that the Territory be 
represented more effectively in Canberra, with a member in 
the Senate and a member of the lower house with full voting 
rights, that an Executive CouncU should be estabUshed, that 
elected members should form a majority in the Legislative 
Council, and that the Council should have limited respon-
sibility in the financial affairs of the Territory.^* A copy of 
the report was forwarded to the Minister, but eUcited no 
response.^' Angry at the apparent slight by Hasluck, aU 
elected members resigned their seats on 18 AprU 1958.'*° The 
following election campaign was waged solely on the con-
stitutional issue, and the measure of support for the members 
throughout the Territory was evident when all were returned 
unopposed at the general election on 28 June, except L.H. 
Purkiss of Tennant Creek, and he was returned with a large 
majority — 129 of the 181 formal votes which were cast. For 
a time it appeared that the protest might be taken up more 
widely outside the Chamber, when, for a short time the Nor-
thern Territory Development League was re-born."' In-
dividual members protested in other ways. Brennan, Ward 
and P. Carroll, the leader of the Waterside Workers' Union 
and the second member for Darwin, resolved to boycott aU 
official functions "until we become convinced that a more 
democratic approach is being shown to the problems of the 
people of the Territory"."^ The boycott was first directed at a 
reception for Hasluck and a parliamentary delegation. 
The government's — Hasluck's — attitude to Territory 
self-government was a simple one. At the opening of the new 
Council Chamber on 25 March 1955, the Governor-General, 
Sir William Slim, noted that "the present Umits to the powers 
of this legislature are due partly to the smallness of the Ter-
ritory population and partly to its inability at the present stage 
to meet the expenditures which are necessary to maintain 
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pubUc services in the Territory".''^ Lambert, the Departmental 
Secretary, had said the same thing a year earlier, when he 
dismissed the idea of a fully elected Council at that time 
because of the preponderance of public servants in the Ter-
ritory: "before we reach that day, [of a fully elected Council] 
we need a much greater diversity of interests and activities in 
the Territory, and a much greater diversity of population"."*•* 
Although Hasluck was of the same mind,"*' he agreed to 
meet members of the Council to discuss constitutional 
matters after the elections of June 1958. The meeting took 
place in Canberra in the July, and paved the way for amend-
ments to the Northern Territory Administration Act in 
1959."* The Territory member in the House of Represen-
tatives was subsequently given the right to vote on all Nor-
thern Territory matters, and an Administrator's Council was 
estabUshed. But perhaps the most significant amendment 
was the increase in the Council's membership. Total member-
ship was increased to seventeen, with the provision for two 
additional elected members and three non-official members 
to be appointed by the Administrator from persons outside 
the pubUc service. Thereafter, the elected members had to 
secure the support of only one of the non-official nominated 
members to secure a majority in the Council. But stUl any 
constitutional advance was more illusory than real: the 
ultimate acceptance or rejection of ordinances remained with 
the government. 
Moreover, the elected members of the Council were con-
cerned that no provision was made in the 1959 Amendment 
Act for the devolution of any financial responsibility upon 
them. They immediately complained of this fact,"' and citing 
this as their grievance, continued their campaign for constitu-
tional reform. Another fruitless delegation went to Canberra 
on the self-same cause in 1961. The following year, at the sug-
gestion of N. Hargrave, counciUors drafted and presented to 
members of federal parliament in August 1962,"* a 
remonstrance wherein they enumerated their constitutional 
grievances. This stratagem had no effect beyond that of 
creating a certain curiosity, having been last used in the 
parliament of Westminster in the time of Charles I: it must 
have amused the historian in Hasluck. In the Territory 
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however, the fear was that rejection of the remonstrance, 
"the last shot in the locker as far as elected members are con-
cerned" might persuade the most talented of the elected 
members to give up the struggle for reform."' Indeed, N. 
Hargrave did not offer himself at the general election of 8 
December 1962. The campaign continued, nevertheless. On 
22 February 1963, R. Ward moved for yet another Select 
Committee to enquire into the political rights of Territorians. 
The report was presented on 11 June 1963, with one of the 
major recommendations being that the CouncU should be 
given some financial responsibility.'° A delegation was once 
more invUed to Canberra to meet the Minister - on 24 
October 1963. Once again, nothing was achieved. Because of 
the impending federal election, the Minister had not been 
authorized by Cabinet to make any commitments: it meant 
little that Hasluck should fob off the delegation with the 
assurance that the discussion "would serve as a useful basis 
for a fuUer conference to be held next year".^' After the 
federal election, Hasluck was promoted to the Defence port-
folio and Territories became the responsibility of C.E. 
Barnes. He was less eager than Hasluck to encourage con-
stitutional change in the Territory." Continued demands for 
an increased measure of self-government resulted in fruitless 
meetings with government ministers in Canberra in July 
1964" and May 1967.^ " At the latter meeting, delegates 
found to their dismay, that besides ministerial colleagues, 
Barnes was attended by Administrator R.L. Dean, Assistant 
Administrator Atkins, the Secretary, Deputy Secretary, 
Assistant Secretary, and with two other officers of the 
Department of Territories together with an officer from the 
Attorney-General's Department. However, the champions of 
self-government could do nothing but rail at the 
government's inertia. 
The elected members of the Legislative CouncU were one in 
their support for the cause of Northern Territory self-
government. Indeed, they were generally umted on most 
issues. At this time, party poUtics was not a factor in the 
Council, and only a minor factor in Northern Territory 
politics generally. Harold Nelson and his son Jock had served 
the Territory in the House of Representatives as Labor men. 
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but any Labor "organization" was but an arm of the union 
movement, and was active only at federal elections. Cir-
cumstances changed somewhat in 1966, when a Country 
Party was formed. This was another result of the long friend-
ship of McEwen, now the Country Party leader, and E. 
ConneUan. At ConneUan's suggestion, a former pilot of his, 
Sam Calder, was prevailed upon to represent the Country 
Party in the 1966 election for the seat left vacant by the retire-
ment of Nelson. With the new organization behind him, and 
thanks to his own popularity, Calder was elected ahead of 
R.C. Ward, the Labor candidate. Subsequently, each party 
organization became better organized, and an influence in 
succeeding federal elections. However, while some members 
of the Legislative Council were elected as members of a party, 
this counted for little in the Council until the early seventies. 
A Liberal Party was formed in 1968, but generally supported 
the Country Party candidate in federal elections. In 1974, this 
informal aUiance was formalized in the establishment of the 
Country-Liberal Party — a party in its own right, indepen-
dent of the federal Liberal and Country Party organizations. 
Hasluck's close, personal — even paternal — attention to 
Northern Territory affairs, and his insistence upon "hasten-
ing slowly" was no more evident than in the field of 
Aboriginal administration. As anthropology has emerged as 
an autonomous discipUne in the universities, and as students 
have striven to establish themselves within the field, few 
aspects of the Territory's history have received more critical 
attention than the role of Hasluck in Aboriginal affairs, the 
poUcy of "assimilation" with which he was so closely iden-
tified, and the question of Aboriginal advancement generally. 
However, while the anthropologists have been quick to 
criticize the administration of Aboriginal affairs in the Ter-
ritory, few have appreciated the realities which shaped ad-
ministration poUcies, or the problems with which the ad-
ministrators had to contend, and fewer still have agreed upon 
alternative policies which show an understanding of the 
reaUty at the time: there is yet only a vague idea of the goals 
of the Aboriginal cause, and no unanimity upon the means 
which should be employed to attain them. 
Whether or not the policies which Hasluck sought to 
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implement were appropriate, and regardless of the fact that 
he strove to implement a policy which had been drawn up by 
his predecessors, it was the single-mindedness of Hasluck 
which did so much to advance the Aboriginal cause. Though 
his policies were essentially conservative, it is indicative of the 
lack of awareness of the pUght of the Aborigines at the time, 
and an indictment on Australians generally, that during the 
fifties the implementation of these policies should have been 
considered "a wonderful forward step by almost 
everybody"." Given the history of Aboriginal administration 
to that time, and the type of expert opinion which was then 
available, it is unrealistic to believe that the government's 
Aboriginal administration could have been much "better". 
Indeed, had it not been for Hasluck, Aboriginal "advance-
ment" may have been delayed further. It has been 
characteristic of all revolutions that the earlier, liberal but 
conservative leaders who have toiled long in bringing about 
change are soon superseded by others of more radical persua-
sion, who become impatient for an increased rate of change 
and who charge the earUer leaders with inhibiting this. 
Hasluck has suffered in this way. In retrospect, Hasluck has 
been criticized for pursuing policies which were inappropriate 
— even misguided — but there is no denying that it was his 
policies, and the support he gave these for so long, which 
created the preconditions for the later revolution in the 
manner in which Australians came to view the Aborigines. 
His efforts in support of the Aborigines in the Northern Ter-
ritory created expectations of advancement which could not 
be easily satisfied, and though his poUcies may seem to have 
been timid, and even inappropriate in many instances, they 
provided the thesis from which others evolved. 
No one can doubt Hasluck's earnestness to "advance" the 
Aborigines; indeed, he claimed that the chance to do so was 
the only factor which made the Territories portfoUo an 
attractive proposition.^^ It frustrated many in the TerrUory 
that he seemed to be interested in it "primarily because U has 
an Aboriginal population"," and it was his insistence that 
budgets for Aboriginal welfare should be increased when 
those for other Territory departments were pared - that 
prompted the jocular rumour that H.C. Giese, the Director 
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of Welfare, must have been brother-in-law to Hasluck. 
However, when he was replaced as Minister, the Northern 
Territory News, for one, was generous in its praise for what 
he had done to improve the lot of the Aborigines in the 
Territory. 
When he took office the Aborigines were a dying race. 
Today they are increasing in population and many are well educated 
and decently housed. 
The race is far from run yet, but the gigantic strides undoutedly [sic] 
taken, particularly in the field of education of the young, cannot be 
disputed. 
Many will not agree that the Welfare approach to the enormous 
problem of reviving a dying and often degraded race was the right one. 
And we, as a newspaper, have often been in the vanguard of the 
critics. 
But nobody has yet come up with any other solution . . .'* 
And it was of his role in helping "to restore the status of the 
Aborigines" that Hasluck was particularly proud.^' 
It is undoubted, too, that Hasluck was more qualified than 
most of his parUamentary colleagues to take such a leading 
role in helping to change ideas about the Aborigines. The 
"advancement" of the Aborigines had long been his concern. 
During the early thirties, he had been a founding member of 
the Australian Aborigines' AmeUoration Association in 
Western AustraUa.*" Subsequently, whilst a reporter for the 
West Australian, he had accompanied H.D. Moseley to the 
Kimberley region during the course of the Royal Commission 
into Aboriginal Affairs in 1934, and had thereby gained a 
first-hand knowledge of their plight.*' In 1936, he wrote a 
series of articles for his paper on the conditions endured by 
half-castes in southern Western AustraUa. And it was to 
increase his understanding of the situation, and hopefuUy 
embark upon an anthropological career, that Hasluck com-
pleted his M.A. thesis on a review of Aboriginal policies in 
Western Australia. It was his belief that the Aborigines must 
"eventually merge into the AustraUan community", by means 
of "a gradual move upwards generation by generation".^^ He 
learnt nothing in the following twenty years to lead him to 
modify these ideas. It is evident that such attitudes were 
based on premises of European superiority, with little 
endeavour being made to consult the Aboriginal people,*^ 
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but it would have been an unusually perspicacious man who 
could have anticipated the ideas of the seventies, after an-
thropology had "arrived" as a field of serious study. 
The policy with which Hasluck was so closely identified 
was that termed "assimUation". It was not his own. It had 
been already formulated in the "New Deal" espoused by 
McEwen. However, it was Hasluck who gave it meaning and 
direction. 
Assimilation means, in practical terms, that in the course of time, it is 
expected that all persons of aboriginal blood or mixed blood in 
Australia will hve as do white Australians. . . 
Assimilation means not the suppression of the aboriginal culture but 
rather, that for generation after generation, cultural adjustment will 
take place. The native people will grow into the society in which by force 
of history they are bound to live.'" 
Hasluck claimed that the poUcy was founded on the prin-
ciples that there should be equaUty of opportunity for aU 
Australians, and that there should be no class divisions.*^ It 
was taken for granted that any social change must be gradual, 
in some instances persisting through several generations.** 
The policy was to be implemented by means of a number of 
strategies. The foUowing were included. 
Extension . . . of government settlement work to encourage nomadic 
and semi-nomadic natives to adopt a more settled way of life . . . 
Provision of health services . . . 
Continual improvement in housing and hygiene standards . . . 
Vocational training. . . 
etc." 
Under this "new" policy, the missions assumed a role as an 
important means whereby the government's policy might be 
implemented. It was expected that the role of the missions 
would decrease as the policy became increasingly effective,** 
but in the short term they received increased subsidies so that 
they might implement aspects of the poUcy in the fields of 
education, health, child welfare and Aboriginal advancement 
generally. In the late forties, the total mission subsidy was 
£2,700: in 1952-53 it was increased to £130,000. Moy, the last 
Director of the Native Affairs Branch, took the credit for this 
increase,*' but it was determined more by the new vigour 
given to the assimilation policy. The subsidy increased to 
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£143,426 during the next financial year, and £166,244 in 
1954-55:'" in 1970-71 $3.3 milUon was spent on Aboriginal 
welfare through the missions." 
The Northern Territory Welfare Ordinance of 1953, which 
set the direction of Aboriginal administration for the follow-
ing two decades, epitomized the ideals of the new administra-
tion. It was claimed to represent a radical departure from 
what had gone before. Henceforth, there was to be no more 
talk of Aborigines. "Under the new legislation . . .," said 
Hasluck, "a native will be committed to the care of the State 
[not because of race, but] solely on the grounds that he or she 
stands in need of special care and assistance. [Thus] the 
Native Affairs Branch of the Territorial Administration wiU 
be replaced by a Welfare Branch under a Director of 
Welfare".'^ This "most important single step yet taken in the 
approach to the Aboriginal problem . . . abandons the 'pro-
tective' approach represented by the Aboriginals Ordinance 
and represents the positive 'welfare' poUcy".'^ However, 
despite the hyperbole, Elkin, for one, was sceptical about the 
radical nature of the new legislation. "It seems a bit like the 
same old woman in another hat" he confided to Moy.'" Later 
he expressed some disquiet "about the refusal to use the word 
'Aborigine' and the turning of them into wards by the say-so 
of the Administration". He continued, "I think that they will 
be, in time, proud of their Aboriginal background and will 
not want to ignore it".'^ The change was but a semantic one. 
Wards of the state, rather than "Aborigines" were to be 
subject to the legislation. However, only Aboriginal natives 
could be declared wards by the Administrator. Persons who 
were able to vote could not be so declared, whUe only 
Aborigines were precluded from voting. The fact that wards 
were deemed to be those who stood in need of special care 
and assistance was but another way of claiming that they 
stood in need of "protection". 
As Elkin suggested, the aUeged changes in Aboriginal 
policy were more apparent than real. This became evident 
during the following years. Indeed, it would have been 
unrealistic of Hasluck, the historian, to have expected a 
radical break with the past, for few revolutions promote the 
change which advocates wish or opponents fear. However, 
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the legislation was important for the manner in which it 
demonstrated the earnestness of the government to address 
Uself to Aboriginal advancement. It was this determination to 
advance the Aborigines which marked the real change. 
The practical demonstration of Hasluck's endeavour to 
promote the welfare of the Aborigines in the Territory was to 
be seen in the manner in which he encouraged the growth and 
development of the Welfare Branch of the Northern Ter-
ritory Administration. H.C. Giese took up the duties of 
Director in November 1954, and remained in the position 
until 1972. He was the perfect lieutenant, and the champion 
of Hasluck's initiatives after the latter was moved to the 
Defence ministry. The eighteen years of Giese's direction of 
the Welfare Branch are akin to Hasluck's period of control 
over the Northern Territory in general. While he was crit-
icized for his paternalistic approach to the Aborigines and his 
reluctance to adapt to change, none could doubt his sincerity 
and dedication to the task.'* 
The Welfare Branch grew rapidly with Hasluck's backing. 
In 1953, the Native Affairs Branch possessed a staff of skty-
four: three years later, the Welfare Branch had doubled the 
number. The number of staff increased to 504 in 1964," and 
in 1971, stood at 986.'* All the whUe it was Giese's concern to 
upgrade the quality of the staff. He was ever eager to attract 
graduates to the Branch," and made provision for officers to 
undertake special training courses at the Australian School of 
Pacific Administration (ASOPA), at Mosman in New South 
Wales.*" 
The Branch was primarily concerned to upgrade the health, 
housing and education of the Aborigines. The results of these 
efforts were particularly evident on the government settle-
ments and missions. New settlements were estabUshed — 
beginning at Papunya in 1956 and Maningrida in 1957 — and 
facilities were upgraded on the older ones. In 1970-71, 103 
new dwellings were built — forty-three on missions, fifty-
four on settlements, and six in town areas.*' Water and elec-
tricity supplies were connected to settlements and missions, 
and sewerage schemes were installed. New hospUals were 
established, and old ones upgraded in many areas. Much of 
this work was funded directly by the government, but a great 
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deal was funded from the Aborigines' Benefits Trust Fund 
which was estabUshed at Hasluck's insistence in 1952, and 
into which royalties flowed from mining or timber operations 
on Aboriginal reserves.*^ 
H.C. Giese took particular pride in the development of 
educational faciUties for the Aborigines.*^ Schools were 
estabUshed on settlements — Bagot, DeUssaville, Yuendumu 
and the Bungalow — before the creation of the Welfare 
Branch in 1955, but they multiplied thereafter. The first pre-
school was estabUshed at the Bungalow in 1954: by 1967, six-
teen had been estabUshed. Education for the Aborigines 
received an added stimulus after an extensive enquiry into the 
educational needs of Aborigines by E. Watts and J.D. 
Gallacher in 1963-64. This promoted an acceleration in the 
building of pre-schools and post-primary schools. Kormilda 
College, a residential transition post-primary college was 
established in 1967: enrolments at the coUege increased rapid-
ly from twenty-four in 1967, to 202 in 1971.*" As in the 
Branch generaUy, so in the education service, an effort was 
made to attract weU-quaUfied teachers by means of scholar-
ships at several teachers' colleges, and by means of training 
courses at ASOPA: in the years from 1960-61 to 1969-70, the 
Welfare Branch trained 215 primary teachers. On all settle-
ments and missions, programmes of vocational training were 
organized: others were estabUshed near Darwin with the aid 
of the Darwin Adult Education Centre. 
The success of the administration's programme of works 
was most evident on the several settlements over which it had 
direct control, and the missions which provided essentially 
similar facilities. Less success was forthcoming on the 
pastoral stations, however. The administration certainly 
endeavoured to include those Aborigines who were resident 
on pastoral stations in its programme. A system of mobile 
schools was devised, and a permanent school was estabUshed 
at Brunette Downs. PastoraUsts were offered all manner of 
subsidies; for nursing sisters, for the provision of health 
facilities, or for the employment or maintenance of extra 
Aborigines. However, the programme on the pastoral 
stations met with mixed success. Many of the pastoralists 
were loath to have a separate organization represented on 
their stations. 
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In legal terms, the policy of assimUation appeared to be 
successful. Throughout the sixties, the authorUies 
demonstrated a grudging willingness to relax the restrictive 
laws which applied to the Aborigines. The changes appear 
sUght, but they were significant. In AprU 1961, on the motion 
of Freeth the Minister for the Interior, a Select Committee of 
the House of Representatives was instructed to enquire into 
the voting rights of Aborigines. The Committee recom-
mended the extension of the franchise, with enrolment to be 
voluntary, but voting being compulsory for those enrolled. 
The Commonwealth Electoral Act and the Northern Ter-
ritory Electoral Regulations were amended accordingly. The 
right to vote, without other rights, meant Uttle to the Ter-
ritory's Aborigines; certainly few had campaigned actively for 
it, and it was lost should any Aborigine cross the Territory 
border into one of the states.*' However, in December 1962, 
Aborigines voted in the Legislative Council elections for the 
first time: their vote was a straw in the wind. Indeed, it was 
that and more, because the fact that Territory Aborigines had 
the right to vote "effectively invalidated the Register of 
Wards and ipso facto the whole basis of the administrative 
system".** 
The system of Aboriginal administration established under 
the terms of the 1953 Welfare Ordinance was a pragmatic 
affair. It was 1957 before the Register of Wards was compil-
ed, and the legislation proclaimed. Almost immediately, the 
shortcomings in the concept of the Register became evident, 
as well as a great deal of the information which it contained. 
The concept of the Register came in for a great deal of 
criticism by anthropologists — but, under the terms of the 
1953 legislation, only those Aborigines declared to be wards 
were able to benefit from the government's welfare pro-
gramme. It was implicit that the Register required periodic 
updating. However, in August 1962, the Administrator's 
Council forced the government to rethink its Aboriginal 
poUcy, when it refused to permU an additional 2,000 
Aborigines to be declared wards. By this time too, the prob-
lems encountered by individuals such as the artist Albert 
Namatjira, who for particular reasons had been exempted 
from the provisions of the legislation, had generated a great 
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deal of criticism. FinaUy, in February 1964, a social welfare 
bill, together with complementary legislation was introduced 
into the Legislative Council. It sought to aboUsh all legal 
restrictions on the Aborigines. The bills generated a great 
deal of criticism, particularly from pastoralists, and especial-
ly on the matter of permitting Aborigines to consume 
Uquor.*' So that any further debate might be better inform-
ed, A.L. Rose proposed that a Select Committee should 
examine the question. The report was completed by May 
1964.** In the words of CM. Tatz, a trenchant critic of the 
government's Aboriginal policy, it was "perhaps the most 
significant and enlightened piece of writing on Aborigines 
this country has seen".*' He referred in particular to the 
manner in which it rejected all contentions that Aborigines 
were fundamentally different from Europeans, and should be 
treated accordingly. The original legislation was adopted with 
only minor amendments, and was proclaimed on 15 
September 1964. Once again, the changes wrought by this 
legislation were more apparent than real. That in itself was 
significant. 
On the question of award wages for Aborigines, too, the 
hand of the government was forced by outside interests — in 
this instance, by the North AustraUan Workers' Union. For 
long, it had been understood that the Aboriginal workers 
were the backbone of the Territory's pastoral industry. 
However, pastoraUsts had contended that the viability of the 
industry could not be maintained if they were forced to pay 
award rates to the Aborigines. In 1965, the NAWU sought to 
have Aborigines brought under the provisions of the Nor-
thern Territory Cattle Station Industry Award of 1951 by 
simply deleting the words "aboriginal" and "aboriginals" 
from clauses of the 1951 Act.'" The government supported, 
indeed, carried the NAWU case before the Arbitration Com-
mission. On 7 March 1966, the Commission ruled that the 
Aborigines should be given parity with European pastoral 
workers, though pastoraUsts were given until 1 December 
1968 before they were required to pay European-award rates 
and provide European-award conditions for Aboriginal 
workers. "In the event, the Commission's judgment gave the 
Union less than it hoped; the Commonwealth rather more, I 
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suspect, than U wanted, and more quickly; and the employers 
most of what they feared."" Once more the question of 
Aboriginal equality with the European was established by the 
European regardless of the effects to be wrought on the 
Aborigines. 
By the late sixties. Aboriginal affairs had attained un-
precedented prominence. At a federal referendum on 27 May 
1967, Australians were asked whether or not the Com-
monwealth should become responsible for Aboriginal affairs. 
An overwhelming majority voted "Yes". "For the first time in 
history, every electorate in every State returned a 'yes' majori-
ty."'^ The implications of this vote were great, though they 
meant little to most Australians at this time. The vote 
demonstrated an increased awareness by European 
Australians of the plight of the Aborigines, and a wilUngness 
to have this ameliorated. This increased awareness was but 
part of a new ethos in Australia at the time, and in part had 
been encouraged by the manner in which Hasluck and his 
lieutenants had so assiduously fostered the welfare of the 
Aborigines in the Northern Territory. 
During the sixties, the government's professed assimilation 
policy came under increasing attack from the new breed of 
anthropologists and social scientists. CM. Tatz was perhaps 
the most trenchant critic.'^ His main criticism in the mid 
sixties was that there was "a very definite gap between poUcy 
as enunciated from time to time, and actual administrative 
practices".'" Such, however, can be said of much government 
policy propaganda. Indeed, this account has argued essential-
ly the same thing, viz., that the changes in administration 
were never as great as was suggested in the legislation, or in 
public statements. The government's apologists constantly 
affirmed that the assimilation programme was planned to run 
for several generations, rather than simply a few years. Thus, 
it was somewhat mischievous of Tatz to base his thesis on the 
credibility gap after less than a decade, when new policy 
initiatives were still being taken. Other critics accused the 
government of pursuing a policy of "cultural genocide".'^ 
However, given the fact that Tatz had so convincingly 
demonstrated the shortcomings in the policy, this criticism is 
hard to sustain. Perhaps more fundamental was the implied 
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crUicism of Elkin, the acknowledged father of the "New 
Deal", who, in 1959 noted "that the Aborigines are not really 
anxious to be like us and so assimilation is up against a bar-
rier".'* It is doubtful that Hasluck was any less astute: a year 
later, Elkin suggested that Hasluck was aware of the prob-
lem." However, if the government is to be criticized, it can 
be for the fact that it could formulate such a contentious and 
long-term programme of social change, and expect to be able 
to control it, despite the many "internal and external 
pressures" which it must generate.'* 
The problems of the day-to-day administration of the 
Welfare Branch make it all the more remarkable that 
anything should have been achieved. There would have been 
no achievements had not the programme been so strongly 
supported by Hasluck during the first decade, and so 
resolutely carried through by Giese. There were always staff 
vacancies within the Branch, and, despite efforts to attract 
trained and competent personnel, many officers had not the 
quaUties demanded for the positions they held. Thus, there 
were always criticisms of the welfare arising from unfor-
tunate relationships between Welfare Branch officers and 
Aborigines. Europeans, in general, failed to support the aims 
of the administration. In 1960, white parents at Katherine 
opposed the admission of Aboriginal children to the public 
school, because of problems of hygiene and overcrowding." 
Their denials of being racists sounded hollow. On the other 
hand, pastoraUsts, who were a powerful lobby group, 
remained stoutly opposed to the idea of a better deal for 
Aborigines — they believed that it meant a worse deal for 
themselves.'"" There were innumerable negotiations between 
Welfare Branch officers and pastoralists concerned with 
wage rates for Aboriginal pastoral workers. None succeeded 
in augmenting wages against wishes of the pastoralists. On all 
occasions, the pastoralists claimed that increased wages 
would kill the industry, and during the award-wage hearing, 
they threatened to discontinue "support" for the dependents 
of Aboriginal pastoral workers who camped on their proper-
ties, should they be forced to pay award rates.'"' The first 
meeting of the Employment Advisory Board was held soon 
after the implementation of the Ward's Employment Or-
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dinance on 1 October 1959. It had no sooner met, than P. J.S. 
Morris, of the Northern TerrUory Pastoral Lessees' Associa-
tion, successfully carried a motion to the effect that the 
Board could not make recommendations on wages and 
employment conditions.'"^ Both F.S. Stevens and J.H. Kelly 
have dilated upon the conditions under which Aborigines 
lived and worked on the Territory's pastoral stations.'"^ 
Primitive though these were on many stations. Welfare 
Branch officers had little power, or in many instances they 
had little inclination to meddle in the affairs of any station. 
They did not condone the situation, but were aware that it 
was a long-established system which was dependent upon the 
goodwill of pastoralists, and that should pastoralists make 
their threats to reject the Aboriginal camps from their 
stations, the final condition of the Aborigines would be worse 
than before. It is iUuminating that H.C. Coombs, a long-time 
critic of the paternalist approach of the Welfare Branch, and 
after 1967, head of the government's Council for Aboriginal 
Affairs, should have been favourably disposed towards the 
arrangements on many pastoral stations ". . .at its best the 
pastoralist-Aboriginal relationship came close to being one of 
mutually understood obligations and interdependence".'"" 
The relationship was flexible enough to permit the Aborigines 
to continue much of their traditional Ufe. It was seriously 
threatened by the move to have Aborigines receive award 
wages. 
The criticisms of the academics and the political opponents 
of the government showed little appreciation of the realities 
of the situation in the Territory. Under H.C. Giese, the 
Welfare Branch was a very centralist organization; the 
justification being that Aborigines found it easiest to relate to 
a single authority for all their needs. Tatz argued that this 
centralism belied the idea that the welfare legislation was not 
simply for Aborigines, and argued that matters of health, 
housing or education should have been supervised by officers 
from the departments charged with these matters.'"' Subse-
quently, the monolUhic Welfare Branch was split up. After 
the initial chaos, there was little indication that the new 
system was inherently better — or worse — than that which 
prevailed before. 
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Those who administered the government's policy were 
criticized for not encouraging genuine Aboriginal solidarity, 
when they failed to support the Northern Territory Council 
for Aboriginal Rights (NTCAR), formed late in 1961.'"* 
Given the conservatism of any government arm — particular-
ly under a Liberal-Country Party regime, this should not 
have been surprising. Any Aboriginal group which developed 
without encouragement from the administration, would 
necessarily be critical of that administration. The government 
administration was particularly wary of the NTCAR because 
of the overt role of two of Darwin's renowned communists, 
B. Manning and T.K. Robinson, in its formation.'"' The 
government preferred to encourage Aboriginal co-operatives 
and councUs on the settlements and missions. 
The government was also criticized for being too 
materiaUstic, and for being overly content to measure its 
achievements for the Aborigines in terms of schools, 
hospUals, and the number of appointments to the Welfare 
Branch. Such observations were vaUd. However, the govern-
ment could do Uttle else other than strive to improve the 
material weU-being of the Aborigines; for despite the 
rhetoric, its advisers were as unclear about the ultimate future 
of the Aborigines as were the many academic critics. The 
government had to pursue this pragmatic policy in the face of 
criticisms from theorists and vested interests on the one side, 
who claimed that it was doing too much, and poUtical op-
ponents on the other who claimed that not enough was being 
done. The government was in a "no-win situation". Such 
criticism only encouraged the government to hold fast, and to 
persist with its own programme. 
When reflecting upon Aboriginal affairs in the thirties, 
Hasluck lamented the failure of those in authority at the time 
to educate Europeans about the Aborigines.'"* Perhaps the 
same might be said of the administration in the sixties. 
By the late sixties, the government's policy for the 
Aborigines was dismissed by academics and activists as being 
unduly conservative at best, if not entirely inappropriate. 
This represented a marked change from the early fifties, 
when the policy of "assimUation" was proclaimed by the 
government and endorsed by the anthropologists. But, in 
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condemning the government for being unduly concerned with 
material and demonstrable achievements rather than wUh 
what the Aborigines might have wanted, the critics merely 
highlighted the dilemma of any administration which must 
serve political masters. This does not mean that ad-
ministrators were unsympathetic to the Aboriginal cause, but 
simply that the options open to them were frequently deter-
mined by poUtical or administrative considerations. But this 
was the Northern Territory dUemma in microcosm. Govern-
ments depend upon widespread approbation for their con-
tinued existence, and to maintain this they must consistently 
demonstrate their achievements. Thus, the concern is ever to 
point to material and quantitative achievements to 
demonstrate the success of particular policies. So long as 
Northern Territory and Aboriginal advancement were 
matters of federal government policy, they were determined 
by political considerations with all the Umitations which this 
entailed. 
The fifties and sixties were economically buoyant years in 
the Territory. However, this was not determined by local 
factors so much as by those which derived from the period of 
sustained economic expansion throughout AustraUa. And, 
although the government of the day might claim the credit for 
the economic expansion, it was at best a facilitator, and at the 
least, simply an observer. 
During this period, there was a great deal of popular in-
terest in the development of northern Australia because of 
political unrest in South East Asia. "From Broome to Darwin 
and back again there is a general unease, a feeling among 
settlers that the government is making only a token effort. In 
February 1963," observed KeUh Willey, "for the first time the 
Legislative Council veered away from political reforms as a 
major theme. Instead, underlying almost every speech, was 
fear of Indonesian expansion and the urgent need for an 
accelerated pace of development.'""' Thus, J.M. Holmes' 
book Australia's Open North which was pubUshed in 1963, 
bears the sub-title A study of Northern Australia bearing on 
the urgency of the times. ^ ^° Indeed, this period saw numbers 
of seminars organized and books pubUshed which dealt with 
this theme of the strategic liabiUty inherent in Australia's 
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underdeveloped and undefended north. '" So too, groups 
were spawned to urge government initiatives in the develop-
ment of northern Australia. These included the Federal In-
land Development Organization (FIDO), which was founded 
in Bourke (New South Wales) in 1960, "^ and the People the 
North Committee which was founded in Townsville in 
1962."^ Public concern was real, and the Liberal govern-
ment's failure to appreciate this almost cost it the Treasury 
bench when it faUed to hold the seats of Herbert and 
Capricornia in the 1961 election."" In 1963, a Northern Divi-
sion was established within the Department of National 
Development, but this was quickly dismissed aS a cynical 
poUtical sop. It had no political clout, and ". . . the prospects 
of its Northern Division actually achieving anything — apart 
from drawing a few maps — are non-existent. The Depart-
ment has been treated as a joke by Treasury for years, and 
most of its best people spend a great deal of their time 
anxiously scanning the Usts of jobs going in the Trade 
Department."'" This disillusionment with the government 
saw Labor's Dr Rex Patterson — formerly Director of the 
Northern Division — sweep to a dramatic victory in the 
Country Party stronghold of Dawson at the 1966 federal elec-
tion."* 
All the while, it was the government's policy that northern 
development should be left to free enterprise, "and that the 
proper role for government is to assist private enterprise by 
providing services which would act as a catalyst to encourage 
that development".'" 
The Northern Territory pastoral industry experienced a 
steady expansion during this period, despite the decision of 
Bovril in 1951 to abandon its project to build meatworks at 
Katherine,"* and a period of drought in the sixties. The ex-
pansion was underpinned by the opening of export abattoirs 
at Katherine and Darwin in 1963, and the implementation of 
the Beef Road programme in 1962.'" The Beef Road pro-
gramme to 1968 provided for the expenditure of about £30 
million on the sealing and upgrading of about 2,400 
kilometres of roads in the Territory. This programme had a 
major effect on the industry. In 1957, only three per cent of 
the annual turnoff of cattle was transported by road, by 1960 
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this had increased to about forty per cent and in the suc-
ceeding six years, this increased to between eighty per cent 
and ninety percent,'^" during a time when the annual turnoff 
increased from about 120,000 to 200,000 head. The benefit to 
TerrUory pastoraUsts of the road programme and the abattoir 
construction, is evident from figures which show that the 
value of beef exported to the United States from the 
Katherine works alone increased from $7,000 in 1963, to 
more than $4,000,000 in 1967.'2' 
The extension of the beef roads had one major effect upon 
the pastoral industry. It meant the virtual eclipse of the 
contract drover, and the annual overlanding of the turnoff. 
During this period, too, the abolition of legal restraints upon 
Aboriginal pastoral workers, the equal pay issue, and actions 
such as those of the Gurindji who sought to estabUsh their 
own community at Wattle Creek,'^^ presaged other major 
changes within the industry. 
Fundamentally however, the pastoral industry at the end of 
the sixties had changed little from what it had been when the 
Commonwealth assumed control of the Territory.'^^ 
Fairbairn, the member for Farrer (New South Wales), was of 
the belief "that too much land in the Northern Territory is 
owned by absentee companies".'^" This was a view held by 
many others outside the government, who contended that the 
smaUer lessees — who predominated in central AustraUa — 
managed their properties better than the large absentee com-
panies, who dominated the pastoral regions of the Top 
End.'^' However, no effort was made to alter the situation. 
Indeed, the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1953 consoUdated the 
status quo. Northern Territory pastoral leases had been due 
to expire in 1964. The NTPLA lobbied hard and long for an 
extension of these leases under favourable conditions.'^* It 
could not have been disappointed with the 1953 Ordinance. 
This provided for fifty-year leases, with any development 
conditions being determined by the Administrator. Not 
satisfied wUh this, however, the NTPLA lobbied a decade 
later for the conversion of these pastoral leases to freehold 
title.'^' For a time, Minister for Territories Barnes firmly 
supported the idea;'^* he abandoned it only after a public 
outcry. It was the popular belief that the major pastoral com-
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panics in the Territory were already in a privileged position. 
The government's encouragement of primary industry also 
extended to agricultural interests. But schemes advanced dur-
ing this period collapsed as completely as did those of the 
nineteenth century, thereby doing a great deal to support the 
contention of B.R. Davidson, which was publicized at this 
time, viz., that agriculture was an uneconomical enterprise in 
the Territory.'" 
The most spectacular collapse at this time was that of Ter-
ritory Rice Ltd. on the sub-coastal plains at Humpty Doo. 
The agreement was signed between the Commonwealth 
government and the American-Australian Company on 21 
December 1955, giving the company an option on almost 
304,000 hectares of the sub-coastal plains for rice growing.'" 
Large-scale aerial seeding began. It was not successful. As 
Hasluck explained to parliament "while the seed was still 
lying on the ground, flocks of geese came and gobbled it 
up".'^' The company persisted during the 1958-59 and 
1959-60 seasons, but because of unsatisfactory yields, aban-
doned any further large scale plantings.'^^ The CSIRO con-
tinued experimenting with rice agriculture, but the collapse of 
Territory Rice Ltd. dissuaded other commercial ventures. In 
1967, just under 5,000 hectares of Tipperary Station were 
planted under sorghum in an effort to develop a crop suitable 
for fattening cattle. The project collapsed as completely as 
Humpty Doo, 1960. (NLA) 
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that at Humpty Doo because of numerous factors pecuUar to 
the region — the vagaries of the seasons, the soU and the wild 
geese. Continued CSIRO investigations into peanut cultiva-
tion in the region about Katherine were not encouraging to 
private enterprise. These suggested that peanuts had little 
potential as an economic cash crop. '" Little had changed 
since the nineteenth century. 
However, there was a resurgence in mining in the Northern 
Territory during this period. Gold and copper production at 
Tennant Creek sustained this resurgence, but uranium mining 
at Rum Jungle and in the region of the South Alligator River, 
manganese from Groote Eylandt, and bauxite from the Gove 
Peninsula promised that the boom would be broadly based. 
This broader base was but one change which had become 
evident in mining after the war. For the most part, mining 
became capital intensive, and the preserve of large 
companies. 
Throughout this period, Tennant Creek remained the 
premier mining region of the Territory. However, it too 
illustrated the changes which had taken place throughout the 
industry. Tennant Creek had been founded on gold. Gold 
production continued to be important, but by 1955, the 
annual value of copper production topped that of gold. In 
that year, the value of copper produced from the Peko mine 
alone, accounted for ninety-seven per cent of the Territory's 
total copper production, and 48.19 per cent of the value of 
total mineral production.''" 
Indeed, the history of the Peko mine reflects that of the 
Territory's mining industry in the post-war period. Peko mine 
was originally worked as a gold mine, but by 1953, the 
discovery of high grade copper ores meant that copper 
mining became the primary concern of the company'" — the 
principal producer of gold continued to be the AustraUan 
Development NL working its Noble's Nob Mine.'^* As 
mining became more capital intensive, activities at Tennant 
Creek became dominated by the Peko Company and Aust-
ralian Development NL. In order to maintain its advantage 
and to have access to other capital markets, Peko copper in-
terests merged with the Wallsend coal interests of Newcastle 
in 1961 to form Peko-WaUsend Investments Ltd.'3' A sub-
r^"^ "-^  
•T"-: Vy. 
Peko Mine, 1960. (NLA) 
sidiary company, Geopeko Ltd, was formed in January 1963 
to co-ordinate and expand Peko's exploration activity. In 
1963-64, Peko was the largest mining operation in the Ter-
ritory. In that year, the new Orlando mine completed its first 
full year of operations;'^* in the following year, the Ivanhoe 
mine was brought into production, and new reserves were 
discovered at the Peko mine. '" By the late sixties, mining in 
the Territory, as elsewhere in Australia, had become a capital 
intensive industry, dominated by large companies rather than 
the small companies or partnerships which had been common 
prior to the war. 
After the war, the Australian economy was more closely 
bound to that of its major trading partners than it had ever 
been before. This was no more evident than in the exploita-
tion of the Territory's uranium deposits. The original 
discovery of uranium ore at Rum Jungle in 1949, had been 
confirmed by the Commonwealth's Bureau of Mineral 
Resources between 1949 and 1952. Almost immediately, 
funds were forthcoming from the United Kingdom and 
United States governments to permit the rapid development 
of the Rum Jungle deposits. In 1953, the government 
declared about 385 square kilometres about Rum Jungle to be 
Hasluck and the Dept. of Territories: 1951-1968 217 
a restricted area, and handed over operations of the mine to 
Territory Enterprises Pty Ltd, a subsidiary of the Con-
soUdated Zinc group.'"" The treatment plant was opened on 
17 September 1954, and a new town of Batchelor was 
estabUshed by the company to house the workers at Rum 
Jungle.'"' With sales of the ore guaranteed by the 
UK-USA Combined Development Agency, mining con-
tinued until 1963, when the original contract expired.'"^ 
During this period. Rum Jungle remained the premier 
uranium mine, but deposits were also worked in the South 
Alligator River region' Deposits were discovered there — at 
Coronation HiU — in 1953. Other deposits were found, and 
ultimately eleven mines were opened, nine worked by the 
United Uranium NL company, and two by South AUigator 
Uranium NL.'"^ In 1956, UUNL secured a contract from the 
United States Energy Commission for 102 tonnes of ore, 
and mining commenced at El Sharana. The following year 
both UUNL and SAUNL secured contracts with the United 
Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority for the supply of ore. 
This encouraged the companies to upgrade roads into the 
area, and to establish treatment plants at Moline and at the 
South AUigator River.'"" However, activities on the field 
were short-lived. SAUNL completed its contract in 1961, 
UUNL in 1964. No additional contracts were immediately 
forthcoming. UUNL later purchased the SAUNL leases and 
plant, and in 1964 converted its own plant to extract gold 
from the tailings, while it awaited a renewed demand for 
uranium.'"' 
While the Territory's first uranium boom was a short-lived 
affair, the mining of other metals, notably manganese from 
Groote Eylandt, and bauxite from the Gove Peninsula, has 
been sustained over more than twenty years. The Groote 
Eylandt Mining Company (GEMCO), a subsidiary of the 
BHP Company, was registered in December 1964 to work the 
manganese deposits on Groote Eylandt. Nabalco was also 
founded in 1964 to manage the bauxite deposits on Gove. 
Nabalco acted on behalf of two companies — Swiss 
Aluminium Australia which owned a seventy per cent interest 
in the venture, and Gove Alumina, a subsidiary of the 
Colonial Sugar Refining Company, in which a number of 
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prominent AustraUan companies held shares. Both mines 
were developed after extensive geological exploration in the 
remote Top End during the early sixties. Both commenced 
operations after lengthy and detailed feasibiUty studies which 
have become a feature of new giant mining ventures.'"* And 
both were permitted, only after consideration was given to 
the impact these developments might have upon the local 
Aborigines. 
The excision of 363 square kilometres from the Arnhem 
Land Reserve for the Gove project, was reminiscent of the 
manner in which the boundaries of the Warramunga Reserve 
near Tennant Creek were redrawn in 1934, to permit develop-
ment of these goldfields. However, agreements were made 
with the companies to ensure that Aborigines might be 
employed on the projects, and the government insisted upon 
the companies paying a royalty of two and a half per cent on 
profits won from the mine, half of which was to be paid into 
a special Aborigines Benefit Trust Fund which was estab-
lished to benefit Aborigines throughout the Territory. In ad-
dition, the Groote Eylandt Mining Company was required to 
make an additional payment for the benefit of local 
Aborigines.'"' Hasluck claimed that in 1963, the notion of 
isolating Aborigines on reserves was outmoded. "Our aim, 
today," he said, ". . . is to ensure that any development of 
reserves takes place in such a way as to promote their welfare 
. . . There will be a continuing need for care" he added, "but 
it should be noted that the development will take place pro-
gressively over the years and that the full impact of change 
will not be felt at Yirrkala for at least seven years to come, so 
that the younger generation of the people will be growing up 
with the Gove project."'"* 
Given the fact that the Gove project alone was expected to 
earn about £12.5 million, there was Uttle that the government 
was going to do to frustrate the development. However, 
Hasluck Wis perhaps being overly optimistic if he truly 
believed that the Gove project would provide "a chance to 
build up hinterland farms and cattle stations" which might 
survive tne mining operations.'"' 
In the mid sixties, the Territory's mining industry was 
broadened further when iron ore deposits were mined at 
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Frances Creek, about 180 kilometres south east of Darwin. 
Production commenced in December 1966, after the Frances 
Creek Iron Mining Corporation secured a contract with the 
SumUomo Shaji Kaisha Company of Japan for the export of 
just over three mUlion tonnes of ore. Immediately, a town 
was established near the mine, a spur line was constructed 
from the mine to the Darwin-Larrimah railway, and work 
began on loading facilities at the Darwin waterfront. ""It was 
anticipated that the new venture would require a £3 milUon 
investment, and earn about £11 million under the terms of the 
original contract alone. 
During the late sixties, the Territory's mining industry 
boomed as it had never done before. On 17 March 1966, the 
first shipment, totaUing 10,989 tonnes of manganese ore, left 
Groote Eylandt.'" By 1967-68, manganese exports to the 
value of nearly $9 milUon from Groote Eylandt proved to be 
the Territory's most valuable mineral export.'" Late in 1966, 
production also commenced at Frances Creek. In October 
1967, Peko-Wallsend commenced production of the high 
grade, Juno Mine, and work began at the Warrego Mine. 
Late in February 1968, Nabalco signed a contract for the con-
struction of an alumina refinery at Gove.'" All the while, 
prospecting and exploration continued at a high level. 
Given the frontier nature of the Territory prior to the war, 
and the dislocation caused during the war years, the height-
ened economic activity, and its many spinoffs, particularly in 
the manner of better communications during the fifties and 
sixties, had a major effect upon the many centres of popula-
tion in the Territory. There was a significant population 
increase in all major centres. Darwin sloughed off its 
makeshift air when the government pledged to build a new 
powerhouse, a high school and new government offices."" 
Alice Springs, the centre of thriving tourist, cattle and 
transport industries, took on a prosperous air. Tennant 
Creek lost much of its raw image, and completely new mining 
towns were established at Batchelor, and Nhulunbuy on the 
Gove Peninsula. The development and maturation of these 
communities was reflected in the establishment of town 
management boards in Katherine (1960), Alice Springs (1961) 
and Tennant Creek (1961), whose function it was to advise 
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the Administrator upon local matters in these 
communities.'" 
The fifties and sixties were decades of great change within the 
Territory, as they were throughout Australia. At last, it 
seemed to capitalists and politicians alike, that the allegedly 
vast economic potential of the Territory might be realized. 
However, this new optimism was not due to any 
developments peculiar to the Territory, but rather to the 
general boom throughout AustraUa. Because of advances in 
technology, with spinoffs in communications and transport 
economies in particular, the exploitation of the Territory's 
mineral resources became feasible. This period of prosperity 
owed little to government action or initiatives. As in the pro-
vision of the beef roads, the government's role was simply 
that of a faciUtator. 
It is interesting to speculate on whether or not the increased 
economic activity, or the social changes such as those brought 
about in the legal status of the Aborigines, or the increased 
popular representation in the Legislative Council would have 
come about regardless of the government of the time. 
However, it is apparent that the many changes which occur-
red within the Territory were faciUtated by the long period of 
administrative stability. Advocates of the social and poUtical 
changes constantly claimed that change and progress were 
more apparent than real. This may have been so, but the legal 
changes were real, and it would have been unrealistic to have 
expected anything more radical. Of their very nature, such 
changes were dependent upon a process of proposal and com-
promise. It had been evident in earUer periods just how easily 
such negotiations could be stalled because of changes in ad-
ministration personnel. It was to become evident, too, during 
the decade of the seventies. However, despite the procrastina-
tion of one such as Barnes, the initiatives taken during the 
Hasluck regime continued to develop. 
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SEVEN 
The Labor Interregnum and After: 
1968 to 1978 
Developments during the seventies highlighted the nature of 
the Commonwealth government's continued role in the Ter-
ritory. Indeed, the role differed little from that which had 
pertained since 1911. Successive governments could do little 
more than react to changes within the Territory which were 
brought about by larger, world-wide, primarily economic, in-
fluences. Those few initiatives which were taken by the 
various governments tended to hinder and frustrate Ter-
ritorians rather than help them. Except in the realm of 
Aboriginal affairs. Northern Territory matters continued to 
receive scant regard in Canberra. Some consideration was 
given to Aboriginal matters primarily because of the em-
barrassment which government leaders felt as they tried to 
assume a larger role on the world's stage. 
The realities of Australian poUtics determined that suc-
cessive governments were more concerned about their image 
in the more populous regions of Australia than in the 
Northern Territory. After R.G. Menzies' uncharacteristic 
low-key exit from politics in January 1966, the leadership of 
the Liberal Party rapidly disintegrated. Harold HoU, 
Menzies' successor, led the coalition to a landslide victory in 
November 1966, but thereafter, the credibility of the Liberal 
Party plummeted as successive leaders, HoU, J. Gorton and 
W. McMahon sought to prevent electoral defeat. They were 
not helped by changes in circumstances beyond their control. 
The increased Australian military commitment to the war in 
Vietnam, and the evident toadying to American foreign 
policy dictates, alienated a generation of young Australians 
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who had grown up under the Liberal Country Party hegem-
ony. This increasingly popular dissent provoked retaliatory 
measures from the authorities, causing divisions in the society 
reminiscent of those which were associated with the conscrip-
tion issue of 1916 and 1917. Then, in the early seventies, the 
booming economy which Australians had begun to take for 
granted, showed signs of faltering. 
While the Liberal leadership disintegrated after the retire-
ment of Menzies, that of the Labor Party became increasing-
ly convincing as that of an alternative government. Arthur 
CalweU retired as parliamentary leader of the ALP in 1967, to 
be succeeded by E.G. Whitlam, a middle-class lawyer. After 
the successful intervention of the federal executive of the 
party in the Victorian branch in 1970, the party was able to 
play down its extreme socialist image. Furthermore, the 
Labor Party was more astute than its opponents in appre-
ciating the changes in the mood of the electorate of the sixties 
and the early seventies, and framed its poUcies to attract the 
many young AustraUans and middle-class voters who were 
disenchanted with the Liberal Party. None but the most naive 
Liberal supporter could have been surprised at the 
Liberal-Country Party defeat at the federal election on 2 
December 1972. 
The first Whitlam government — Whitlam and his deputy 
L. Barnard — began with a flourish to implement many of its 
election promises. The same enthusiasm was continued by the 
second, twenty-seven member ministry which was sworn in on 
19 December 1972. A host of new poUcies were introduced in 
the first heady months of the new Labor government. Therein 
lay its chief faiUng. It soon became evident — to observers at 
least — that enthusiasm was not sufficient for a government. 
Like its leader, the parUamentary party was inexperienced in 
government, ever eager to implement reforms immediately 
and showing impatience at delays. Furthermore, the Liberals 
refused to accept defeat; their majority in the Senate and 
their obstructionist tactics frustrated the Labor government 
and laid bare its inadequacies. Whitlam and his team survived 
the general election on 18 May 1974, which was brought 
about by a double dissolution after the Liberals' threat to 
block supply in the Senate. However, Labor's persistence 
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with policies which antagonized particular interest groups, 
and the continued ineptness of senior ministers, left little 
doubt about the outcome of the controversial election on 11 
November 1975. The Liberal Party under the leadership of 
Malcolm Eraser since the 1974 election, swept back to power 
in coalition with the Country Party. It remained firmly in 
power in Canberra through the remainder of the seventies. 
Given the nature of Australian politics for almost a decade, 
from January 1966 to November 1975, it is little wonder that 
Northern Territory affairs received little attention. But, then, 
this was the norm rather than the exception. 
The administration of the Territory immediately prior to 
Labor's electoral victory in 1972 was very much in accordance 
with a poUcy of "steady as she goes". In February 1968, the 
administrative arrangement was again altered, when the Ter-
ritory's affairs once more became the responsibility of the 
Department of the Interior — this time under the Country 
Party Minister Peter Nixon. The new arrangement brought 
little reaction from the local politicians who were divided 
simply as to whether or not matters could become worse than 
they were.' AU were agreed, however, that it was weU to be 
rid of Barnes.^ Nixon was succeeded by Ralph Hunt on 5 
February 1971, but any changes in the administration or 
policy were imperceptable. Members of the Legislative Coun-
cil continued to complain that poUcy was determined by the 
departmental civil servants in Canberra rather than the 
minister. 
During 1968, there were two significant constitutional 
developments, though once again as with most constitutional 
changes, any significance was more apparent than real. Dur-
ing the year, after repeated negotiations between the Ter-
ritory's advocates for constitutional change and the govern-
ment, the Territory's member of the House of Represen-
tatives was finally granted full voting rights, and the non-
official nominated members of the Legislative CouncU were 
replaced by additional elected members. The full vote for the 
Territory's Canberra representative affected littie: aU restric-
tions were lifted at this time, no doubt, because the member, 
Sam Calder, who was elected in 1966, was a member of the 
Country Party and likely to remain in Canberra for some 
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time. SimUarly, the increased number of elected members of 
the Legislative CouncU meant Uttle, because the government 
maintained the right to veto any resolutions of the Council. 
Members continued in vain to press for an increased measure 
of responsibility. 
During 1970, members of the Legislative Council of all per-
suasions became increasingly angry at the alleged remote con-
trol exercized by "84 absentees in Canberra".^ Once more, 
they demanded an enquiry into the future administration and 
government of the Territory. The federal government refused 
the request. In protest, the elected members used their 
numbers to take control of the Legislative Council for a time 
on 27 May." It availed them littie. On 25 October 1972, Hunt 
submitted to parUament "Proposals for the Transfer of a 
Range of Functions to the Northern Territory Legislature and 
Executive".' These proposed more extensive constitutional 
changes than had been made hitherto, though they were 
criticized for being overly cautious,* and they were dismissed 
by many as an election ploy because of the imminent federal 
election.' Given the Labor victory at the December federal 
election, the reformist zeal of Hunt and the McMahon 
government cannot be assessed; it was left to the short-lived 
Labor administration to preside over the next significant con-
stitutional reforms in the Territory. 
Federally, the Labor interregnum was something akin to 
the passage of a comet; it was spectacular, but of short dura-
tion, leaving very little of substance. Given Whitlam's diffi-
culties with ministers, such as Connor, Cairns and Cameron, 
many of which were of his own making flowing from 
such ploys as giving the Irish ambassadorship sinecure to Gair 
of the D.L.P., and others consequent upon the conservatives' 
domination of the Senate, it is a wonder that anything was 
achieved in the Northern Territory. This is particularly so, as 
U was evident that Whitlam, like his conservative 
predecessors, considered the Territory to be of little electoral 
consequence. However, these many preoccupations 
undoubtedly help to explain the lack of detaUed attention 
which was given to Territory matters. In the space of three 
years, the Territory was the responsibiUty of three ministers,* 
none of whom was influential in Caucus. 
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Keppel Enderby was appointed Minister of the new 
Department of the Northern TerrUory on 19 December 1972. 
Less than twelve months later, on 9 October 1973, he was 
replaced by Rex Patterson after a reshuffle of portfolios 
aimed, in part, at shoring up Enderby's position in his own 
electorate in the AustraUan Capital Territory.' Patterson re-
mained as Minister until 21 October 1975, first as Minister for 
the Northern Territory, then, after yet another re-
arrangement on 6 June 1975, as Minister for Northern 
Australia. Although he was one of the early high fliers within 
the party, he held little sway in Caucus: this had been ex-
emplified by his ineffectual efforts to assume some respon-
sibility for mineral developments in northern Australia in op-
position to R.F.X. Connor, the Minister for Minerals and 
Energy'" — "Not one voice was raised on the 18-member 
[Federal ALP] Executive in support of Dr Patterson."" In 
October 1975, after Connor resigned from the ministry 
because of his involvement in the "Loans Affair", the Nor-
thern AustraUa portfolio was given to Paul Keating — wUo 
was elected by Caucus to fill the vacancy caused by Connor's 
resignation.'2 As far as the peoples' champion in the Ter-
ritory was concerned, this was the last straw. "How can there 
by any confidence in a Government which downgraded the 
Territory to its most junior Minister, the third Minister in 
three years?"'^ 
As Heatley observed, "The Territory appeared to have 
much to hope for from the new Labor government."'" Many 
constitutional initiatives had been taken by earlier Labor ad-
ministrations. The SculUn government had attempted to set 
up the sort of Legislative Council which was finaUy estab-
lished under the Chifley government, and, whilst in opposi-
tion, the party had pressed for Senate representation for the 
Territory. Also, more particularly, in the build-up to the 1972 
election, Labor promised to grant greater powers of self-
government to the Territory by 1974." 
Certainly the first initiative was auspicious when a separate 
Department of the Northern Territory was estabUshed, and 
Enderby insisted that the administration would be "head-
quartered" in Darwin.'* The separate Department had long 
been urged by the critics of distant Canberra rule. However, 
The Labor Interregnum and After: 1968-1978 231 
any goodwiU was eroded when the post of Administrator was 
aboUshed for a time after the resignation of F. Chaney in 
June 1973." Enderby claimed then that, "It has always been 
recognised that there would be an inconsistency in having a 
separate administration with the duty of administering the 
Territory alongside a departmental structure with similar 
responsibiUties."'* However, the new arrangement did not 
work. O'Brien, the departmental secretary, became Acting 
Administrator, but declined to sign any bills into law or send 
them to Canberra. In the meantime, the continuing efforts of 
the Legislative Council went for nought. In December 1973, 
the government appointed Jock Nelson to the post which it 
had earlier deemed unnecessary, but even Nelson's popularity 
was insufficient to redeem the government's depressed stocks. 
Any residual goodwill generated by the establishment of the 
separate Northern Territory department, was lost when in 
June 1975, this was absorbed into the Department of 
Northern Australia.'' 
The Labor government had a penchant for squandering the 
goodwill generated by popular initiatives. In 1973, constitu-
tional negotiations were commenced with representatives of 
the Legislative Council. Subsequently, a Joint Parliamentary 
Committee was appointed to make recommendations for con-
stitutional reform in the Territory. However, as early as 22 
March 1974 — eight months before the report of the commit-
tee was presented — Patterson announced that the Territory 
was to have a fully-elected nineteen-seat Legislative 
Assembly, with the elections to be held in October.^" The 
decision seemed rather precipitate, because there was yet no 
idea of the powers or role of the new Assembly. The new 
Legislative Assembly met for the first time on 20 November 
1974, unsure of its precise role because of the government's 
delays in accepting the recommendations of the Joint Commit-
tee — that there should be a gradual devolution of executive 
power to the Assembly. The longer the delay the more critical 
the elected representatives became. In February 1975, after 
the devastation of Darwin by Cyclone Tracy, the Joint Com-
mittee was reconvened to determine whether or not any 
recommendations should be changed: all the early recom-
mendations were reiterated. Subsequently, the primary con-
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cern of the government became that of its own survival, 
bedevilled as it was by the internecine struggles within the 
Caucus, and the obstruction by the conservative opposition 
in the Senate. The recommendations of the Joint Committee 
were never acted upon before Labor was ousted from power 
at the federal election of December 1975. 
The creation of the fully-elected Legislative Assembly was 
welcomed by Territorians. So too, was Labor's endeavours to 
have the Territory represented in the Senate. This had long 
been advocated by Territory members of the House of 
Representatives. However, the Labor-sponsored enabling biU 
to provide for two Territory Senators was twice opposed by 
the Liberal government, in 1968 and again in 1970. It was 
again rejected by the conservative-dominated Senate in 1973. 
It finally passed, only because it was one of the measures 
brought before the historic joint sitting of parUament on 6 
August 1974: on this occasion, the Territory's Country Party 
member, Calder, crossed the floor to ensure Senate represen-
tation for the Territory. The new act suffered several legal 
challenges, but was upheld on each occasion. At the elections 
in December 1975, the first Territory Senate seats went to B. 
Kilgariff, the Country Party candidate, and E. Robertson, 
the Labor candidate.^' 
However welcome, these constitutional advances did little 
to win back any regard for the Labor government. Something 
of the extent of the Territory's mistrust of the Labor 
administration was demonstrated at the elections for the first 
Legislative Assembly in October 1974. Labor candidates fail-
ed to win one seat: the Country-Liberal Party picked up 
seventeen of the nineteen seats, while the remaining two went 
to Independents, who by force of circumstance, became the 
official opposition. The result also demonstrated the extent 
to which policies in the Northern Territory had become 
polarized. This was a direct result of the federal Labor 
government and its unpopular policies. 
The failure of the Labor government to win support in the 
Territory was but a microcosm of its failure to retain the sup-
port of the wider Australian electorate. As in the Territory, U 
acted in an amateurish fashion in attempting to achieve too 
much too quickly; it showed little concern for the suscep-
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tibilities of particular interest groups, and neglected to con-
solidate the few gains which were made. 
The aftermath of Cyclone Tracy, which devastated Darwin 
during the night of 24-25 December 1974, killing at least 
forty-nine people, highlighted the essential flaws in the Labor 
government. 
Just as the devastation of Cyclone Tracy was complete, so 
the response of the federal government was immediate and 
generous. Prime Minister Whitlam was overseas at the time, 
leaving his deputy, Dr Cairns to make the crucial decisions. 
His chief decision was to appoint Major-General Alan Stret-
ton, the Director of the National Disaster Relief Organisa-
tion, to take sole charge of the operation, including complete 
control in Darwin, irrespective of "the legal niceties of the 
sUuation".^ ^ As Stretton has said, "Jim Cairns was genuinely 
concerned about the suffering of the people in Darwin and 
made emotional decisions." This had been typical of the 
Labor government, and the reason for many unwise deci-
sions. 
The manner in which Stretton used his almost absolute 
power antagonized many of the local leaders. He pointed out 
that there was no state relief organization: but a local 
organization did exist, and committees had been estabUshed 
to organize relief on the Christmas morning before he arrived 
at Darwin.2^ Stretton justified his position by the fact that 
Darwin was in a Commonwealth territory rather than in one 
of the states.2" Certainly, he was able "to tap the resources at 
the Australian Government level",^ ^ and he had the objectivi-
ty of an outsider to be able "to make tough, fast decisions",^* 
but many of the local authorities would have preferred him to 
have played a less conspicuous role by supporting and advis-
ing, rather than dominating local authorUies. 
In other ways, too, the unwise decisions of the government 
created ill-feeling and divisions within the community at a 
time when such divisions were best avoided. The days 
immediately following the cyclone had witnessed a tremen-
dous amount of self-help and dedication by individuals and 
organizations. Even Stretton was amazed at the "feverish 
activity from a small band of wharf labourers" in their efforts 
to unload the Darwin Trader."^"^ Much of this goodwiU was 
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undermined when Attorney-General Murphy granted special 
hardship allowances for local and reUef police who were at 
that time working in Darwin.2* The effects of this decision 
were compounded when the Public Service Board extended 
similar concessions to aU public servants in Darwin — to 
those who had remained, as weU as to others who arrived 
from the south to help rehabilitate the pubUc service." It 
once more opened up the traditional divisions which had long 
bedevilled Darwin society. 
Throughout Australia, the Labor government had lost a 
great deal of electoral support because of its centraUst 
policies and its apparent disregard for local issues and 
groups. The Darwin relief effort indicated that it had learnt 
little from its time in government. Only five days after the 
disaster. Caucus met and established the Darwin Reconstruc-
tion Commission (DRC), under the chairmanship of Sir 
Leslie Thiess, to supervise the rebuUding of the city. This en-
couraged mistrust and resentment from those who beUeved 
that it would have been better to have simply extended the 
authority of the construction authorities — the Housing 
Commission and the federal Department of Housing and 
Construction — which were already estabUshed in the Ter-
ritory. With the experts employed by the DRC bent upon 
replanning Darwin, and the local malcontents sniping at U, 
the Commission achieved nothing during its first months, 
and only succeeded in heaping opprobrium upon the Labor 
government.^" "The whole Darwin scene, six months later, 
adds up to a melancholy mess", bemoaned the News. "Apart 
from the massive initial clean-up, nothing has been done."^' 
Thiess soon resigned from the Commission, to be foUowed 
for a short time by A. Powell of the National Capital 
Development Commission. Clem Jones, the one-time Mayor 
of Brisbane and unsuccessful Labor candidate at the earlier 
federal elections, succeeded to the chairmanship of the DRC, 
and finally had it commence the task for which it was 
appointed. 
When it was wound up on 12 AprU 1978, the Commission 
had achieved an impressive record. It had spent in excess of 
$300 miUion: U had built 1,850 new houses and 144 new flats, 
while rebuilding 800 houses and 128 flats, and expending a 
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great deal on the provision of new faciUties and services. ^ ^ 
However, the Labor government — now in opposition — 
gained no credit for this. 
In the Northern Territory, at least, the Labor government 
had had an immense opportunity in the days following 
Cyclone Tracy to re-estabUsh its credibility. Despite its 
evident concern for the victims and its enthusiasm to help 
them, it faUed to capitaUze on the opportunity because of its 
propensity for taking unnecessary decisions which were 
bound to alienate important sectors of the community. 
However, this was but a microcosm of Labor's record in the 
wider Northern Territory, and throughout AustraUa general-
ly. 
The unpopularity of Labor in government was demon-
strated when the Liberal and Country Parties swept back to 
power under Malcolm Eraser in December 1975. Their re-
sounding victory indicated that the electorate in general was 
more fearful of a Labor government than of any constitu-
tional instabUity resulting from the circumstances of the elec-
tion. In the Northern Territory, the popular Jock Nelson was 
persuaded to resign his position as Administrator so that he 
might contest the House of Representatives seat for the 
Labor Party. He was persuaded to do so only because of his 
"deep sense of shock and outrage at events in Canberra . . . 
in which the leader of a majority elected
 Government. . . has 
his commission withdrawn"." His sense of shock and 
outrage was not shared by the majority of Territory electors, 
and Calder was returned comfortably. Thereafter, it was the 
Liberal-Country Party government which presided over the 
continued devolution of power to the Territory's elected 
Legislative Assembly. 
In marked contrast to the pre-Labor days, "constitutional" 
advance progressed rapidly, though stiU not as rapidly as the 
local poUticians would have hoped. By 1975, the difference 
was that an increased measure of self-government for Ter-
rUorians was an election promise of all major parties. 
Though the Labor Party was phUosophically opposed to ad-
vancing the Territory to full statehood,^" it was prepared to 
provide the Legislative Assembly with executive powers as 
soon as possible, in accordance with the recommendations of 
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the Parliamentary Joint Committee. However, the Liberals 
were prepared to do this — and more. In his election cam-
paign in the TerrUory in November 1975, Eraser promised 
statehood for the Northern Territory within five years.^ ^ 
The victorious conservative government immediately won 
points when it re-established the Department of the Northern 
Territory. It mattered little that the Minister Evan Adermann 
was only a junior member of the government, for he was ex-
pected to do little more than preside over the demise of his 
department. Soon after a consultative committee, comprising 
members of the Legislative Assembly and government 
representatives, was appointed to supervise the transfer of 
functions to the Territory's Legislative Assembly. On 27 
September 1976, Adermann announced the first stage of the 
process, when, from 1 January 1977, select executive func-
tions were to be transferred to the Assembly; an embryonic 
Northern Territory Cabinet was to advise the Minister on the 
administration of the state-type activities of the Department 
of the Northern Territory." Dr Goff Letts, the majority 
leader in the Assembly, and long an advocate of Territory 
self-government, became the Chief Executive, and seemed 
destined to achieve what so many others before him had 
sought. Another welcome decision was that taken on 6 
October 1976, which was to appoint a member of the 
judiciary to the position of Acting Administrator, rather than 
a senior public servant, as had been the case hitherto. Then, 
on 12 July 1977, Cabinet approved the final timetable for 
Northern Territory self-government.^' This provided for the 
progressive transfer of state-type functions to the Legislative 
Assembly on 1 January 1978 and on 1 July 1978. On the latter 
date, the Department of the Northern Territory was to be 
aboUshed, and a separate Northern Territory government 
estabUshed, with control over, and responsibility for, its own 
finances. The whole programme of self-government was to be 
completed by 30 June 1979. Significantly, no mention was 
made of eventual statehood for the Territory, with its many 
constitutional implications. 
Each new responsibility was welcomed by Territorians. 
Paradoxically however, Letts, who was the one responsible 
for heading consitutional negotiations with the government, 
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was denied the privilege of leading the Territory to self-
government. Elections for the second Legislative Assembly 
were held on 13 August 1977. The CLP lost six seats to the 
ALP, five of which were those of Cabinet members: the 
casualties included Letts, the Majority Leader and Chief 
Secretary, and his deputy, the Cabinet member for Finance, 
G. TambUng.^ * Thus, greatness was thrust upon the young 
lawyer Paul Everingham, who had apparently jeopardized 
any chances of parliamentary leadership, when he had earlier 
resigned from his positions as Deputy Majority Leader and 
Executive Member for Finance and returned to the back 
benches, so that he might devote more time to his legal prac-
tice.'' He was elected CLP leader unopposed, and it was left 
to him to conclude the negotiations for the Territory's self-
government. 
Just as Labor in opposition had been the avowed supporter 
of those in the Territory who pressed for an increased 
measure of self-government for Territorians, so it was also 
the champion of Aboriginal advancement. Of course, by the 
late sixties, no major party could afford not to espouse this 
cause. However, to many of the government's critics, the 
Liberal poUcy had been in practice for twenty years and was 
stiU found to be wanting."" Much was expected of the new ad-
ministration. As in many other areas, it set about with a will to 
fulfil its electoral promise, and to promote a policy of self-
determination rather than one of assimilation — or integra-
tion, as it had come to be called. First of all, it re-organized the 
administration of Aboriginal affairs. Because the federal 
government was directly responsible only for the Aborigines 
in the Northern Territory, the effects of the policy changes 
were most apparent there. The changes seemed far-reaching. 
However, despite the hyperbole, and the claims of some of 
those who were involved in drafting what was allegedly a new 
policy, little of real substance changed for the Aborigines."' 
A great many expectations had been built up amongst in-
tellectuals and articulate Aborigines during the sixties. The 
overwhelming vote in the referendum of May 1967, clearly 
gave a mandate to the government to provide a "New Deal" 
for Aborigines. Prime Minister Holt certainly attempted to 
initiate this. In November 1967, after seeking advice from Dr 
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H.C. Coombs, a man of wide administrative experience who 
had been Director-General of Post-War Reconstruction, and 
Governor of the Reserve Bank, Prime Minister Holt an-
nounced the creation of an Office and Council for Aboriginal 
Affairs."^ Coombs was appointed Chairman of the Council, 
which was to include W.E.H. Stanner, Professor of An-
thropology and Sociology at the Australian National Univer-
sity, and B. Dexter, then the Australian Ambassador to Laos: 
Dexter was to be the Director of the Office. The purpose of 
the Office and Council was to advise the government on all 
matters involving Aborigines, particularly the manner in 
which they might be affected by government departments and 
agencies. The Office was to be part of the Prime Minister's 
Department, with the Council reporting directly to the Prime 
Minister. 
The hopes for a "New Deal", which were raised by the 
referendum result and the creation of the Council, were not 
realized. Once again, the fate of policy initiatives became 
dependent upon political manoeuvring in Canberra soon 
after Holt's disappearance on 17 December. Gorton was 
disinterested in the Council and its objectives. In March, he 
passed the responsibiUty to W.C. Went worth, whom he ap-
pointed Minister in Charge of Aboriginal Affairs — in part 
payment for support in the leadership battle. The new status 
did not represent an achievement in the cause of Aboriginal 
advancement: the federal government had immediate respon-
sibility for the Aborigines in the Northern Territory, but they 
remained firmly under the jurisdiction of the Minister for the 
Interior. Under McMahon, the Office was further downgrad-
ed when it was removed to a new Department of Environment, 
Aborigines and the Arts, under P. Howson, who was deemed 
to be a weak minister, and a disaster for the Council."' 
Coombs, Stanner and Dexter found the situation almost 
intolerable. They were roundly opposed to the Aboriginal 
policy being pursued in the Department of the Interior, which 
they believed paid little or no heed to the wishes of the 
Aborigines themselves. However, they were powerless to 
effect change, because of the ambivalent role of the CouncU, 
the weakness of the Minister, the strength of the Interior 
Ministers, Nixon and Hunt, and that of the Interior Secretary 
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Warwick Smith."" Indeed, at one time during the Gorton 
regime, the Council thought seriously of resigning."' 
The electoral victory of the Labor Party in December 1972 
once more raised expectations of another "New Deal" for the 
Aborigines. As in many other fields, the first weeks of the 
new administration were auspicious. On 19 December 1972, a 
separate Department of Aboriginal Affairs was created with 
Gordon Bryant as the first Minister, and Dexter as the 
Secretary. It comprised the Office of Aboriginal Affairs, the 
Welfare Division of the former Department of the Interior, 
together with other administrative units from the former 
Departments of Interior, and Environment, Aborigines and 
the Arts. Immediately after, the monolithic organization 
comprising 897 personnel which had been built up by H.C. 
Giese during almost twenty years, was dismantled — largely 
in accordance with the principals long espoused by CM. 
Tatz. Giese, himself — the bete noir of long-time critics of 
the government's "paternalistic" policy — was put onto the 
unattached Ust. On 1 January 1973, the health services and 
personnel of the earUer Welfare Division were transferred to 
the Department of Health. In a similar fashion, the Depart-
ment of Labour assumed responsibility for the employment 
of Aborigines. And on 13 February 1973, those who had been 
associated with Aboriginal education, were hived off to the 
Department of Education. Funds previously used for 
research purposes were transferred to the AustraUan Institute 
of Aboriginal Studies."* 
Like so many expectations raised by the Labor electoral 
victory, the "New Deal" for Aborigines never eventuated. 
Confusion rather than resolution in pursuit of the "New 
Deal", characterized the new dispensation. The fledgling 
Department of Aboriginal Affairs quickly found itself unable 
to cope with the many demands which were made upon it, 
and it was frequently criticized publically for allegedly 
squandering pubUc monies. In September 1973, barely nine 
months after its creation, the Secretary had to take the 
extraordinary step of calUng upon the Auditor-General, 
because "he could no longer adequately control the financial 
operations of the Department"."' 
During this time, too, differences and mistrust appeared 
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between Bryant and his advisers, and Dexter and his subor-
dinates, which further complicated the work of the Depart-
ment."* In one instance in September 1973, Bryant sent his 
wife to the Maningrida Settlement to investigate the situation 
of a young girl who had been removed from white foster 
parents in Darwin and returned to her family."' Bryant's en-
thusiasm for the Aboriginal cause also put him off-side with 
his Prime Minister over the fate of the Torres Strait Islanders, 
and his open confrontation with the Queensland Premier, 
Bjelke-Petersen.'" On 9 October 1973, Bryant was replaced 
as Minister by Senator J.L. Cavanagh amidst rumours -
strongly denied — that his downfall had been engineered by 
Dexter." In reality, Bryant's problem was that of the Labor 
government writ small: "regardless of the sympathy or even 
empathy that a Minister brings to his portfolio, he wiU in-
evitably faU if he cannot marshaU and control the resources 
of his department in the interests of explicit policies"." The 
Department settled down under Cavanagh, but by that time a 
great deal of damage had been done to its image. Indeed, the 
alleged excesses of the Department prompted the "Rights for 
Territorians" movement which was established at a public 
meeting in Katherine on 7 March 1973, the chief object of 
which was to protest against the level of monetary benefits 
offered to Aborigines." 
Another early initiative which gave promise of a better deal 
for Aborigines was the appointment on 8 February 1973, of a 
Commission under Mr Justice Woodward to enquire into the 
means whereby Aborigines might be given freehold title to 
traditional land. The very establishment and conduct of this 
Commission pointed to the hoUowness of the government's 
concern for an Aboriginal policy of self-determination. The 
Commission was estabUshed "without Aboriginal representa-
tion or consultation" and thereby was viewed with a certain 
mistrust by Aboriginal spokesmen".'" In a simUar fashion, 
ministers gave scant regard to the deliberations of the 
National Aboriginal Consultative Committee which was 
elected in 1973, for the purpose of acting as a forum for 
Aborigines. 
Despite the propaganda, and an array of progressive 
legislation, the Labor interregnum achieved Uttie of any conse-
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quence for the Aborigines. Policy debates gave ample oppor-
tunity for leaders and spokesmen to grab headlines, but the 
disarray which accompanied the creation of the Department 
of Aboriginal Affairs only served to confuse the very people 
who stood most in need of help. It is little wonder that the 
movement of groups of Aborigines from stations and 
reserves to traditional lands should have gathered momentum 
at this stage, regardless of the system of establishment grants 
initiated by the federal government in 1974. This "Outstation 
Movement" had begun during the late sixties as tribal 
Aborigines sought to protect their culture from the effects of 
the many social "advances" which had been made during the 
sixties, particularly with the increased availability of alcohol, 
and the introduction of a cash economy." 
The election of the Liberal-Country Party government in 
1975 brought a return to a less doctrinaire approach to 
Aboriginal affairs, though the idea of self-determination — 
or self-management as it was called — remained the 
philosophy which determined poUcy. In the field of 
Aboriginal administration as elsewhere, the government 
introduced budget cuts which curtailed innovative pro-
grammes, thus forcing a reappraisal and a consolidation of 
the essential work of the Department. 
However, the government did persist with the implementa-
tion of the recommendations of the Woodward Commission. 
This Land Rights legislation was the most tangible expression 
from a succession of governments of a concern for 
Aboriginal welfare. The Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern 
Territory) BiU was introduced into the House of Represen-
tatives by Minister Viner on 4 June 1976. It finaUy passed the 
legislature late in 1977 after considerable opposition from 
pastoral lobbies.'* It was proclaimed on Australia Day 1977. 
It provided for Aboriginal Land Trusts to have inalienable 
freehold title to traditional land on Northern Territory 
Aboriginal reserves, and other vacant Crown land: it provid-
ed for Northern and Central Land Councils to administer the 
land, and for the payment of royalties for the privilege to 
mine on Aboriginal land." Thereafter, the Land Councils 
became responsible for negotiations with the several mining 
companies which were at that time exploring in the Top End. 
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The first claim on vacant Crown land under the provisions of 
the Land Rights legislation was not made untU October 1977. 
It was not until the following May that the claim for tradi-
tional land about Borroloola was upheld. Complementary 
legislation in the Northern Territory Legislative Assembly -
consisting of a number of ordinances covering entry to 
Aboriginal land, sacred sites, wildlife conservation, and entry 
to seas adjoining Aboriginal land'* — was not passed untU 
late in 1978. 
The total package of Land Rights legislation was a clear 
statement by the government — supported by the Labor 
opposition which, when in office, had appointed the Wood-
ward Commission — of its concern for the welfare of 
Aborigines. It was a mUestone because it sought to satisfy 
their spiritual demands, not simply their material welfare on 
which so much had been spent hitherto. However, even this 
legislation highlighted the essential difference between policy 
and reality. The Land Rights Movement was Australia-wide, 
and was a matter of particular concern to Aborigines in 
Queensland — yet the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth 
government extended only to the Northern Territory. Indeed, 
the gap between policy and reality in 1978 was as apparent 
then as it had ever been. Minister of Aboriginal Affairs, I. 
Viner, had a vested interest in claiming ten years of progress 
in the administration of Aboriginal affairs since the 1967 
referendum." So, too, did H.C. Coombs.*" Those who had 
sought to implement earUer policies were not convinced of 
any evident "progress" in the years after 1972, during which 
time so many welfare-inspired initiatives were scuttled. From 
a completely different viewpoint, astute Aboriginal observers 
were unconvinced of any "progress". Indeed, such sudden 
changes and progress, as were suggested by Viner and 
Coombs, are contrary to the logic of history. To one such as 
Marcia Langton, Secretary of the Federal CouncU for the 
Advancement of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, 
"The fine words and rhetoric of the new poUcies have 
reassured white Australians that, at last their Government is 
doing the right thing by the people they dispossessed." She 
complained that this is a completely false impression, and 
continued, "Dr Coombs and his colleagues have done an ex-
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cellent job of rewriting the platforms of the Australian 
Government. The task that [still] remains is to transform 
those words into reaUty."*' 
During the decade prior to Northern Territory self-
government on 1 July 1978, the Territory's economy, with 
that of Australia generally, continued the growth which had 
become evident during the sixties, although there were some 
ominous signs in the economy by the mid seventies. For the 
most part, this growth was underpinned by those industries 
which had traditionally sustained the Territory's economy — 
mining, pastoraUsm, and the pubUc service. During this time, 
however, prawning commenced and prospered off the Nor-
thern Territory coast, and tourism became the Territory's 
second greatest money earner. 
One more grand agricultural scheme had collapsed during 
this period as completely as any of those of the nineteenth 
century. In 1971, a venture similar to that proposed for 
Tipperary Station in the late sixties was begun at Willeroo 
Station, seventy kilometres south/west of Katherine. The 
Northern Agricultural Development Corporation invested 
$16 milUon in this new project to grow grain-sorghum. By 
1974, it was in the hands of the liquidator. 
The pastoral industry suffered several years of drought 
during the early seventies, but it recovered during the latter 
years of the decade as overseas markets remained strong.*2 It 
received a filUp in 1969 when a new export abattoirs was con-
structed at Alice Springs. Fundamentally, however, there 
were few changes in the industry, though increased labour 
costs convinced pastoraUsts to continue minimizing these 
costs wherever possible. On some stations, helicopters were 
introduced for mustering. 
During this time, the mining industry was the Territory's 
major export earner. The estimated value of production 
increased from $33 miUion in 1968 to $205 mUlion in 1978. 
However, this sustained increase in the value of exports 
masked a major shift in the focus of the industry from 
Tennant Creek to the Top End. 
At the beginning of the decade, prospects at Tennant 
Creek were good. In 1970, Peko-WaUsend was persuaded to 
begin construction of a flash smelter, which was finally com-
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missioned on 17 December 1973 at a cost of $24 milUon.*' 
Almost immediately, the world price for copper fell: world 
stocks doubled during the year to August 1975. In January 
1975, Peko-Wallsend announced the retrenchment of 550 
men at Tennant Creek.*" In February, the smelter was placed 
on care and maintenance. Copper production at the Peko 
mines all but ceased, with operations being confined prin-
cipally to gold production. Copper prices remained depressed 
throughout the decade. As a consequence, production fell 
from nearly fourteen million tonnes in 1973, to only four 
milUon tonnes in 1978. The scaUng down of Peko-WaUsend 
operations also meant a decline in gold production at 
Tennant Creek from 5,221 kUograms in 1973, to 3,865 
kilograms in 1978. 
During this time, activities about Pine Creek again went 
into decline. 
The uranium mining at Moline and El Sharana had ceased 
in the late sixties: the uranium treatment plant at Rum Jungle 
finally closed in 1971. As well, the iron ore mine at Frances 
Creek which had commenced operations in 1968, closed in 
1975, and soon after on 30 June 1976, the railway from 
Darwin to Larrimah closed. Pine Creek was threatened with 
extinction as plans for the realignment of the highway meant 
that it would by-pass the town. 
However, despite the downturn in mining in the established 
mining districts, those operations at Groote Eylandt and on 
the Gove Peninsula expanded enormously. Manganese pro-
duction from Groote Eylandt increased from 588,000 tonnes 
in 1968 to one and a quarter milUon tonnes in 1978. In 1968, 
work began on a treatment plant to produce one million 
tonnes of high grade concentrates annually: additional ex-
pansion in 1976 raised the capacity to two million tonnes. 
Mining of the bauxite deposits at Gove commenced in March 
1971: the first stage of the smelter was opened in June 1972, 
with the second stage being completed during the following 
year. By 1978, four and a half miUion tonnes of bauxite were 
produced. These mining operations required the estabUsh-
ment of major new townships to house the many miners -
1,200 at Gove, 600 at Groote Eylandt - and their famiUes. 
As well as the expansion of the manganese and bauxite 
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mining, the seventies held out the promise of major new 
uranium mines in the region of the South Alligator River. In 
mid 1970, Queensland Mines announced a major find of 
uranium ore at Nabarlek, which was calculated to triple the 
known AustraUan reserves of uranium.*' Soon after, Peko-
WaUsend-E.Z. Industries announced the discovery of an even 
larger reserve at its Ranger deposit.** Subsequently, other 
deposits were discovered at JabUuka and Koongarra, aU in 
the same Alligator Rivers area. However, it was June 1978 
before the requisite enabling legislation permitted the Ranger 
project to proceed.*' Under the terms of the 1953 Atomic 
Energy Act, the Commonwealth was the owner of these ore 
deposits. Given the policy of Labor Mines and Energy 
Minister R.F.X. Connor to exercize tight government control 
over mineral exports, it was not until 30 October 1974 that an 
agreement was drawn up whereby the companies and the 
government were to mine the Ranger deposits. Further delays 
followed the Labor government's decision to appoint Mr 
Justice Fox to enquire into the environmental aspects of the 
mining operation. This stirred a nationwide debate on the 
very merits of nuclear energy and its strategic implications. 
The final report of the Commission was not tabled until 17 
May 1977. Finally, accommodation had to be made for the 
provisions of the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Ter-
ritory) Act.** The near decade of frustration had dulled some 
of the enthusiasm associated with the uranium discoveries, 
but operations at the mines since 1978 have ensured that 
mining activities will continue to underpin the Northern 
Territory economy during the early period of self-
government. 
The period of economic boom was reflected in aU aspects 
of Territory life. There was a steady increase in the total 
population from 67,537 in 1968 to 101,233 in 1974. The 
decline in 1975 to 87,584 was due to the exodus of people 
from Darwin after Cyclone Tracy.*' In 1976, the total 
population had increased to 101,385. The effects of Cyclone 
Tracy were temporary and were confined to Darwin. Darwin 
and Alice Springs remained the most populous urban centres 
with 43,344 and 14,149 people at the time of the census in 
June 1976. However, the effect of the new mining boom was 
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evident in the fact that Nhulunbuy, on Gove Peninsula, was 
the third most populous centre with 3,553 inhabitants. 
Katherine was home to 3,127 and Tennant Creek to 2,236. 
The increase in population transformed the older urban 
centres because of housing requirements and need for 
associated facilities. Major new suburbs grew about Darwin 
and Alice Springs, and the commercial centres were 
transformed by the construction of modern buUdings. In 
June 1972, the Darwin River Dam was opened by Prime 
Minister McMahon to meet the needs of the increasing 
population of Darwin. 
The economic boom was reflected, not simply in raw 
population figures, but also in the increased amenities pro-
vided for Territorians. Local government had been restored 
in Darwin in 1957. Civic leaders in AUce Springs had declined 
the offer of local government in 1968, fearing that it might 
impose an intolerable rate burden on residents, but accepted 
it in 1976 when Alice Springs was created a municipality. The 
first local government elections in Katherine and Tennant 
Creek were held late in 1978. 
The Territory had always been a multi-cultural society, 
particularly in Darwin and the Top End. This became more 
evident in the period after World War II with the immigra-
tion of southern European migrants to Australia and the 
Northern Territory. That the Territory provided ample op-
portunity for migrants was demonstrated by Michael PaspaUs 
who died on 17 October 1972 after having amassed a fortune 
in post-war Darwin.'" The Chinese have always been a pro-
minent minority in Darwin, and there has always been a 
number of South East Asians, particularly those engaged in 
fishing and pearling. Most recently, this Asian community 
has been sweUed by refugees from East Timor (after August 
1975), and from Vietnam (after April 1976). Recent initiatives 
to expand trade with countries in South East Asia, and to en-
courage Asian investment in the Territory, wiU reinforce this 
multiculturaUsm. 
The boom in education has been another feature of the 
Territory in the seventies. The first matriculation class was 
offered in the Territory in 1965. Only five years later, a 
second high school for Darwin was built at NightcUff. On 9 
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March 1974, tertiary education was provided with the open-
ing of the Darwin Community College. This coming of age in 
the field of education was evident in 1971 when the tradi-
tional links with the South Australian Education Department 
were cut. Thereafter, curriculum and teacher recruitment were 
the concern of the Commonwealth Teaching Service. The 
cuUural maturity of Territorians was reflected in the commit-
ment in early 1978 to provide appropriate new facilities for 
the museum and art gallery in Darwin. 
Mainly, because of developments in communications, Ter-
ritorians in all major urban centres participated in the boom 
of the seventies. The Australian Broadcasting Commission 
began television transmission in Darwin in August 1971: the 
commercial channel began in November. In December 1971, 
televison came to Alice Springs, and four years later to 
Katherine and Tennant Creek. 
The life-style of Territorians underwent a great change in 
the post-war years, most notably during the sixties and seven-
ties. This was occasioned by the rapid increase in population 
which prompted a greater diversity than had existed before, 
and it was facilitated by increased and more efficient means 
of communication. Territorians remained physically isolated 
from the major population centres of Australia, but com-
munication with these centres was rapid and direct. By the 
late seventies, the physical circumstances of Territorians in 
the major urban centres differed little from those of urban 
dwellers in the more populous south. 
It is too early yet to explain, and to assess in depth, the 
impact of the short Labor interregnum on the history of the 
Northern Territory, but it is evident that it was far-reaching, 
though perhaps not decisive on any particular issue. The 
mining industry generally abhorred the minerals and energy 
poUcy of Connor, and expressed reUef at his resignation in 
October 1975." However, it is doubtful that his poUcies had 
any fundamental effect upon Territory mining. The federal 
government's direct involvement in the uranium mining in-
dustry had been the legacy of legislation of an earUer Menzies 
248 At the Other End of Australia 
government, and by the mid seventies, the issues associated 
with the mining and use of uranium were so divisive, that no 
government was willing to make hasty decisions about the 
mining and export of uranium. It is not clear the extent to 
which the Labor government's decision to revalue the 
Australian doUar in December 1972 affected the mining and 
pastoral industries, but certainly this was less important than 
the world-wide collapse of copper prices and the several years 
of drought at this time. 
The Labor government took credit for initiatives that en-
sured a greater measure of self-government for Territorians, 
and an aUegedly "better deal" for Aborigines in the Territory. 
However, by the seventies, all major poUtical parties were 
united on these issues, and differed only on the timing and 
means whereby these might be advanced. The Aboriginal 
policy and administration underwent no evident change after 
the 1975 election, and the Liberal-Country Party government 
wasted no time in preparing the Territory for self-government. 
Indeed, given Territorians equality with their southern cousins 
in everything but poUtical self-determination by the mid seven-
ties, it is doubtful that any government in Canberra could 
have delayed for long the granting of self-government to Ter-
ritorians, even though, at this time, the proponents of self-
government belonged to only a politically-conscious minority. 
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Retrospect and Prospect 
Negotiations for the transfer of the Territory to the Com-
monwealth in 1911 had continued through several years, and 
in the face of numerous setbacks: it had been finally sealed, 
and arrangements made for the transfer with almost inor-
dinate haste. The Territory's receipt of limited self-
government foUowed a remarkably similar course. 
Lobbying on the part of vocal Territorians for self-
government had continued for several decades. However, in 
the years after the Liberal-Country Party return to power 
late in 1975, the process of devolution of power was pursued 
by the federal government with alacrity and single-
mindedness. This single-mindedness of the federal govern-
ment took all Territory lobbies by surprise.' They could do 
little other than accept the measures, and adjust to them as 
best they could. 
The timetable for self-government had been set by the Nor-
thern TerrUory (Administration) Act in 1976.^  On 11 May 
1978, in accordance with this timetable. Minister Adermann 
introduced into federal parUament the Northern Territory 
(Self-Government) Bill - before the negotiations between 
the parties had been concluded, and before the Com-
monwealth Grants Commission had completed its examina-
tion of the viability and impUcations of Territory self-
government.' Little more than three weeks before the date 
for self-government, the financial agreement between the 
federal and Territory governments had yet to be finalized. On 
7 June, Everingham confessed to the Legislative Assembly 
that it was doubtful that members would see a copy of the 
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financial agreement before 1 July:" in effect, he asked them 
to enter upon self-government with a tremendous act of faith 
in the goodwiU of the federal government. Within a week of 
self-government, the feverish negotiations broke down over 
the question of whether federal or Territory authorities 
would be responsible for supplying services to the Aboriginal 
settlements which were to remain the responsibility of the 
Commonwealth. For a time, there appeared to be the 
possibiUty that Everingham might reject the offer of self-
government.' Only a matter of days before the deadline, the 
issue was resolved.* However, if the question of self-
government was as important as generally claimed or believ-
ed, such an issue should not have been permitted to jeopar-
dize it, particularly so near the deadline. Indeed, the whole 
question was pursued with excessive haste which satisfied 
none but the federal government. 
Because of doubt about eventual self-government and the 
hasty arrangements which were made to celebrate its attain-
ment, it is not surprising that such an auspicious day should 
have been blemished by the minor problems described by the 
representative of the Age. 
The oval festivities started on time at 4.30 — but not without hitches. 
Speeches by Mr England, Mr Everingham, and the Minister for the 
Northern Territory, Mr Adermann were supposed to last 25 minutes: 
instead they went 12 minutes. 
The crowd then waited 13 minutes before three Fills flew overhead 
and officials awaited anxiously for the Derwent to position itself in the 
harbor for the 17-gun salute. Official guests killed time by leaving the 
dais and mingling with the crowd. 
Throughout the night there were lighting and audio equipment 
problems. 
The scheduled one-hour concert of bands and entertainers was cut 
midstream when organisers re-arranged the programme to allow a 
20-minute fire-works display to go ahead at the announced time of 7.30. 
Food supplies ran out at 7 p.m.' 
Still, despite the mishaps, the informality would have 
appealed to Territorians. 
The new dispensation was greeted confidently enough. The 
Territory government became responsible for a new range of 
state-type functions, with that for health and education to be 
added during the following twelve months: the Department 
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of the Northern Territory was to be formally abolished on 1 
October. The federal government was to retain responsibility 
for uranium mining and Aboriginal affairs - these promised 
to be contentious issues, and there were few complaints that 
responsibility for these was not to devolve to the Territory. 
Tourism was now the second biggest income earner for the 
Territory behind mining, and the future of these industries 
seemed assured. Furthermore, a generous financial commit-
ment by the Commonwealth for at least three years, muted 
the criticisms of those who feared that the Territory could not 
afford self-government and the increased taxes which it was 
feared would be required to support it. 
Indeed it seemed that Territorians had obtained an almost 
idyllic situation. Effectively, they had the trappings of 
statehood, without several of the most onerous and conten-
tious responsibilities which were the lot of the states at the 
time. By 1978, any campaign for full statehood for the Ter-
ritory had effectively stalled, largely because of the federal 
government push; though by this time, even Malcolm Eraser's 
1972 promise of statehood by 1980 had been revised to imply 
a Liberal-Country Party commitment to statehood some 
time in the future. The AustraUan Labor Party, indeed, had 
been ideologically opposed to statehood, and the Northern 
Territory Branch had run the 1977 election campaign with a 
fair degree of success with statehood as a prominent issue. 
Though the ALP cast the Country-Liberal Party as a cham-
pion of statehood, the CLP had spoken simply of responsible 
self-government as its aim for the Territory. The CLP was 
quite content with the achievements of 1978, and in no hurry to 
press for additional constitutional change. 
However, the issue of statehood for the Territory, while no 
longer a prominent issue, remains very much alive. Despite 
the hyperbole. Territory self-government remains at risk so 
long as it is simply enshrined in a piece of federal legislation 
and subject to the federal government of the day. In addi-
tion, the Commonwealth retains the right to disallow within 
six months, any legislation of the Northern Territory Legis-
lative Assembly; and the Northern Territory Supreme Court 
remains a federal Court. Unless the Northern Territory is 
granted statehood with its autonomy guaranteed by a con-
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stitution, any achievements of self-government remain 
fragile. 
However, the very manner in which the Territory might 
attain statehood poses so many problems that politicians are 
content to leave weU enough alone for the present. Several 
worthy commentators have discussed the constitutional 
options which are open for the continued constitutional 
development of the Territory, whether independently, or 
associated with other states or other regions.* The logic of 
developments to date suggests that the Territory, as now con-
stituted, would be raised to statehood. However, even this 
expedient raises a number of constitutional questions 
associated with Territory representation in the federal parlia-
ment and Loan CouncU meetings. Also, the AustraUan Con-
stitution is unclear on the manner in which the Territory — 
which was once part of one of the original states of the Com-
monwealth — might be raised to statehood.' Because of the 
constitutional complexities, it is little wonder that Territory 
and federal politicians have sidestepped the issue, and settled 
for the time-honoured policy of "letting sleeping dogs lie". 
However, the lesson of history suggests that the issue cannot 
be ignored indefinitely. 
If it is not possible to foresee the political future of the Ter-
ritory, so it is impossible to forecast the economic future. 
Modern developments in transport and communications 
technology have meant that the isolation of the Territory wiU 
never be the problem that it has been historically, and that 
new industries in the Territory wiU become economically 
viable. However, the record of spectacular faUures of Ter-
ritory economic enterprise make it foolish to suggest that the 
economic future of the Territory is assured. Furthermore, the 
same transport and communications developments which 
diminish the isolation of the Territory, mean that its economy 
is also more closely tied to the vicissitudes of the larger world 
economy. 
The critics of any whiggish interpretation of history 
disclaim the concept of political or economic development, 
and content themselves with describing and explaining 
change. The history of black/white relations in the Northern 
Territory during the years of Commonwealth control, have 
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witnessed numerous changes, but many would contend that 
there have also been many developments which have been 
embodied in laws and regulations. In many instances, the 
sentiments expressed in the laws have not yet become widely 
accepted and practised. Much yet remains to be done to 
satisfy the aspirations of blacks and whites in the Territory, 
and to eradicate prejudice and bigotry. There wiU yet be a 
great deal of argument and confrontation between pro-
ponents of different ideas, and also a great deal suffered by 
those over whom the antagonists argue. However, there can 
be no return to the situation which prevailed in the early part 
of the century. And while the future history of black/white 
relations in the Territory is also impossible to predict, it is 
hoped that it might continue to set the lead in the resolution 
of this AustraUa-wide problem. 
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Appendix 
MINISTERS IN CHARGE OF 
THE NORTHERN TERRITORY 1911-1978 
Minister 
E.L. Batchelor 
J. Thomas 
P.M. Glynn 
J.A. Arthur 
H. Mahon 
H. Mahon 
F.W. Bamford 
P.M. Glynn 
A. Poynton 
G.F. Pearce 
G.F. Pearce 
Sir T.W. Glasgow 
C.W. Marr 
Sir N.R. Howse 
C.L.A. Abbott 
C.L.A. Abbott 
A. Blakeley 
R.A. Parkhill 
R.A. Parkhill 
J.A. Perkins 
E.J. Harrison 
T. Paterson 
J. McEwen 
J. McEwen 
H.S. Foil 
From 
29. 4.1910 
14.10.1911 
24. 6.1913 
17. 9.1914 
14.12.1914 
27.10.1915 
14.11.1916 
17. 2.1917 
4. 2.1920 
21.12.1921 
9. 2.1923 
18. 6.1926 
2. 4.1927 
24. 2.1928 
29.11.1928 
10.12.1928 
22.10.1929 
6. 1.1932 
12. 4.1932 
13.10.1932 
12.10.1934 
9.11.1934 
29.11.1937 
7. 4.1939 
26. 4.1939 
To 
-I-8.10.I911 
24. 6.1913 
17. 9.1914 
Government 
Fisher (ALP) 
Fisher (ALP) 
Cook (Lib) 
H-9.12.1914 Fisher (ALP) 
27.10.1915 
14.11.1916 
17. 2.1917 
3. 2.1920 
21.12.1921 
9. 2.1923 
18. 6.1926 
2. 4.1927 
24. 2.1928 
29.11.1928 
10.12.1928 
22.10.1929 
6. 1.1932 
12. 4.1932 
13.10.1932 
12.10.1934 
9.11.1934 
29.11.1937 
7. 4.1939 
26. 4.1939 
29. 8.1941 
Fisher (ALP) 
Hughes (ALP) 
Hughes (Nat Lab) 
Hughes (Nat) 
Hughes (Nat) 
Hughes (Nat) 
Bruce/Page 
(Nat/CP) 
Bruce/Page 
(Nat/CP) 
Bruce/Page 
(Nat/CP) 
Bruce/Page 
(Nat/CP) 
Bruce/Page 
(Nat/CP) 
Bruce/Page 
(Nat/CP) 
ScuUin (ALP) 
Lyons (UAP/CP) 
Lyons (UAP/CP) 
Lyons (UAP/CP) 
Lyons (UAP/CP) 
Lyons (UAP/CP) 
Lyons (UAP/CP) 
Page (CP/UAP) 
Ministry 
EA 
EA 
EA 
EA 
EA 
EA 
H&T 
H&T 
H&T 
H&T 
H&T 
H&T 
H&T 
H&T 
H&T 
HA 
HA 
HA 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Menzies (UAP/CP) Int 
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Minister 
H.S. FoU 
J.S. CoUings 
J.S. CoUings 
H.V. Johnson 
P.A. McBride 
E.J. Harrison 
P.M. Hasluck 
C.E. Barnes 
C.E. Barnes 
C.E. Barnes 
C.E. Barnes 
P.J. Nixon 
R.J. Hunt 
R.J. Hunt 
L.H. Barnard 
K.E. Enderby 
From 
29. 8.1941 
7.10.1941 
6. 7.1945 
13. 7.1945 
19.12. 1949 
24.10.1950 
11. 5.1951 
18.12.1963 
26. 1.1966 
19.12.1967 
10. 1.1968 
28. 2.1968 
5. 2.1971 
10. 3.1971 
5.12.1972 
19.12.1972 
R.A. Patterson 9.10.1973 
R.A. Patterson 6. 6.1975 
P.J. Keating 
I.M. Sinclair 
21.10.1975 
12.11.1975 
A.E. Adermann 22.12.1975 
+ 
EA 
H&T 
HA 
Int 
Ter 
N.T. 
NA 
To 
7.10.1941 
6. 7.1945 
13. 7.1945 
19.12. 1949 
24.10.1950 
11. 5.1951 
18.12.1963 
26. 1.1966 
19.12.1967 
10. 1.1968 
28. 2.1968 
5. 2.1971 
10. 3.1971 
5.12.1972 
19.12.1972 
9.10.1973 
6. 6.1975 
21.10.1975 
11.11.1975 
22.12.1975 
30. 6.1978 
Died whilst in office 
External Affairs 
Home and Territories 
Home Affairs 
Interior 
Territories 
Northern Territory 
Northern Australia 
Government 
Fadden (CP/UAP) 
Curtin (ALP) 
Forde (ALP) 
Chifley (ALP) 
Menzies (L/CP) 
Menzies (L/CP) 
Menzies (L/CP) 
Menzies (L/CP) 
Holt (L/CP) 
McEwen (CP/L) 
Gorton (L/CP) 
Gorton (L/CP) 
Gorton (L/CP) 
McMahon (L/CP) 
Whitlam (ALP) 
Whitlam (ALP) 
Whitlam (ALP) 
Whitlam (ALP) 
Whitlam (ALP) 
Eraser (L/CP) 
Fraser (L/CP) 
Ministry 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Ter 
Ter 
Ter 
Ter 
Ter 
Int 
Int 
Int 
Int 
N.T. 
N.T. 
NA 
NA 
NA 
N.T. 
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